Philodemi Rhetorica (trans. Hubbell) OPTIMIZED

TRANSACTIONS OF
THE CONNECTICUT ACADEMY
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES

VOLUME 23] SEPTEMBER 1920 [PAGES 243-382

THE

Rhetorica of Philodemus

TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY
BY

HARRY M. HUBBELL, Ph.D.

Assistant Professor of Greek and Latin in Yale University.

NEW HAVEN, CONNECTICUT
PUBLISHED BY THE
CONNECTICUT ACADEMY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
AND TO BE OBTAINED ALSO FROM THE

YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

PREFACE.

This work is intended to be a systematic presentation of the
rhetorical fragments of Philodemus, with an interpretation of
the more important passages, in the hope that they may be made
more accessible to the general reader than they have heretofore
been. On many points of interpretation the author's judgment
has changed repeatedly in the course of the work, and he is far
from positive that the correct rendering has in all cases been
attained. But in the present condition of the text perfection is
an unattainable ideal, and some slight gain in accuracy would
hardly justify a greater expenditure of time. It would perhaps
be more exact to call it a paraphrase than a translation. While
it has been possible in general to translate almost literally, there
are many passages where the papyrus is so fragmentary that
nothing more than an approximation is possible, and the gaps
must in some cases be filled entirely by conjecture. Moreover
at times it has seemed best to condense some of the more prolix
paragraphs. It is hoped that this will in no way hinder the
student who is seeking an introduction to Philodemus.

The author is profoundly grateful to his colleagues and friends,
Professor G. L. Hendrickson and Dr. E. W. Nichols, who very
generously read the translation in manuscript, and offered
valuable criticism.

THE RHETORICA OF PHILODEMUS.

Introduction.

The excavations at Herculaneum in the eighteenth century,
so rich in results for the student of classical archaeology, pro-
duced another treasure which aroused the greatest interest in the
learned world, and seemed for a time likely to overshadow in
its importance the additions which these excavations made to
our knowledge of ancient sculpture. In one of the villas were
found many charred papyrus rolls. At first they were not recog-
nized as such, and many were destroyed before the discovery
was made that they were the remains of a very extensive private
library. Even then the task was hardly begun, for it was found
impossible at that time to unroll the papyri ; many were cut apart
and sadly mutilated before a successful method was devised.
Thereafter the work of unrolling and deciphering them was
undertaken, and has continued, though with very serious inter-
ruptions, to the present time. Two series of Herculanensia Volu-
mina totaling twenty-one volumes were published in Naples, and
a third series is now planned, of which the first volume has
already appeared. 1 In addition to these editions copies of many
of the rolls were made under the direction of English scholars
early in the last century. These copies are preserved at Oxford;
some have been published. 2 These do not exhaust the Hercula-
nean discoveries, but are fairly representative of the whole mass
of papyri.

The expectations aroused in the scholarly world by the dis-
covery of these papyri have been realized only to a small degree.
For instead of finding the lost works of some master of Greek
literature, it was seen that the library was composed of philo-
sophical works, almost entirely of the Epicurean school; nor
were the volumes written by the greatest of the Epicureans, but

1 Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt XI Tom. Naples, 1793-1855.
Vol. VII did not appear. Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt
collectio altera, XI Tom. Naples, 1862-1876. Herculanensium Voluminum
quae supersunt collectio tertia, Tom. I, Milan, 1914.

2 Herculanensium Voluminum Ps. I, II, Oxford, 1824, 1825; W. Scott,
.Fragmenta Herculanensia, Oxford, 1885:

24S

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

mainly by Philodemus, at best an authority of the second rank.
In fact it has been acutely conjectured by Comparetti 3 because
several copies were found of the same works of Philodemus that
this was Philodemus' own library, and by another ingenious bit
of reasoning Comparetti concludes that the villa in which the
library was found belonged to the Piso family. We know that
Philodemus was for many years a member of the household of
L. Calpurnius Piso cos. 58 B. C, and it may well be that at his
decease his library passed into the possession of the Pisos.*

It is to his connection with Piso that we owe most of our
knowledge of Philodemus. He was a native of Gadara, had
studied with the Epicurean Zeno at Athens, had been expelled
from Himera, for what cause we do not know, 5 and settled at
Rome where he became the client of Piso. From this point our
knowledge of him is derived from Cicero. In the attack on
Piso Cicero mentions an Epicurean who lived on terms of inti-
macy with Piso, and describes in no complimentary terms his
activities in commemorating the grosser side of the revels in the
Pisonian circle. Cicero mentions no name, but Asconius iden-

3 La villa cle' Pisoni e la sua biblioteca in Pompei e la regione sotterrata
di Vesuvio nell' anno LXXIX (Naples, 1879) p. 159 ff. also in Comparetti
e de Petra, La villa Ercolanese dei Pisoni, Turin, 1S83.

4 Certainty cannot be obtained, and Mommsen (Archae. Zeit., XXXVIII
(1880), p. 32) has argued strongly that the villa cannot have belonged to
Piso. Comparetti replied in La Bibliotheque de Philodeme, in Melanges
Chatelain, 1910, p. 118 ff.

* Evidence of his expulsion is given in a fragment of Aelian quoted by
Suidas s. v. TifiCipTai. Another notice (s. v. <rvKotpa.pTeii> and i^c/)cua) may
also be from Aelian and is commonly printed with the other notice in
editions of Aelian, e. g. fr. 40 Hercher. If it refers to Philodemus, it
appears that epidemics and famines at Himera were supposed to have
been caused by his contemptuous remarks about the gods ; his expulsion
followed.

"In Pisonem 28, 68; Dicet aliquis : unde haec tibi nota sunt? Non
mehercules contumeliae causa describam quemquam, praesertim ingenio-
sum hominem atque eruditum, cui generi esse ego iratus, ne si cupiam
quidem, possum. Est quidam Graecus qui cum isto vivit, homo, ut vere
dicam-sic enim cognovi-humanus, sed tamdiu, quam diu cum aliis est aut
ipse secum. Is cum istum adolescentem iam turn hac dis irata fronte
vidisset, non fastidivit eius amicitiam, cum esset praesertim appetitus :
dedit se in consuetudinem, sic ut prorsus una viveret nec fere unquam ab
eo discederet. Non apud indoctos, sed, ut arbitror in hominum eruditis-

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

249

tifies the object of the attack as Philodemus, and there is no
reason to doubt his statement. 7 Much of Cicero's abuse of
Philodemus is undoubtedly due to the heat of the invective
against Piso, and should be correspondingly discounted, but the
basis of fact is probably only too true, for Philodemus has borne
testimony against himself in the scabrous epigrams preserved
in the Anthology. It is noticeable, too, that Cicero qualifies his

simorum et humanissimorum coetu loquor. Audistis profecto dici philo-
sophos Epicureos omnis res, quae sint homini expetendae, voluptate metiri.
Recte an secus, nihil ad nos, aut, si ad nos, nihil ad hoc tempus : sed
tatnen lubricum genus orationis adolescenti non acriter intelligenti est
saepe praeceps. 60. Itaque admissarius iste, simul atque audivit volupta-
tem a philosopho tanto opere laudari, nihil expiscatus est r sic suos sensus
voluptarios omnis incitavit, sic ad illius hanc orationem adhinnivit, ut non
magistrum virtutis, sed auctorem libidinis a se ilium inventum arbitraretur.
Graecus primo distinguere et dividere ilia, quern ad modum dicerentur :
iste claudus, quern ad modum aiunt, pilam : retinere quod acceperat, testi-
ficari, tabellas obsignare velle, Epicurum desertum dicere; etenim dicit,
ut opinor, se nullum bonum intelligere posse demptis corporis voluptatibus.
70. Quid multa? Graecus facilis et valde venustus nimis pugnax contra
imperatorem populi Romani esse noluit. Est autem hie, de quo loquor,
non philosophia solum, sed etiam ceteris studiis, quae fere ceteros Epi-
cureos negligere dicunt perpolitus. Poema porro facit ita festivum, ita
concinnum, ita elegans, nihil ut fieri possit argutius. In quo reprehendat
eum licet si qui volet, modo leviter, non ut improbum, non ut audacem,
non ut impurum, sed ut Graeculum, ut assentatorem, ut poetam. Devenit
autem seu potius incidit in istum eodem deceptus supercilio Graecus atque
advena, quo tot sapientes et tanta civitas. Revocare se non poterat famili-
aritate implicatus, et simul inconstantiae famam verebatur. Rogatus,
invitatus, coactus ita multa ad istum de isto quoque scripsit, ut omnes
Hbidines, omnia stupra, omnia cenarum conviviorumque genera, adulteria
denique eius delicatissimis versibus expresserit. 71. In quibus si qui velit
possit istius tamquam in speculo vitam intueri : ex quibus multa a multis
lecta et audita recitarem, ni vererer ne hoc ipsum genus orationis, quo
nunc utor, ab huius loci more abhorreret: et simul de ipso, qui scripsit
detrahi nihil jlo. Qui si fuisset in discipulo comparando meliore for-
tuna, fortasse austerior et gravior esse potuisset : sed eum casus in hanc
consuetudinem scribendi induxit, philosopho valde indignam : si quidem
philosophia, ut fertur, virtutis continet et offici et bene vivendi disciplinam :
quam qui profitetur, gravissimam sustinere mihi personam videtur. 72.
Sed idem casus ilium ignarum quid profitetur, cum se philosophum esse
diceret, istius impurissimae atque intemperatissimae pecudis caeno et
sordibus inquinavit.

'Vol. V pt. 2, p. 16, Orelli; Philodemum significat, qui fuit Epicureus
ilia aetate nobilissimus, cuius et poemata sunt lascivia.

!

250

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

condemnation of Philodemus; he grants that he is humanus as
long as he remains in proper society. He has a breadth of cul-
ture far surpassing that of the average Epicurean, and his poetry-
has the charm and polish of the best society verse. However
his too easy good nature has brought him into the meshes of
Piso's net, from which he is unable to extricate himself. These
qualifying phrases agree with the other notice in Cicero 8 which
may be taken as showing more nearly than the harsh words of
the In Pisonem his real attitude toward Philodemus.

I have mentioned that Philodemus was a disciple of Zeno.
This connection is of prime importance ill estimating Philode-
mus' position in the Epicurean sect, and in the contemporary
world of letters, and necessitates a brief consideration of Zeno.
Here again, we rely for our information largely upon Cicero.
When the latter was a student at Athens in 79/8 he was advised
by Philo to study Epicureanism under Zeno. He was probably
at this time head of the school, though the fact cannot be estab-
lished beyond a doubt. 10 At any rate he was the ablest exponent
of the Epicurean doctrine, and Cicero records that his style
distinguished him from the other representatives of his sect.
Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo ut tu, distincte, gra-
viter, ornate. De Nat. Deor. I, 21, 59. We derive further
information about his style from the notice in Diog. Laert. VII,
1, 35. Diogenes is enumerating the different philosophers by
the name of Zeno, with a line of description for each ; of our

Zeno lie says, oyimn -iXotoos to yeVos, <£i\ocro<£o? ' EmKovptios rati
vorjaai koI £pfir)vtv<rai cratprjq. Evidently his style was striking,
otherwise we should not have two independent notices de-
voted so markedly to it ; this characteristic is all the more
remarkable because the Epicureans affected indifference to man-
ner of presentation. Now we have seen that Philodemus

8 De Fin. II, 35, 119; Quae cum dixissem, Habeo, inquit Torquatus, ad
quos ista referam, et, quamquam aliquid ipse poteram, tamen invenire
malo paratiores. Familiares nostras, credo, Sironem dicis et Philodemum,
cum optimos viros, turn homines doctissitnos.

3 W. Cronert in an article published in the Jahreshefte d. ost. archae.
Inst., vol. X (1907), pp. 145-153, entitled Die Epicureer in Syrien, thinks
that he has discovered in Pap. ined. 986, fr. 19 mention of the enmity
between Philodemus and Cicero.

10 See the discussion in Zeller III, 1 (3rd ed.), p. 373, n. 2.

The Rhetorka of Philodemus.

was poet to the Piso family, and his reputation in Rome
rested fully as much on his poetry as on his philosophy.
And we shall find in the second book of his Ilepi pVoptxi}? that a
strife had arisen among the Epicureans which perhaps was not
serious enough to be called a schism, but at least gave rise to
several controversial pamphlets, and much truly Epicurean bil-
lingsgate. In this quarrel Zeno and Philodemus supported the
thesis that a certain kind of rhetoric, to which they applied the
adjective "sophistic," was an art, and this was disputed as heresy
by the opposing party. The Epicureans as a whole rejected all
rhetoric as useless ; Zeno and Philodemus held that the epideictic
branch of rhetoric was a proper subject for study because that
alone could be reduced to rule, whereas the parts involving per-
suasion depended on the speaker's ability to catch the popular
favor. The rhetorical works of Philodemus are an exposition of
this doctrine. Thus the fragments which we have are the remains
of a distinct literary movement in the Epicurean sect, and should
be regarded as a literary pronunciamento. The interesting point
of connection here is that Zeno whom Cicero lauds a stylist was
the champion o. mis new view which accepted that part of
rhetoric which above all others was primarily concerned with
style rather than with thought.

Philodemus' importance as a man of letters in Rome is shown
again by his relation to the Augustan group, Horace, Vergil,
Varius, Quintilius. That these poets were at one time strongly
influenced by the Epicurean philosophy is too well known to
need mention. But it is only recently that any close connection
between this group and Philodemus has been shown. To be
sure there was the allusion to Philodemus at the end of the
second satire of the first book, but this did not prove anything
more than that Horace was acquainted with Philodemus' epi-
grams. But Korte has discovered amid the almost undecipherable
fragments of Jlepl KoXaxttas the names Oiapie, KoiWAie, OifepyiAie,
'Opajne, showing with great probability that Philodemus was
acquainted with the Augustan group. 11 Still more recently Hen-
drickson has traced the influence of the technique of an epigram
of Philodemus on Horace Car. f, 38. 12 It may therefore be set

11 Augusteer bei Philodem, Rhein. Mus. XLV (1890), pp. 172-177.

12 An Epigram of Philodemus and two Latin Congeners. Amer. Journ.
Phil. XXXIX (1918) pp. 27-43.

252

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

down with a reasonable degree of certainty that Philodemus
was a prominent figure in the literary circles of Rome of the
late republic and early empire ; that his interest in polite letters
distinguished him as it had his master Zeno from the rest of the
Epicureans, and that his interest in literature is reflected in the
doctrines of the Rhetorica.

The latter works have attracted less attention than they de-
serve. The philosophical works were naturally the first to be
attacked in the hope of supplementing our scanty knowledge of
Epicurean doctrines. But little that was satisfactory was done
on the Rhetorica until Sudhaus' edition. 13 In this he collected
all the fragments of the Rhetorica, using the Oxford and Nea-
politan copies, and supplementing these with his own examina-
tion of the papyri. His results were little short of astounding,
when the nature of his material is taken into consideration,,
though unfortunately for the general reader or even for the
specialist in this field they are almost nullified by glaring faults
in arrangement and presentation. He has clearly established the
existence of two works, a 'Yit-o/w^citikw in one book, and Tle.pl
prp-opiKrjs in seven. The relationship between these works is as
follows : The Hypomnematicon is the precursor of the Ilepi
prjTopiKijs. It was intended for private circulation, to propound
to his own immediate associates at Rome his peculiar views on
rhetoric, at that time a subject of lively interest and active debate
in the Graeco-Roman world. These views were not original
with Philodemus; he had derived them from his master, Zeno,
and their source may be still higher in the Epicurean school.
But Zeno was known to Roman audiences mainly through the
intermediary of Romans who like Cicero had attended his lec-
tures at Athens, and Philodemus may have found that his doc-
trines had the appearance of novelty at Rome. The pamphlet
circulated anonymously, though we must suppose that the author-
ship was an open secret, at least in Rome. By accident the book
fell into the hands of an Epicurean of Rhodes, who scented

13 Spengel published the fourth book in 1837, an admirable piece of work
considering the scanty nature of his materials. Gros published the
■Rhetorica from the Oxford copies with Latin translation and commentary
in 1840.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

253

heresy, and recognizing the views as peculiar to Zeno, assumed
that he was the author, and published a reply. This attack led
Philodemus to return to the subject of rhetoric with a reply to
his critic, and a restatement of his views now expanded to the
seven books On Rhetoric. Naturally, then, the two works cover
much of the same ground, and seem to have followed the same
general plan. The Hypomnematicon contained criticisms of the
arguments for and gainst rhetoric, such as we find at length
in the second book riepl p V to P ik^, and again in the seventh book.
From this section we have a considerable group of quotations
from Diogenes of Babylon who appears also in the seventh book.
We have also small fragments of the criticism of Nausiphanes
and the Peripatetics, which forms the bulk of our fragments
of the sixth book. There was also a discussion of the nature
of "art," parallel to that of book I. But most important of all
we have in col. XXXIX ft", a full statement of the contents of
the constructive part of the work with Philodemus' definition of
rhetoric. 14

The n«/ai prjTopiKiji may be briefly outlined as follows :
Book I General introduction. Nature of "art."

Book II Is rhetoric an art? Criticism of arguments for and against.

Philodemus' view that sophistic i. e. epideixis is an art,
but all other varieties of rhetoric, as well as politics, are not.

Book III The sophistical school does not produce statesmen ; in fact the
sophistical training is often harmful.

Book IV Criticism in detail of the claims of rhetoric, apparently as
given in some manual. Philodemus denies the ability of
the sophistical schools to teach a beautiful style ; complains
of their faulty treatment of metaphors; denies the claim of
the sophists to universal knowledge, and their assumption of
moral superiority.

Book V Detailed discussion of the disadvantages of rhetoric, with a

comparison of the wretched life of the rhetor with the

happy life of the philosopher.
Book VI Attacks on philosophical schools which advocated the study

of rhetoric. The surviving fragments deal with Aristotle

and Nausiphanes.

Book VII Criticism of the Stoic attitude toward rhetoric. Further criti-
cism of Aristotle. Comparison of rhetoric and philosophy.

"In this paragraph we have followed in the main the conclusion stated
by Sudhaus in the note on p. 44 of his Supplementum.

*S4

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

it will be seen that the work assumes a twofold character.
On the one hand it is a discussion of the moral and educational
value of rhetoric, and is a counterpart of the encomia of rhetoric
prefixed to manuals such as we find in the Rhetores Graeci. On
the other hand it is a discussion of a minor point in Epicurean
philosophy, an attempt to interpret the Epicurean creed to meet
the changed conditions of the time. The latter side was the im-
mediate occasion for the work, and the one into which Philo-
demus throws his whole soul. But by the perversity of history
it is his criticism of other works on rhetoric which is of most
interest to us. For in the hazy condition of our knowledge of
the development of rhetoric subsequent to Aristotle, and of the
educational conflict between the rhetoricians and the philoso-
phers, any additional facts assume an importance quite out of
proportion to their original value. Nausiphanes, Alexinus, Diog-
enes of Babylon, these are names which Philodemus has made
more than mere names. One who wishes to see how far Philo-
demus is of service to the history of literature should carefully
study Philodemus in connection with the first chapter of von
Arnim's Dio von Prusa, and note how much of our still meager
history of the period depends on Philodemus.

If the most valuable portions of the Rhetorica are the quota-
tions from earlier authors, the unique part is his definition of
"sophistic rhetoric." His discussion of the value of rhetoric and
its place in the educational system is concerned first with the
definition of "Art." After a lengthy refutation of the views
of others he presents his own definition, which he claims is sanc-
tioned by usage, and not formed, as those of his opponent have
been, for the purpose of proving the doctrines of some school.
An art, he tells us, is a habit of action resulting from the obser-
vation of certain fundamental principles which apply to the
majority of cases. The art produces a result that is beyond the
power of those who have not studied it. Moreover, it produces
this result regularly and surely, and not at random. 15

On the basis of this definition he examines the claims of
rhetoric, and makes a threefold division. These three divisions,
he says, are not the ordinary divisions, TravrjyvpiKov, tto\ltlkov, Simv-
ikov, but ao^iuTLK^ prjTopiKrj, generally called by him simply o-o^i-

I, 69, 2 = Suppl. 35, 1.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus. 2 55

ortiei (^ropaii in the strict sense including forensic and delibera-
tive oratory, and -koXltlk^ or political science. 18 Of these three
only To^LariKri is used in a technical sense, which apparently
originated with the Epicureans, and is restricted to the study
of the principles of composition, with special reference to epi-
deictic oratory. It is placed on a level with poetics and might
be called the art of prose writing. I, 122, 29 = Suppl. 61, 12 . . .

o'ia.% aiToi voumvrai, Koi ras T&v \6ymv &a0«ras, oL'cuv airol ypd<pw<rCv

T£ Koi <rxAdt,OV<TLV. *Cl/KV TOLVVV TO piQohlKOV QuV avT^V, OV TroXh Si

xaOdnep ovUi tt]V nOL^TlKrjv.

To the other two branches, p-qropiKi) in the narrow sense and
mXiruci,, he denies the position of an art. They lack the essential
characteristic, namely a definite set of principles which can be
imparted from teacher to pupil. Quite the contrary, ability in
oratory and politics is the result of practice and experience.
The successful public speaker may be compared to a good mer-
chant, a hunter, or even a successful thief." All succeed, how-
ever, as a result of their own skill based on experience, and their
occupations cannot be called arts in the sense in which we speak
of music as an art.

Similarly aotpurTrjs means an epideictic orator, and by a natural
enlargement of its semantic area, a teacher of epideictic oratory;
and o-o^to-rewiv means to teach or practice epideictic. This mean-
ing of "sophist" is quite different from that current down to
the fourth century. The development of meaning has been
worked out by Brandstatter, 18 and need not be repeated here
except so far as it affects our immediate discussion. Brand-
statter infers from the fragments of Philodemus that Epicurus
was the first to use "sophist" and related words in this sense,
and that it became a part of the technical vocabulary of the
school in the writings of Hermarchus and Metrodorus. But
an examination of the passages on which he based his conclusion
(I, 78, 2-19; 78, 19-85, 19; 85, 27-89, 10; 120, 10; 120, 22)
will show that Philodemus nowhere quotes from Epicurus an
example of the use of the word. The passages are in some

10 II, 245, 6-
" I, 74, 13.

18 Leipziger Studien, 1894.

256

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

parts hopelessly corrupt, but the general sense is clear enough.
It seems that Epicurus recognized epideictic oratory as an
art, and made the distinction between this and practical oratory
which Philodemus makes. That he applied the term "sophistic"
to epideictic oratory cannot be proved from Philodemus. The
latter is arguing against an unnamed opponent who claimed to be
unable to find in Epicurus a statement that sophistic was an art.
But the mere fact that Philodemus is compelled to argue that
Epicurus meant this, instead of quoting a short sentence that
would settle the question definitely, seems to point to the con-
clusion that the statement was not to be found in Epicurus
except by implication. As to Metrodorus the case is simpler,
for we know the title Xlpbs rois o-oqWas, 19 in which sophist prob-
ably had the meaning which it bears in Philodemus. We might
conjecture that this work was the first in which the word was
regular!}' used in the technical sense. The question is doubtful,
however, for there is the possibility that o-ocpto-^ was used in a
different sense. Diogenes Laertius (x, 26) concludes his list of
Epicureans with the words, Z-qvw ff 6 SiScmos anpoarm ' 'AnoXXoUpov,

iroXvypdcpos avrjp- K al A^rptos 6 imKXrjOiU AaKwv, Aioye'i^s 6' 6 Tapcrevs
o Tas eViA«KTOvs a^dAus <rvyypdi//us, *ai 'f2piW kgu aAAoi oh oi yvr)o~m
'EmKovpaoi o-o<t>L<TTa<; airoKaXovo-ii'.

The difficulty arises first in regard to the antecedent of ovs.
Is it aXXoi or Demetrius, Diogenes, Orion and others? It is
tempting to reason thus : Zeno invented this meaning of o-o^io-rmij
and O-O0UJ-T17S,- he with the others mentioned with him, and Philo-
demus formed a distinct group of Epicureans noted for their
contention that sophistic was an art, and called sophists in deri-
sion by orthodox Epicureans. But two objections arise to this
interpretation; Zeno was probably head of the school; if so he
was presumably orthodox. In the second place it is probable
that this list in Diogenes comes from Philodemus' <rwra& s tw
4>i\oo-6<t><j>v. If that is so the last clause obt — AmuaxXownv cannot
refer to Zeno, for Philodemus would not reproach his master
with heterodoxy. Consequently the identity of those called soph-
ists remains doubtful, and there is always the possibility that
the word may have had two different applications in the Epi-
curean school, and that Metrodorus used one and Zeno the other.

Diog. Laert. X, 24.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

257

But in the absence of definite proof it is perhaps safe to say
that Zeno used the word in the same general sense as Metro-
dorus, but with greater precision. 20

This peculiar use of o-ofrvrr/s and the theory of the artistic
nature of o-o<£iotik>7 colors the whole of Philodemus' argument,
and should be kept in mind in reading the following pages. It
may not be amiss to discuss at this point some other words which
are used in peculiar senses by Philodemus, and which require
some comment if the translation is not to be misunderstood.
T£X"i? is (i) an art, craft or profession, or (2) the formal state-
ment of the principles of the same, i. e., a manual or handbook.
The English would undoubtedly be better if I had varied my
translation between craft and profession, but where so much of
the argument depends on the meaning of this one word I have
thought it best to have a uniform translation at the cost of a
certain artificiality of expression. It was almost imperative,
also, to use a word which would permit of a derivative denoting
agent, for rexyirrp is used constantly of one who has mastered a
rixyv- "Art" and "Artist" give the necessary pair in English,
and if it is borne in mind that in this work "art" means any
activity or occupation which is reducible to rule, and "artist"
anyone who pursues such an occupation, no confusion will
result. 21 The opposite of rexyinp is Sxexyos which I have rendered

See the discussion in Korte, Metrodori Epicurei Fragmenta, Jahrb. f.
cl. Phil. Suppl. XVII (1890), p. 552 «.

21 The history of re X ''V and 'art' and their derivatives affords interesting
parallels. 'Art' in its largest meaning in English has nearly as extensive
a semantic area as re X "v in Greek; "profession" which is included under
rixn is not wholly included under art in English ; e. g. medicine is either
an art or a profession, but the ministry is not an art. Artist and rexylr-qs,
theoretically equivalent, have both undergone a narrowing process;
Te X vlTr,$ came to mean an actor, while artist suggests primarily a painter.
Both became terms of compliment, and both were extended to cover fields
of activity which caused the more respectable artists to blush at the
misuse of the word. A passage from R. G. White, Words and their Uses,
forms an interesting parallel to some words of Philodemus, "Artist has
been beaten out so thin that it covers almost the whole field of human
endeavor ... A cook is an artist; so is a barber; and Goldsmith
soberly calls a cobbler an artist." Philodemus I, 59, 19 — Suppl. 30, 7
TA $' Ik irapaTijpriJews ml rims icrropks o-vvri<rirrip.4va. Wx"« V o-unjfleia t&v 'BXXi)«d»
06 ram ti irpoo-ayopeiei Kara, rbv KipLOV rptrwov 6XK tdTiv St€ Kwraxpuiltril, KaOdwep
ivloTe ml rois h rats 6aiip.aaLV cvrrbnvs rex^ras KaKel Kal to 5e{<ws (6\a <rx<<roi ml

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

by "layman." As the opposition is almost always between the
trained speaker or lawyer, and one not so trained, this use of the
word will be natural enough to English readers. "EirivTijix-q is
used at times in the same sense as Tl X vq. At other times there is
the usual distinction between art and science, a distinction which
is emphasized by the use of adjectives; re'xvr/ oroxaoriio? is op-
posed to eTria-Trj/xi] jrayios or itTTrjKvia. I do not recall seeing Tt\vr)
7rayios.

'P-qTiap and its derivatives form another group that is puzzling
to the translator. The start can be made with for which

the time-honored translation "rhetoric" must almost necessarily
be used. But pyrtap causes trouble. As used by Philodemus it
shifts from orator to teacher of rhetoric, though for the latter
he sometimes uses prrropucos, and one's first impulse is to vary
the translation to suit the shift in meaning. But a twofold
objection arises: the word "orator" does not cover the same
semantic area as pvrwp, even if we exclude from the latter word
the meaning "professional teacher of speaking." With us
"orator" means either a person chosen to speak on a definite
occasion as in the phrase "orator of the day" in which case it is
equivalent to speaker, or a person gifted in speech, as "he was
a natural orator." There is nothing in either case to indicate
that speaking is the man's habitual, occupation. The Greek
gropes, however, formed a distinct profession; it covered the
field which to-day forms part of the fields of the lawyer, the
preacher, the statesman and the public lecturer. Manifestly
"orator" fails to cover the semantic area of prjriop. A second
reason is that in Philodemus there is a constant play between
pijrtop and p-rrropiKi] 22 which depends for its point entirely on
etymology, and this is lost if we translate by "orator" and "rhe-
toric." I have therefore translated p-qrap throughout as "rhetor,"
preferring the awkwardness of using a word hardly acclimated in
English to the loss of the point of many of Philodemus' sentences.
P V to P ik6s I render by "rhetorician" in the sense of teacher of
rhetoric.

(rwBcimi KO.X ivegpewai Tiva iroVT)pQs rexvacbv \4yeL Kal ri X vas ras ir Tats Kio/UfSlttts
Kal ttS.ii to Totlrois irapa7r\-r]awv. Kal fij^ tQ Kal irapaTT]py)aiv Kal ILcKriciv t^ X "V
irpoaayopeveiv ra TfXeicTa tuv it> rtf fill? Wx«" Tt-poauyopeiovTes oin hv ipe6.voip.ev.

"See II, 2is. col. XI for a case of the double meaning of Mrrup which
is easily lost in translation.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

259

ttoXitikij and ttoXitiko*; should strictly speaking be rendered so
as to keep the etymological connection, e. g. "politics" or
"political science" and "politician." However as ttoAitikos has
none of the opprobrium which sometimes attaches to politician
in English, I have rendered it by "statesman." There is not in
the case of this pair the reason for keeping the etymological con-
nection plain which we have noticed in the case of prJ-rcup-pi/i-opiKos.

The date of the Rhetorica cannot be determined with exact-
ness. It was written in the lifetime of Zeno, if we may be allowed
to interpret strictly the present tenses of the paragraph referring

to him; Suppl. p. 44 ff . ; p. 45, 1. I : o nap' r/fiuiv e<rnv Zr/vuiv,
p. 48, 1. 13: T« 6 €Kth' di/aypai/zas £<jtlv ; Ov Zyjvwv ye- Zeno's dates
cannot be determined exactly ; he was born as early as 1 50, was
teaching and apparently head of the school in Athens in 79/8, and
was succeeded by Phaedrus shortly thereafter, if Phaedrus was
succeeded by Patro in 70/69. 23 If we place Zeno's death at 75
we should have the inferior limit for the Rhetorica. One other
point may be taken into consideration; the Tltpl prrropiKr}<; was
addressed to a certain young Gaius (£ Td'U ttoi, I, 223, 5). This
would suggest that Philodemus was at Rome, acting as tutor in
some Roman family. The beginning of Philodemus' Roman
sojourn may lie approximated as follows: he met J'iso when the
latter was adolescens. 2 * If we place the limit of adolescentia at
30, the acquaintance must have begun before 71, as Piso was
born at least as early as 101. That would make it possible for
Philodemus to have been in Rome in the seventies, and so to
have addressed the Rhetorica to his pupil Gaius before the death
of Zeno in (circ.) 75- 25

It is almost paradoxical to pass judgment on the style of an
author from whom we have scarcely a single sentence that has
remained entire. Much of the obscurity is undoubtedly due to

21 We really are not certain about the date of the succession of Patro.
Phaedrus was contemporary with Zeno and probably did not long survive
him. The only certainty is that Patro became head of the school before
51 B. C, v. Cic. Ad Fam. XIII, 1. For a fuller discussion of the dates v.
Zeller III, 1 (3rd ed.), pp. 373-5, Susemihl II, p. 261 ff.

" Cic. In Pis. 28, 68.

20 Comparetti on slightly different grounds arrives at a conclusion
regarding the limits of Philodemus' literary activity which admits of the
date given above for the publication of the Rhetorica. v. La Biblio-
theque de Philodeme, Melanges Chatelain, p. 128.

260

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

unskillful emendation, and many of the half sentences would
be plain enough if we only knew how the sentence began. Any-
one who will take the pains to study the articles in which Sudhaus
first published his reconstructions, and notice the steps by which
the difficulties were cleared away year after year will appreciate
the fact that it is dangerous to dogmatize about Philodemus'
obscurity, for a single brilliant discovery may affect the inter-
pretation of a whole book. For example, after Sudhaus had
published his first volume, he discovered that Papyri 1015 and
832 were the upper and lower parts respectively of the same
papyrus. The result was the complete reconstruction of the
sixth book in his second volume, and a brilliant contribution to
the history of rhetoric by von Arnim. But allowing for the
difficulties arising from the fragmentary condition of the papyrus,
many others still remain. Chief among these is the philosophic
jargon of the Epicurean school, and the habit, also due to
philosophy, of preferring abstract to concrete, and the impersonal
to the personal. There is a dreary wordiness and prolixity which
is so often characteristic of both philosopher and rhetorician in the
period of decline. Characteristic, too, of the period is the hair-
splitting, the page after page devoted to quibbles over the meaning
of "art," "rhetoric," "sophistic," and the dozen other trifles with
which the scholastic age of Greek literature amused itself.
Philodemus' interest in expression did not carry him into the
refinements of Atticism ; his Greek is the typical literary Koine
of the day, and he distinctly deprecates any attempt at imitation
of the ancients and the cultivation of a special or artificial dic-
tion. 20 His theory of style is that there is no style except the
ordinary language of every day intercourse. 21 A clear use of
this provides a better means of expression than is offered by
all the schools of rhetoric. Thus while renouncing all theories
of style he commits himself to a very far-reaching theory. Free-
dom from the frills of rhetoric he certainly attained ; one could
wish that we might say as much of the clarity of his style. From
the smooth, flowing style of the epigrams we might expect a
similar ease and sharpness of definition in the Rhetorica. It
is however wholly lacking even in the portions which are nearest

20 I, 151, 6 : "E7retTa el [xcv fiySt eh (frntriKuis KaXos X670S, t'crws &i> TjV amytcaiov
dycnrav rbii /card Wjua • rvv de inrapxorros, &6\iov to TrapUvras avrbv iir inupov
Ka.ra.vra.v.

27 1, 153, col. X.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

261

to a state of complete preservation. It is an interesting com-
mentary on the artificiality of the epigram that a second-rate
writer like Philodemus can attain comparative success in it while
failing to write a readable prose style. Philodemus' mastery of
the epigrammatic style is purely formal ; nowhere does he show
any great originality of thought ; but his style is uniformly lucid
and pleasing. In his prose, partly as a result of his theory of
style, partly as a consequence of his rambling method of thought,
he never attained such a degree of excellence. Even after
making due allowance for the obscurity caused by imperfect
restoration, it is hardly possible that he will ever be found to
deserve the characterization of his master, kcI vrftrai k<u ipp-qvevvai
tra <£?js.

The translation follows closely the edition of Sudhaus in three
volumes ; Philodemi Volumina rhetorica edidit Dr. Siegfried Sud-
haus. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner 1892, vol. II, 1896, Supplemental!,
1895. As the fragments are presented in some confusion by
Sudhaus, I have appended a schematic arrangement of the
contents according to the divisions of Philodemus' work.

Philodemus Sudhaus Hubbcll

Book I I, i-i2 = Suppl. 3-8 21,5-267

Book II I, 13-18 *7-*>3

ip-123 = Suppl. 11-61

123-136

136- 137 = Suppl. 61-62

137- 146

II,

65-130

Book III

v.

Sudhaus'

Intro. P. XXXVI

293

Book IV

I,

147-225

293-3<>5

Book V

n,

131-167

305-318

1,

225-270

Book VI

1,

270-289

318-332

1,

289-325 ;

revised in II, 1-64

Book VII

1,

325-385

332-341

Frag! Incerta

n,

168-195

341-346

Hypomnematicon

11,

196-303

346-364

Corresponding pages in the Sudhaus edition and in this trans-
lation.

Sudhaus Hubbell

r, 1-146 265-286

147-225 293-305

225-385 3»-34i

(289-325 revised in II, 1-64)

262

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

Sttdhaus
II, 1-64

Hubbell
321-332
286-293
305-3"
341-346
346-364

65-130
131-167
168-195
196-303

The following bibliography aims to include editions of the
Rhetorica, and journal articles which deal with Philodemus'
literary relations and with critical and exegetical questions
raised by the Rhetorica. No attempt has been made to include
reference to Philodemus in the ordinary encyclopaedias, or
histories of literature and philosophy.

Cronert W., Die Epicureer in Syrien. Jahrb. d. ost. arch. Instituts,

X (1907) PP. 145-153.
Hillscher A., Hominum litteratorum Graecorum ante Tiberii mortem in

urbe Roma commoratorum historia critica. Commentatio ex supple-

mentis annalium philologicorum (pp. 355-444) seorsum expressa.

Leipzig, 1891.

Korte A., Augusteer bei Philodem. Rhein. Mus. XLV (1890) pp. 172-177.
Stemplinger E., Strabons literar-historische Notizien. Munich, 1894.

EDITIONS OF THE RHETORICA.

Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt XI torn. Naples, 1793-1855.
Vol. VII did not appear. The rhetorical fragments are in vols. IV,
V and XI.

Herculanensium Voluminum quae supersunt collectio altera. Tom. I-XI
Naples, 1S62-76. The rhetorical fragments are in vols. III-XI.

Herculanensium Voluminum partes I, II, Oxford 1824, 1825. The rhetor-
ical fragments are in vol. II.

Bassi D., Frammenti inediti di opere di Filodemo (Vepi /xovuiktjs, -wepl fleuv,
irepl pijropiKijs) in papiri Ercolanesi. Rivista di Filologia XXXVIII,
3, pp. 321-356. Unimportant new fragments. May be of Philo-
demus ; at any rate seem to discuss the same questions.

Diibner F., Philodemi Fragmenta (Philologis Gothae conventum agentibus
s. p. d. Fr. Diibner), Paris, 1840.

Spengel L. Philodemi de Rhetorica. Librum Quartum ex voluminibus
Herculanensibus Oxonii MDCCCXXV excussis ed. Leonardus
Spengel. In Abhand. d. Miinch. Akad. Phil. Classe, III Thl. 1 Abth.
1837, pp. 207-303.

Gros E., Philodemi irtpi pyTopiK?}?. Ex Herculanensi papyro lithographice
Oxonii excusa restituit, latine vertit, dissertatione de Graeca elo-
quentia et rhetorica notitiaque de Herculanensibus voluminibus
auxit, annotationibus indicibusque instruxit E. Gros. Adiecti sunt
duo Philodemi libri de rhetorica Neapoli editi. Paris, 1840. The
fourth book.

LIFE AND LITERARY RELATIONS.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

263

Sudhaus S., Philodemi volumina rhetorica edidit Siegfried Sudhaus. 2
vols. Leipzig, 1892, 1896.
Supplementum. Leipzig, 1895, with the title

*iXo5ij,iwu nepl p-qTopiKTjs A' B'. The introduction is largely by L. Rader-
macher, entitled, "Critolaus und die Rhetorik."

USEFUL ACCOUNTS OF THE DISCOVERY AND DECIPHERING OF THE ROLLS.

Comparetti D. and de Petra G. La Villa Ercolanese dei Pisoni. Turin,
1883. Contains p. 91 S. a "Catalogo generale dei Papiri Ercolanesi
redatto dal Dr. Emidio Martini."

Mommsen T. Inschriftsbitsten. Archae. Zeit. XXXVIII (1880) 32.

Scott W. Fragmenta Herculanensia ; a descriptive catalogue of the
Oxford copies of the Herculanean rolls together with the texts of
several papyri accompanied by facsimiles, edited with notes and
introduction. Oxford, 1885.

PALAEOGRAPHY AND LANGUAGE.

Comparetti D. La Bibliotheque de 'Philodeme. In Melanges offerts a

M. Emile Chatelain, 1910.
Cronert W. Falschungen in den Abschriften der Herculanensischen

Rollen. Rhein. Mus. LIII (1898) pp. 585-595-
Cronert Guil. Quaestiones Herculanenses. Leipzig, 1898.
Cronert W. Kolotes und Menedemos. Texte und Untersuchungen zur

Philosophen-und Literaturgeschichte. Leipzig, 1906.
Cronert W. Memoria Graeca Herculanensis. Leipzig, 1903.
Cronert W. Die Ueberlieferung des Index Academicorum. Hermes,

XXXVIII (1903) pp. 357-405-
Glatzel A. De optativi apud Philodemum, Strabonem, Pseudo-Longinum

usu. Diss. Breslau, 1913.
Grein E. L. 3fij for oi before Lucian. Studies in honor of Gildersleeve.

1902, p. 472.

Schmid W. Der Attizismus in seinen Hauptvertretern von Dionys von
Halicarnassus bis auf den zweiten Philostratus. Stuttgart, 1887-
1897. The references to Philodemus are in parts III and IV.

Schrofel E. De optativi apud Dionysium Halicarnaseum usu. Diss.
Breslau, 1909.

Strathmann G. De hiatus fuga, quam invenimus apud Philodemum Epi-

cureum. Progr. des Realgymn. Viersen, 1892.
Wendland P. Berliner Philologischer Wochenschrift XVI (1896) p. 1451.

CRITICAL AND EXEGETICAL STUDIES.

von Arnim H. Ein Bruchstiick des Alexinos. Hermes, XXVIII (1893)
PP- 65-72.

von Arnim H. Coniectanea in Philodemi Rhetorica. Hermes, XXVIII

(1893) pp. 150-154.
von Arnim H. Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa. Berlin, 1898.

Chapter I.

264

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

von Arnim H. De restituendo Philodemi de rhetorica lib. II. Progr.
Rostock 1893.

Bucheler F. Ante-Diluvianisches aus Philodem. Rhein. Mus. XX (1865)
pp. 3U-3I4-

Dubner F. Passages detaches des Papyrus d'Herculanum. Revue de

Philologie I (1845) pp. 3H'323.
Fuhr K. Zu griechischen Prosaikern. Ill Zu Philodems rhetorischen

Schriften. Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) pp. 428-436.
Gomperz Th. Beitrage zur Kritik und Erklarung griechischen Schrift-

steller. IV, no. 27 In Sitzungsber. d. phil. hist. Classe d. k. Akad.

d. Wiss. in Wien CXXII (1890) , Wien.
Gomperz Th. Herculanensia. Zeit. f. d. ost. Gymn. XXIII (1872) pp.

24-32.

Gomperz Th. Die herculanischen Rollen. Zeit. f. d. ost. Gymn. XVI

(1865) pp. 815-828; XVII (1866) pp. 691-708.
Gomperz Th. Kritische Bemerkungen. Wiener Studien II (1880) pp.

1-20. no. 4.

Gomperz Th. Marginalien. Rhein. Mus. XXXII (1877) pp. 475-478.
Liers H. Rhetoren und Philosophen im Kampfe um die Staatsweisheit.

Progr. des. Gymn. Waldenburg, 1888.
Olivier F. De Critolao peripatetico. Diss. Berlin 1895.
Radermacher L. Studien zur Geschichte der antiken Rhetorik. Ill Eine

Schrift iiber den Redner als Quelle Ciceros und Quintilians. IV

Ueber die Anfange des Atticismus. Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) pp.

285, 35 1-

Sandys J. E. Review of Philodemus ed. Sudhaus vol. I. Class. Rev. IX
(1895) PP- 358-359-

Schneidewin W. Studia Philodemea. Diss. Gottingen, 1905. Studies in
the fifth book.

Sudhaus S. Alexinos. Rhein. Mus. XLVIII (1893) pp. 152-154.
Sudhaus S. Aristoteles in der Beurtheilung des Epikur und Philodem.

Rhein. Mus. XLVIII (1893) pp. 552-564.
Sudhaus, S. Exkurse zu Philodem. 1. Ein literarischer Streit in der

epikureischen Schule. 2. Eine Scene aus Epikurs Gastmahl. 3.

Noch einmal Nausiphanes und Aristoteles bei Philodem. Philo-

logus LIV (1895) pp. 80-92.
Sudhaus, S. Neue Lesungen zu Philodem. Philologus LIII (1894) pp.

1-12.

Usener H. Epicurea. Leipzig, 1887.

Usener H. Variae lectionis specimen primum. Jahrb. f. class. Phil.

CXXXIX (1889) p. 377-
von Wilamowitz-Mollendorf U. Memoriae Oblitteratae. Hermes XI

(1876) pp. 291-304. Corrigendum ad Hermae Tom. XI p. 304,

Hermes XI (1876) p. 515.
von Wilamowitz-Mollendorf U. Lesefriichte. Hermes XXXIV (1899)

p. 636 f.

BOOK I.

We have five fragments of the first book, one of seven columns, the
others containing one column each. If we may make a rather large
generalization from so small a section we might say that the first book
contained an outline of the whole work. I have therefore reconstructed,
partly from references, partly by inference the following outline of the
book" The fragments which we possess come from the latter part of
the book.

The first book contained :

1. The dedication to Gaius. Cf. I, 223, 5.

2. A statement of the purpose of the work : to criticize various views
of rhetoric,

a. those of its supporters,

b. those of its opponents,

c. those of the extreme Epicureans who denied that sophistic

rhetoric was an art, thus running counter to the doctrines
of Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus. Cf. I, 12.

3. A discussion of the relation of the arts to one another, and of the
nature of an art, with especial reference to the errors into which both
supporters and opponents of rhetoric fall. Cf. I, 1, ff.

First a division of arts and sciences according to the relative necessity
of natural ability and training (0t)<m and Auk^is).

Sudhaus

Some sciences depend entirely on natural ability and need but I^i, fr. IV
little practice ; some accomplish their purpose of and by them- ~ upp ' J
selves, granted that the workman has the natural endowment
common to all the human race ; no practice is necessary ; some
do not need natural ability but only practice.

In the case of some arts, their purpose can be accomplished
partially and reasonably well by those who have not studied the
principles of the art ; in other cases only the person technically
trained can succeed.

Some say that an art must have definite rules, e. g. grammatice, 1^ fr I
others that an art is merely wisdom or skill (<ro<j>ta), others require ~, upp '
that it have a definite purpose, e. g. Plato 1 ; others demand that
it shall tend to improve life. 2

1 Gorgias 503E.

• Possibly Critolaus, cf. Sextus Empiricus Adv. Rhet. 10-12, 20.

266 Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

Those who define art fall into the error of expecting that one
definition will cover all arts (or rather that all arts fulfil equally
I, 3, fr. all the requirements of the definition), in order to obtain what
4 = 8 SUPPl ' '^ e y ca ^ union of arts (o-wSeoyxos) . Then when they find an
art which has some characteristic not shared by the others, as is
frequently the case, they exclude it from the position of an art.
I, 4, Col. In the sciences there is frequently an interchange of function :

I = Suppl. two sc ; ences produce the same result. 3 But this does not prove
that they are not arts. 4 It is not unheard-of for the same result
to be accomplished by two arts, and perhaps this is the best way
of distinguishing the merely useful from the necessary art.

Objections can be made to most if not all of the arguments
here mentioned (i. e. in the gap between fr. I and Col. I). The
worst class of arguments are those which act as boomerangs and
demolish the position of the disputant. As far as these argu-
ments are concerned no one can object to the opponents' saying
that there are perfect artists and imperfect ones as well. It is
Col. III. un f a i r to blame the perfect artist for the failures of his imper-
fect colleague. But that is what the present critics are doing.
The end of rhetoric is to persuade in a speech; consequently it
is idle to mention other means of persuasion, such as beauty.
If laymen sometimes persuade by means of a speech it does not
Col. IV. f n ow that they persuade better or more frequently than the
trained rhetor. 5

Apart from the aforementioned obscurities you will find that
many of the arguments overstep the bounds of the facts under
discussion and are built up on double meanings of words. Many
of the arguments do not differ in validity, but by a variety of
examples display the fertility of the inventors. Then, too, in
these arguments there is a great deal of bare assertion, entirely
unsupported by argument (aKarda-Kcvov, Karao-Kevri = constructive
argument) .

3 E. g. Sculpture and music both produce pleasure.

* Philodemus seems to use ^io-tt}^ and Tix"V interchangeably.

5 If Philodemus here as elsewhere, notably in Book II, seems to cham-
pion the cause of Rhetoric it is because he is refuting the arguments
against rhetoric in order to show that they are inadequate, and that the
only true answer to the claims of rhetoric comes from the Epicurean
school.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

267

The following error is found in almost all the arguments : they Col. V.
assume from the lack of technical treatises at a given time or
place that no art then existed. But it is hardly to be expected
that we can find technical works in a period in which the art of
writing had not been invented.

Most, if not all, the arguments do not prove what they claim
to prove even if the premises be granted. For if the art of
music does not produce the ability to read and write, it may still
be the art of other things. Similarly if they assume that sophistic
rhetoric does not produce political science or practical rhetorical
ability, they are right, but that does not preclude the possibility
that sophistic is an art. G

"Just as dialectic is an art, but accomplishes nothing unless Col. VI.
combined with ethics or physics, so rhetoric is an art, but accom-
plishes nothing unless combined with politics." There are many
other errors in the arguments, but we do not intend to take them
up in detail. Col _ V II.

Those Epicureans are to be censured who assume that sophistic
is not an art, and thus run counter to the teachings of Epicurus,
Metrodorus and Hermarchus, as we shall show later. Such
Epicureans are almost guilty of parricide. 7

BOOK II.

In the second book Philodemus discusses the question : Is rhetoric an
art? The fragments fall into two classes. The first consists of one
papyrus in ten short fragments and a continuous passage of very consider-
able proportions, contained in Volume One, pages 13-146, most of which
has been incorporated by Sudhaus in the Supplementum pages 11-62. The
second group consists of many fragments mostly unconnected, collected in
Volume Two pages 65-130. The content of the first group may be
expressed schematically as follows :

'Here we get the first statement of Philodemus' favorite distinction
between aofywrw^ priTopw-fi on the one hand, and ttoXituct; and ep.wpa.KTos prjropiKri
on the other.

7 This paragraph gives an interesting glimpse of the passion for ortho-
doxy which was characteristic of the Epicurean school. It also reveals
the intensity of the feud between Zeno-Philodemus and the other branch
of the sect.

2 68

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I. Arguments advanced by others.

1. Arguments against rhetoric refuted.

2. Arguments in favor of rhetoric refuted.

3. Criticism of the views of Epicureans on rhetoric.

II. Philodemus' constructive arguments.

The book is thus seen to be a critique of various works about rhetoric.
The Epicurean triad, Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus provide most
of the material for the last two sections. Among the opponents of
rhetoric to whom prominence is given are Diogenes of Babylon and Crito-
laus. The work of Critolaus has been discussed by F. Olivier, De Critolao
Peripatetico, Berlin 1895, and by Radermacher in the introduction to
Sudhaus' Supplementum. In general I follow their conclusions, although
I am not prepared to go as far as they do in crediting Critolaus with most
of the ideas expressed in this book. In the notes I have indicated briefly
my judgment on the sources of the principal ideas without entering into
an extended discussion for which the reader is referred to the excursus at
the end of this volume.

Section I-i.
Refutation of arguments against rhetoric. 1

I, 14, fr. V. The arguments are quoted in direct form without introduction, and are
I, 16, fr. IX. followed by a brief criticism. The first is fragmentary but may be recon-
structed as follows :

(a) "The Spartans and Romans expelled rhetors." This does
not prove that it is not an art, for states have expelled physicians,
musicians and even philosophers. 2

I, 19, Col. I The argument which is criticized at the beginning of column I is miss-
= Suppl. 11. ing, but must have run somewhat as follows: 'An art always produces a
beneficial result." 3

But the captain sometimes loses his ship, the
physician kills his patient. We must either deny that navigation
and medicine are arts, or abandon the demand that all arts must
always be beneficial. 4

(c) "Different arts do not attain the same end, but gram-

1 See note 5 on page 266.

1 Cf. the similar discussion in Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 20-25. It was one
of the commonplaces of current educational argument; Sextus records
that it was used by Critolaus, and by the Academics, Clitomachus and
Charmadas ; v. Excursus p. 379.

3 For a similar passage cf. Quint. II, 17, 23 ff. ; v. Excursus p. 378.

' Cf . Book I, fr. III.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

269

marians and dialecticians attain the end of rhetoric." Others I, 19, 12 ff.
do persuade, but the end of rhetoric is not to persuade but to ~ ff Supp1,
persuade in a rhetorical speech. The philosopher persuades by
force of logic, Phryne 5 by her beauty; neither persuades
rhetorically.

(d) "An untrained person should not be able to excel one who I, 20, 9 ff. =
has been trained in an art, but in rhetoric this sometimes occurs." Su PP'- I2 > 6ff -
The untrained man may excel the trained man at times in a
conjectural art (o-Toxao-riK??) , but never in an exact science. But

if the layman without experience be compared with a man trained
in the schools the comparison does not justify the conclusion that
sophistic and politics are not arts.

(e) "In other arts the rules are true, in rhetoric they are I, 22, 11 ff.
false." (The reply is fragmentary but seems to mean) : The same ^gf UPP '' I2 '
statement might be made about philosophy or medicine. In those

some lay down principles which are not true, but the error of
some individuals does not prove that the whole subject is not an
art if properly treated.

(f) (a) "The artist does not deny that he is an artist, but the I, 23, 4& =
rhetor does." The major premise is false. Some artists do deny ^ jy pp1 ' I3,
that they have an art.

(/3) "And yet if the meanest artists do not deny that they have
an art we should not expect the sophists to deny it." 7 But as
a matter of fact philosophers, geometricians, poets and physicians
sometimes do deny it, thinking thereby to allay the suspicions of
those who expect to be deceived.

3 For Phryne cf. Quint. II, 15, 6 and 9; Athen. XIII, 590, 591; Sext.
Emp. Adv. Rhet. 4; Plut. Vit. Hyper, p. 849E. The story runs that
Phryne was accused of impiety, a capital charge, by one Euthias, and
defended by her lover Hyperides. When the latter saw that the jury was
likely to bring in a verdict of guilty he rent Phryne's robes and exposed
her breast, and thus won a verdict of acquittal. As we see from the
employment of this illustration by Quintilian in a similar context, this was
one of the stock arguments against rhetoric. Alciphron seems to be
answering this argument in Ep. I, 31, Bacchis to Phryne, when he says :
fi-qU tois "kiyovaL <roi, on ei p.ij rav x<tw>wi"6" Trepipij£a/i.4in) Ta luurrapia. tois
5iKa<TT<us 4irt$€ifas, oiSiv 6 pr/Tiop dj<pi\u, TreWov. Kai yap airb tovtp tm ir naipi}
yivtjraX <roi, 77 iKetvov irapfox 6 <rwr/yopta.

8 For illustrations of the false rules of rhetoric v. Sext. Emp. Adv.
Rhet. 10-12; Quint. II, 17, 18 ff; v. Excursus, p. 375.

'This continues the thought of the quotation in the preceding paragraph.

270

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

(y) "They deny that they possess the so-called sophistic
rhetoric, and say that it is not a separate kind of rhetoric.
However they do lay claim to the possession of experience in
practical affairs reduced to a system, and ability to discuss these
matters, and boast of it; a good example is Demosthenes." It
is a disgrace for them to be ashamed of their art. However as
sophistic offers no system for public speaking, how can it produce
public speakers ?

(8) "Therefore it is plain that some criticize the art as having
no characteristic which distinguishes it from other arts." In
the case of other arts, too, which are really or apparently harm-
ful, some criticize the teachers not for what they profess to know,
but for what they do not even desire to accomplish.

— S%p? "14 "Every artist professes to accomplish a result, the rhetor
16 ff. ' ' does not profess to persuade." By no means all artists profess

to accomplish the end of their art at all times. All who deal
with conjectural arts, as, for example, physicians and pilots,
sometimes fail in their purpose. The rhetor does profess to
accomplish his purpose, which is not to persuade always, but to
persuade better than one who has not been trained.
I, 26,17 ff. (h) (Fragmentary and obscure.) "Every artist claims the
= Suppl. 15, • £ Ti 1 • re u r- u 1

6 ff. province of the art as his own peculiar held (1. e. as belonging

to the trained man and him alone) ; but the earliest speakers
possessed the power of rhetoric before the art of rhetoric was
formulated." On this principle we have to reject tlx: art of
medicine because men healed before Asclepius.
I, 27, 31 ff. (i) "A rhetor never charges others with lack of art, but with

— Suppl. 15, jjgjjjg j n a sta (- e f mmc [ w hich prevents them from seeing the

connection of events." Therefore we must say that rhetoric is
not a matter of practice or experience. 8 For they would have
claimed the results of practice for themselves.
1, 27,^ 6 ff . = (j) "Men spoke better before manuals of rhetoric were written
^ upp . is, have since." The facts are granted, but inasmuch as

rhetoric is not entirely subject to the rules of art, but demands
much practice and natural ability, it is not surprising if there
were once better rhetors than now, just as there were better

8 For i<TTop(a>' Sandys in Class. Rev. IX (1895), p. 359, proposes to read
Ipreiplav, as and i/j.ireipia are coupled in the Gorgias to which Philo-

demus refers several times.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

271

philosophers. By this reasoning we should have to deny the
position of an art to medicine and poetics. Then too, one might
claim that there are good rhetors now. However sophists did
not flourish before the technical treatises, but the arts were
introduced by the statesmen, not by those who had made no
study of the subject; and there are other arts about which
nothing has been written as is the case in many parts of the
barbarian world.

Section 1-2.
Refutation of arguments in favor of rhetoric.
Having now discussed the arguments against rhetoric's being I, 29, 14 ff.^
an art we shall now take up the arguments in its favor. ~ ff"

General criticism of these arguments.

(a) They assert that it is an art without establishing the pre-
liminary principles on which their statement rests.

(b) They fail to see that not only is art required for some
purposes, but practice is required for others, and think that the
same training is adequate for sophistic and politics, whereas
there is no art of the latter.

(c) If they apply the term "art" to the state of mind adapted
for making rhetorical speeches, how can this be the property of
only a few?

Let us take up the arguments one at a time.

"If the rhetors did not use a method we would not find many I, 31, 3 ff . =
paying money for their courses." This argument rests on the ff p1 ' I7 '
supposition that rhetoric is an art of politics. This is con-
tradicted by Epicurus in his treatise llcpl r^s pjjropiK^s in which
he says : "Those who study in the rhetorical schools are deceived.
They are charmed by the tricks of style, and pay no attention to
the thought, believing that if they can learn to speak in this
style they will succeed in the assembly and court of law. But
when they find that this style is wholly unfitted for practical
speaking they realize that they have lost their money." In this
respect rhetoric may fittingly be compared to the art of prophecy.

"Not a few who were unable to speak in public have gained r, 35, iff. =
ability by studying in the rhetorical schools." But some come SuppL 19.
out of the schools worse than when they went in. And if some
improve, it may be from other causes which we shall discuss

272

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

elsewhere; and we shall also discuss elsewhere why they fre-
quent the schools. This improvement does not demonstrate that
rhetoric is an art for it is possible for speakers to improve by
practice and experience.

= SuppI \ [K k ^ n0t a " al ' t] " the ma i° rit y of the students would
24 ff. ' not become good, but inefficient." Yet we see at times some
without art producing: more and better speakers than those who
possess accurate knowledge; this proves that it is not an art.
Some leave the study of sophistic to the child, and afterward
give the youth the benefit of association with those who have
had. practical experience in the assembly and courts. Then if
they succeed they are said to have studied with sophists, and
the sophists get the credit for giving them the training which
they have received from another source.
Suppl. S 2o; = "Lawyers and statesmen send their sons to the sophists to
17 ff. pursue those studies which gave them their ability." In the first

place some insist that they wasted the time which they spent in
study with the sophists, and send their sons to their own
teacher— the people. However if they do send them to the
sophists it is because they do not want their sons to be deprived
of any possible advantage to be obtained at the rhetorical schools,
but they do not expect the school to produce a trained statesman!
Some send their sons to the rhetoricians merely for a liberal
education, putting rhetoric on a par with other studies.

= Suppl ^1, " As in " 1Usic and & rammar so in rhetoric there is a transmis-
7ff. ' sion of knowledge from teacher to pupil, and the training is not
without method." There may be a transmission of knowledge
which is not connected with an art but acquired by experience
and observation. The statement that "the training is not with-
out method" is mere assertion without any argument to support
it. If the statement means that sophistic is an art of practical
speaking it is entirely wrong. (Lacuna.) In publishing tech-
nical works they are like the Chaldaeans and prophets who give
out dreams to deceive the people, and are themselves deceived.
If we grant anything we grant that sophistic is an art; but not
even those who teach it believe that it is an art of politics.

= Su l \%2 ^ theie WCre n ° art ° f rnetoric ] "none of those who speak
gff upp. 22, power £ u ]j y and intelligently would speak artistically." We may

turn the argument around and say that if some speak artistically
before the court or the assembly the graduates of the schools

!

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

273

do not share any of their good qualities. However we may he
accused of using language loosely and failing to distinguish
between what comes with art and what without. For we use the
word "artistic" in our everyday speech in a loose way, e. g. one
plays games artistically.

"On seeing a beautiful statue you would say without argu-
ment that it was the product of art ; you will pass the same _L s J ppl ^3,
judgment after investigating the acts of statesmen." One might 5 ff.
acknowledge that the works of the panegyrists are the products
of art. But inasmuch as the acts of a statesman deal with a
subject which cannot be reduced to the rules of art how can they
reveal that they are the products of art.

"If it were not an art those who have studied it would not ^^^^3
practice proof (or demonstration)." Not only is one who has 20 s.
not studied an art unable to do the work of an art, but one who
has not practiced and observed cannot reap the benefits. By
studying what pleases the crowd and practicing, one can become
skilled in politics. This is a strong proof that sophistic is not
the art of politics. If it is, let him who has studied the technical
treatises go before the people and speak !

Section I-3.
Criticism of the views of Epicureans on rhetoric.

The Epicureans who claim that rhetoric is an art of zvriting s'uppl.^,' -
speeches and delivering epideictic orations make the error of 10 ff.

'Here Philodemus seems to be attacking "sophistic" which he else-
where admits as an art. The inconsistency is only apparent, however, as
will be plain if we examine closely the meaning of "sophistic" as denned
by Philodemus. The "sophists" are in his language the professional
teachers of rhetoric, and sophistic is the subject taught in these schools.
This subject matter is called "rhetoric" by those who teach it, and it is
claimed that it trains for deliberative and forensic oratory, and therefore
is an art. This Philodemus denies. The ability to persuade in a speech
whether in law court or in public assembly, he says, is the result of natural
endowment and facility acquired by practice ; it must be acquired by each
individual and cannot be set down in the form of rules and imparted from
teacher to pupil ; hence it cannot be called an art. In so far, then, as the
professors of rhetoric attempt to teach the principles of public speaking
and the laws of politics with a view to producing statesmen, they fail, for
sophistic is not an art of politics. Later he sets the limits of sophistic —
it is the art of epideixis and nothing more.

274

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

applying the terra rhetoric to what should properly be called
sophistic. Those who admit that sophistic is an art, but deny
that there is an art of forensic and deliberative oratory because
sophistic is not the art of these branches, have failed to prove
that there is no art of forensic and deliberative oratory. There
may be a method of these branches ; but all they have shown is
that some do succeed by means of natural ability and experience
without the aid of rhetoric. Nor have they established beyond a
doubt, as they should, that sophistic is the art of epideictic. The
treatise on rhetoric ascribed to Polyaenus we have already shown
to be spurious.

= Su l \ S 2 Th ° Se Wh ° Say ;t iS a " art ' but re 1 uires abilit y and practice,
15 ff" PP ' 25 ' not to acquire it but to attain the end completely, have utterly
failed. They have not made the division between the different
parts of rhetoric (i. e. sophistic and practical rhetoric) which
was made by Epicurus and his immediate successors. Epicurus
demonstrated that sophistic is an art of writing speeches and
delivering epideictic orations but is not the art of forensic or
deliberative oratory; accordingly they say that sophistic is an
art; his successors likewise have said that there is no art of
politics. They certainly leave no place for any science of politics.

Moreover their statement that ability and practice are needed
to learn the art of sophistic is false, or we must make the same
statement about philosophy. . Their illustration from the art of
grammar turns against them. For natural ability is required for
rhetoric just as much as it is as a foundation for grammar. In the
case of grammar natural ability and practice are required in order
to acquire the knowledge of the subject, not to attain the end.
Consequently if rhetoric is similar to grammar we must admit
that ability and practice are needed to acquire rhetoric. When
they say that ability is required for delineation, for making
suitable gestures, etc.. and experience is needed to judge the
proper occasion for speaking, what have they left for art? They
ought to show what is needed to acquire the art if ability and
practice are not needed.
I. S3, 3 «. = Those are wrong who claim that rhetoric is not an art on the
Suppl. 27, assumption that an art must have method and a transmission of
definite knowledge, if on the other hand they allow medicine
which is conjectural to be an art.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

275

(a) Their expression d tis TtpotiK-q^e assumes that one can define
art as one chooses. 10

(b) While criticizing those who do not make proper divisions,
they fail to differentiate between the several parts of rhetoric.

(c) Politics is an art according to their grouping of the sciences
and this is false. For it has no method, nor is it even a con-
jectural art. This can be proven by passages from Epicurus
and Metrodorus. (Some of which are quoted.)

(d) It is stupid to say that the rhetors have observed the ele-
ments which generally persuade, and have reduced them to a
system, and that we persuade by use of prooemium and narrative
and the other parts of an oration.

A fourth class 11 present arguments which are a combination of ^ 57, 23 ff.
the last two, and are open to the same objections. Their defini- ^ f " pp ' 2
tion of art is "a state of training acquired as a result of observa-
tion, by which the proposed end is obtained generally and with
reasonable probability." This removes the distinctive character-
istic of an art which is its method and general principles applying
to the individual cases. The practical skill acquired by observa-
tion is not called an art by the Greeks except that sometimes in a
loose use of language people call a clever woodchopper an artist.
If we call observation and practice art we should include under
the term all human activity.

They say that politics is not an art, and yet they claim that
rhetoric i. e. iroAtri/oj pyropiKij is helpful in practical life. How
can rhetoric be called an art when it does not help the artist but
sometimes makes him inferior to the layman. Dialectic and
eristic may be arts by their definition, but in differentiating
between them and rhetoric they prove that rhetoric has no
method. The other differences which they point out all go to
show that rhetoric is not an art. These points of difference are
(1) when it contributes anything it is something insignificant
and accidental; (2) it is not necessary, a layman can do as well

10 Philodemus has in mind in this criticism his purpose to base his judg-
ment of rhetoric on the definition of rcxvy accepted by usage. Cf. such
passages as I, 69, 2 — Suppl. 35, I : etrny toivvv koX Xtyerat napa ro?s ' EXX^Cif •
I, 59, 19 = Suppl. 30, 7 ff . V crvv-fidaa t<2v 'EWr/vwv • I, 68, 7 = Suppl. 34, 14;
Kara rije {TVifrjdfiav.

11 Possibly these were followers of Diogenes of Tarsus, who derived
their arguments from his ' E7riXe\-Toi SxoXcu.

276 Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

as an artist; (3) its principles are easily acquired; (4) it depends
largely on practice and memory. In short rhetoric has 110 method.
I, 64, 1 iff. Bromius in his discussion of the arts passes over sophistical
= Suppl. 32, rhetoric on the ground that it is not regarded as an art either bv

IQ ft. .

people in general or by Epicurus. The only art that he will
allow in this connection is politics. How can he do this when
sophistic is an art and is so considered by the leaders of our
school? If he considers sophistic to be no art why does he not
prove his statement? How can he make the claim that the
good statesman has calculated the means of arousing the emo-
tions, and of persuasion, and uses these continually? Any suc-
cess which the speakers attain they attain because of practice,
but they do not succeed universally. Furthermore, his statement
that the technical treatises of the rhetoricians are not entirely
barren is in direct contradiction to the teachings of Epicurus
who says that all such treatises are useless for producing the
political faculty.

Section II.
Philodemus' theories about rhetoric.

We shall now present our own views under the following
heads :

(a) Definition of art according to usage.

(b) Epicurean doctrine declares that sophistic rhetoric is an art.

(c ) Sophistic is an art of epideixis and writing of speeches, but
not of forensic and deliberative oratory.

(d) Politics depends on investigation and practice, but has none
of the essentials of an art.

Section Il-a.
Definition of 'art.'

An art, as the term is commonly used, is a state or condition
resulting from the observation of certain common and elementary
principles, which apply to the majority of cases, accomplishing
such a result as cannot be attained by one who has not studied
it, and doing this regularly and certainly and not by conjecture.
For the moment we may leave out of the discussion whether or not
a looser use of the word sanctions the inclusion under the heading
'art' of all occupations depending wholly on practice. This

I, 68, iff.=
Suppl. 34,
12 ff.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

277

definition applies both to the exact sciences like grammar and
music which have certain definite rules, and to the conjectural
which are in possession of certain common elements affecting 12
individual case-,, although these common elements may not have
been completely mastered, and the result may not be accomplished
always but only more frequently than by those who do not possess
the art.

(There follows a passage which cannot be restored.)

If rhetoric has no method it is not an art. We apply the terms
'experience,' 'observation,' 'practice' when one has failures
as well as successes ; but we never call this art, for the essence
of art is to accomplish the result always.

[Another lacuna; apparently, A dancer] has observed the
proper way of producing a beautiful effect, i. e. how to stand,
how to walk, etc., but he has no method or elementary principles
to impart as has the musician. The same statement applies to
acrobats. If we class these occupations as arts we shall include
practically everything. To sum up ; these which we now say
are arts we say have a certain character which is possessed by
grammar and sculpture ; and those which we deny are arts lack
this character and are characterized by observation. On the basis
of this definition we declare sophistic to be an art and politics not.

Section Il-b.
Epicurean doctrine declares that sophistic is an art.

We now turn to the statement : We are not responsible for j ?7 2 g ff

the statement that sophistic is an art and that politics is dependent = Suppl. 38,

on observation and practice, but this comes from the founders 14 ft "
of our sect, not from us. 13 I shall show where in the works of
Epicurus Zeno found the expression of this doctrine. In the
first place what would one make of the continual use by Epicurus

13 There is a difference between the principles of the exact arts or sci-
ences and those of the conjectural; of the former it is said that they
accomplish the result Sid twos TrctpciTTjp-ijo-ews oroixeiW tlvSiv Sitikovtuv 5i4
wXetivan tQu Kara fiepos • of the latter that they possess koivuv tivwv Sia-
TeivovTwv ei's to Kara /j.epos.

1S By iiixeh Philodemus means himself and his master Zeno. They had
been engaged in a controversy with another group of Epicureans who dis-
puted the claim that Epicurus considered sophistic an art.

2 7 8

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

in his book on rhetoric of expressions like this: "schools of
rhetoric," "the ability produced by the schools," "profession,"
"instruction about speeches and enthymemes" and the like?
I, 78, 19 ff. Turning to Hermarchus, we find the same opinion in an epistle
==Suppl. 39, t0 Theophides. Alexinus in his work on education criticized the
rhetorical sophists for wasting their time on investigation of use-
less subjects, such as diction, memory, and the interpretation of
obscure passages in the poets. He added, "We can grant that
they try to speak about useful subjects, by which it is possible
to settle questions of philosophy; for if they do not possess
ciri<TTijfi.ri they do use conjecture which is the instrument of the
rhetor." To this Hermarchus replied, "If by speaking about
useful subjects he means speaking about such matters as will
bring them pecuniary reward, he is insane."
I, 81, sff. Hermarchus then continues [Lacuna in which was shown the

.-Suppl. 40, use j essness f t | lese so - ca iled useful subjects which the rhetori-
cians discuss:] "It is better to lose one's property than to keep
it by lawsuits which disturb the calm of the soul."
I. 82, 24 ff. Nor can we praise the rhetors for teaching their pupils to give
= Suppl. 41, a dvice on public questions. Hermarchus says: "If he says that
the rhetors deserve admiration for being useful statesmen his
statement will not stand the test. For cooks and carpenters give
useful advice which need not be put in the form of a speech.
Similarly any farmer without rhetorical training, even without
elementary education can discover what is useful for the state.
I. 84, 31 = Furthermore, what are we to make of Alexinus' statement that
Suppl. 42, 1. r hetorical speeches depend not on knowledge but on experience
and conjecture? He cannot mean that they have no dialectical
syllogisms. At any rate he rebukes Eubulides for despising
speeches without syllogisms."

We have given these last quotations in case anyone desires to
have them, realizing that they will seem to have been written
about some other subject than the one under discussion. 14
j_ g Si 27 _ Metrodorus in the first book of his Ilepi ■wovqjt.a.Tun' seems to
Suppl. 42, indicate clearly that rhetoric is an art. Speaking with one who
had written on poetics he says, "Until some proof is brought

14 In this remark of Philodemus we have a na'ive admission of the weak-
ness of his case. His attempt to find exact statements in Epicurean
authorities to support his position is not particularly successful.

14.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

279

in regard to the art of the rhetoricians, it can hardly be said that
it produces rhetors." Then he adds, "Callistratus and others
spoke satisfactorily before the assembly about the public interests
without having studied the r^y of Thrasymachus or of any one
else." Elsewhere he says that those who teach the art of speak-
ing do not speak themselves ; it is ridiculous to suppose that one
man possesses the theory, and another the power, of speaking.
(Lacuna)

A little later he says, "One who purposes to speak in public will
not seek the teacher who after giving theoretical instruction is
not able to see the next step; but with an eye solely to the task
to be accomplished will fulfill by himself the purpose of the art,
and will let no chance escape of becoming a better orator."

An outline of the history of the controversy which Philodemus dis-
cusses in the next section may enable the reader to understand some of
the points to which he alludes in very obscure language. Philodemus was
the pupil of Zeno, an eminent Epicurean who taught at Athens in the
latter part of the second and early part of the first century B. C, and
attained great eminence among his contemporaries, if he was not actually
head of the school. Cicero attended his lectures at the advice of Philo,
and admired his style; Non igitur ille, ut plerique, sed isto modo, ut tu,
distincte, graviter, ornate. De Nat. Deor. I, 21, 59. His style is alluded to
by Diogenes Laertius, VII, I, 35, «al voycrai nal epin)Kvaa.i catt-ris- he was
evidently interested in style, and this interest served to distinguish him
from the average Epicurean. Philodemus shared his master's interest in
elegance of style as we may conclude from Cicero's remarks; (In Pis.
28, 68) Homo . . . humanus . . . Est autem hie, de quo loquor non
philosophia solum, bed etiam ceteris suidiis quae fere celeros Kpicureos
negligere dicunt, perpohtus; poema porro facit ita festivum, ita concin-
num, ita elegans nihil ut fieri possit argutius. It was this literary interest
which led Zeno to make a collection of passages from Epicurus, Her-
marchus and Metrodorus, which he thought proved that the leaders of
the school considered sophistic rhetoric an art. He limited the province
of the art, however, so as to include only the writing of a speech, par-
ticularly of an epideictic oration such, for example, as the orations of
Isocrates, and excluded all power of rhetoric to persuade in the fields
of forensic and deliberative oratory. The quotations, as far as they can
be recovered from Philodemus, are not convincing; still it must be
acknowledged that while Zeno might not have been able to quote chapter
and verse from Epicurus in support of his view, he was in spirit true
to Epicurean principles. For Epicurus, at least in his exoteric writings,
paid attention to clearness if not. indeed, elegance of style. 15

v. Usener, Epicurea, p. XLII.

280

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

Zeno had not published his views, but Philodemus had published anony-
mously a Hypomnematicon which was not intended for general circula-
tion. A copy of this fell into the hands of an Epicurean of Rhodes who
wrote a reply criticizing Philodemus' pamphlet as heretical, and also
assuming that it had been written by Zeno. The next section is an answer
to this attack.

I. 89, 11= Some Epicureans now resident at Rhodes write that when in
Suppl. 44, 4. t j le course f their teaching at Cos and again at Rhodes they
were upholding- the thesis, "Rhetoric is not an art," some stu-
dents recently come from Athens asserted that this position was
not agreeable to the teaching of Epicurus. Being asked to quote
their authority, one said that a definite statement on this point
was to be found in the Symposium or in the Lives ; the other
said he did not know where the statement was to be found, but
knew that this view of sophistic was held by the Epicureans in
Athens. 10 The philosopher darkly hinted at in the latter phrase
is Zeno; the fact that he had written nothing on the subject
does not prevent the opponent from writing a reply to him.
Frequently in this treatise he says that he found in Epicurus no
trace of a statement that rhetoric is an art, but countless state-
ments that no part of it is subject to the principles of art. Now
we shall not hesitate to set forth in the future at greater length
wherein we think this philosopher is wrong. For the present we
shall give a brief outline of our criticism.
I. 92, 10 = The opponent says that Epicurus and M etrodorus considered
Suppl. 45, t< na t (-i le political and forensic branches of rhetoric needed prac-
tice and experience and a certain experimental knowledge,
whereas the panegyrical branch depended on practice and expe-
rience and a certain habit of expression without any knowledge
of facts. Moreover the leaders of the school believed there
was no art of persuading large bodies of men; that the afore-
mentioned practice and experience do not suffice to persuade even
in a majority of cases, and those trained in panegyric are less
able to face the tumult of the assembly than those who have no
rhetorical training; Epicurus and his followers knew that rey/cu

10 Philodemus is careful not to mention names, though describing the
opposing parties by phrases which would be intelligible to his audience.
The Rhodian school represents the author who had criticized Philodemus'
work, thinking it to be Zeno's; the philosophers at Athens are Zeno and
Philodemus.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

281

had been written, and referred to these works by this name with-
out granting that they accomplish their purpose; if any one
possesses the power of persuasion, it is responsible for evil and
not good. With these arguments he thinks that he proves that
those who believe any part of rhetoric to be an art are inconsistent
..villi Epicurus.

I wonder at the perplexity of the pupils of that "philosopher I, 95, 18 =
of Athens." If they cared to know where this doctrine was laid f^ ppl 46,
down they might have consulted the philosophers at one of the
meetings of the school on the twentieth of the month, or any of
the regular associates of Zeno, who lives in Athens, not in Persia.
In order to satisfy their desire we have presented the passages
which we claim prove that the so-called sophistic rhetoric is an
art, and is not a part of rhetoric ; for the divisions of rhetoric
are not as he assumes throughout his work, panegyric, political
and forensic any more than the genus dog is divided into the
species sea-dog and land-dog.

We forgive the man for having written so much against our
position ; we should not have mentioned it except to show what
strange things philosophers sometimes do. "But I desire to
know," you will say, "who wrote that book"? Not Zeno. 1T

Our claim that the Isocratean orations and those of like char- I, 99, 5b =
acter are not composed without method is especially attacked in Suppl. 48,
the passage, "Epicurus believed that there was no art of per-
suading large bodies of men; that those who are not rhetoricians
sometimes are more persuasive than the rhetoricians ; that those
trained in panegyric are less able to face the tumult of the
assembly than those who have no rhetorical training; that
Epicurus spoke of arts, and said that those acquainted with them
were benefited, but did not mean that this enabled them to attain
the end ; if anyone possesses the power of persuasion it is
responsible for evil and not for good."

But the arguments of Epicurus which prove that there is no
art of politics do not prove that the sophists do not possess
some other art. We shall select certain passages from the
Symposium of Epicurus which support our view. I, 102, 21 =

In order to represent the young man as being refuted when Suppl. 49,

" Philodemus was the author of the book (his Hypomnematicon)
which had been attacked on the supposition that its author was Zeno.

282

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

he claimed that his rhetorical study gave him power to deliver
panegyrics and engage in politics, Epicurus makes Idomeneus
beg pardon for his youthful presumption, and represents some
one addressing him thus ; I quote word for word, "It is strange
that you are not prevented by your youth from surpassing older
and famous men in the power of rhetoric" ; by which he means.
"It is strange that you are not prevented by your youth from
excelling in rhetoric, which seems to require practice, while it
is possible for you to be prevented by your youth from partici-
pating in philosophical discussions which depend more on
knowledge than on practice."

"This," says the opponent, "is a clear statement from Epi-
curus ; he makes a hard and fast distinction between eV«rr);^r/
and rpt/3ij, and considers that all rhetoric, not merely the political
and forensic divisions, depends entirely on experience. If
rhetoric were wholly or in part an art, Epicurus' statement would
become an absurdity meaning, 'If that which is produced by
method can be attained by a youth, much more can that be
obtained which is produced by method.' "

To assume that this statement of Epicurus refers to rhetoric
as a whole, and not to the political part alone violates both the
letter and the spirit of the Symposium. If sophistic rhetoric is
an art, as it really is, requiring much practice (for the Epi-
cureans acknowledge that some sciences need practice) how is
Epicurus absurd? If the political form or division of rhetoric
requires practice, and the sophistic, knowledge only, how is this
absurd? The statement which our opponent thought to reduce
to an absurdity, really means, "If that which is produced partly
by method can be obtained by a young man, much more so, that
which is produced by method alone."

Our opponent now proceeds to discuss the phrase So/cei rpiBijs duai (I,
J03, 6 = Suppl. 50, 12). The passage is so fragmentary that the meaning-
can be restored only partially. Philodemus has been arguing that the
phrase meant that a part of rhetoric employed method and art, and a
part depended on practice and experience. The opponent insists that the
phrase Tpipfjs dva*. expresses Epicurus' view of rhetoric as a whole,

and that 5om? tki is merely a milder expression for icriv, a form of
expression which Epicurus uses even when making a positive statement
about philosophy. If ookjh rpi/3?js e?»cu applies to the political branch of
rhetoric 5oit« must be equivalent to larir with the implication that
o-o0tcrTiK7) /MrropiKi) also depends solely on Tpi/317 and so Philodemus' position
is refuted. To this Philodemus replies :

The Rhctorica of Philodemus.

283

This is foolish. For it is not like Epicurus to hesitate to speak I, 109, 7 =
the truth. However an obscure statement as to its being an art n upp ' 54 '
is characteristic of the leading Epicureans. One ought not to
insist on the letter, but rather follow the spirit of the passage
as revealed by comparison with other passages.

[Opponent.] "Do you not then admit that he agrees with those
who declare that rhetoric is not an art, if you admit that he spoke
without reservation?" No, for in other places he clearly says
that it is an art.

[Opponent.] "But we claim that Soxel applies also to iroAn-uoj."
(The implication i? thai if 'lit; use of &>«i instead of am allows
one part of rhetoric, viz., sophistic to be an art, it also allows
us to consider politics an art, and this is acknowledged to be
false.) We grant this, and even grant that Sokci applies to
sophistic; for Epicurus did not wish to settle the question by
this one passage, and in many others he says that it is an art.

If anyone should ask Epicurus just what he considered an art
and what not, he would say that the uncertainty of the premises
makes the conclusion uncertain. He is in doubt whether all
rhetoric depends on practice; he agrees that it requires much
practice.

Again we say, "If he considered it to be only a matter of |, 112, 7 = ^
practice and experience, he would not have added Bond." They Suppl - 561
said that our interpretation did not give the right meaning, or
that it did not give the only meaning. If the first is true we do
not understand Greek ; if the second, why do they, too, use
obscure language in attacking us ?

I shall show that Epicurus is obscure in the passage on ^poV^o-i; 1, 112, 24 =

when he says, ov paXkov av Soc;aei' iirio-rijprj atria dvai rjirep rplfj-1) ' also Suppl. 56,

that he shows that rhetoric is the result of knowledge and prac-
tice, but more of practice than of knowledge ; that philosophical
theorizing is the result of both, but more of knowledge than
of practice; second, that he shows that philosophical theorizing
is the result of both, but of one in a greater degree than the
other, while rhetoric is the result of one alone; third, that phi-
losophical theorizing is the result of knowledge and not of
practice. The opponent chooses one of these interpretations at
random. But suppose we substitute eo-n for Soxa eW so that

the sentence reads, 2v p.iv ovk iicipyov rrj prjropiKrj hvvapu irpoiyi.iv, o

Tpifirjs io-n koi o-wrj6eia% 7roAA^s. How can this mean that rhetoric

284

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

is not the result of art, but of practice alone? We might say

TroWrjs (^tAoTrortas €<rrt $t)\ov6tl to <pc\o(TO<p€iv Kal fj <pi\oo~o<put, but 110

one would assume that philosophy is the result of labor alone.
So by jtoAA^s io-TLv rj prjTopiKrj kuX o-vvqdeLw; Epicurus means

Furthermore, from the words that this man has used it is
uncertain whether Epicurus assumed that rhetoric was the result
of practice alone, or of art and practice, or largely but not
entirely of practice. For in the sentence, ©av/wo-rov 8i/, u <ri>

jxkv ovOtv iiupyov ha TrjV t]\lkuiv iv rfj pr/ropiKy Svvap.a irpoi-^av
&OKel Tpl[3rjq dvai Kal o-vvr/Ocias woWrjs, does o SoK£t ktA. refer to

p-QTopiKy Swdfia or iwepexuv? It is possible to take this to mean
that the power of rhetoric can be acquired by art, but to surpass
all in it requires practice. This, however, I do not hold to be
true. If you wish to consider how the author of the book
understood this, he will say that SokcT refers no more to mepixuv
than to pr)Topu<rj, but you have rejected my plain statement, and
use the tricks of the sycophant against me.

I, 119, 28= [In a fragmentary passage Philodemus promises to discuss

Suppl. 59, j ater p assag - es f rom Metrodorus.]

I. 120, 10= Epicurean authorities hold that sophistic rhetoric does not
Suppl. 60, 6. perform the task of practical and political rhetoric. This can
be proved by passages from Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metro-
dorus. The ability to speak in assembly and court comes from
practice and observation of political events.

Section II-c.

Of the third section only the title can be determined with certainty.
Sophistic rhetoric is an art of epideixis, and of the arrangement
of speeches, written and extemporaneous.
To which we may add the passage

Sophistic is not the knowledge of political rhetoric; this sec-
tion we shall take up in the Hypomnematismus 18 which is to
follow. In that will be demonstrated that political ability cannot
come from these sophistical schools any more than from the
common schools or from the philosophical schools; that often-
times the possession of it is responsible for no small mischief,
and does not even bring success in actual law cases.

I, 122, 25 =
Suppl. 61,
10.

I, 135, 40.

u He refers to the third book, now lost.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

285

Section Il-d.
Politics depends on investigation and practice.

We now pass to the last section. No system of politics has I, 136, 20 =
ever been imagined except that offered by the rhetorical sophists. Suppl. 61,
Now since sophistic contributes nothing to produce political
ability, it follows that those who possess this ability have acquired
it without the help of scientific principles.

After I, 122 the papyrus is so mutilated that 110 continuity between
columns remains, and often the meaning of any one column is doubtful.
I have given the only important passage in the last few columns. For the
sake of completeness I append a synopsis of the other columns.

... it follows necessarily that the experience of the sophists I, 124, col.

is transmitted not without method. 1. 24 . . . those emulated xxv -
among many peoples, Euphranor, Nicias, Nicomachus and
Hegesias 1 " and many others.

Prooemium, narration, demonstration, exception 20 and sum- I, 126, col.

mary. xxvi.

Unless he said that the Panegyric of Isocrates or the Pana- I, 127, col.
thenaic or the Busiris and the Helen and the Peace" 1 were f^/ 11,
without method.

What is true of the most inconsequential arts is true of I, 128, col.
rhetoric. In these one with a suitable nature, who acquires the XXVIII >
principles and adds i<> them practice is able to product' the result;
one who does not learn the principles, either from others or
from manuals, even if he aims at the desired goal always is
incapable of producing any of the results. So in rhetoric.

A clever man without studying the technical works of the I, 130, col.
sophists can study some sophist's speech and so learn to imitate XXlX -
them. But how can he imitate it if it is a long way off? "How
can he help imitating it if it is very near?," says Epicurus. 22
1. 16. How can they expect that there will be differences in the
written works when the art is the same ? How will they persuade
in medicine and many other sciences ? But, as I said, the kinds

" For Hegesias we should probably read with WiSamowitz. Hermes
XXXIV (1899), p. 636, Pausias.

""Reading in I. 5 vrf&up&tu, will) Fuhr, Rhein. ihis. LVII ( [902) p. 432.

21 Reading L 24 rt>v irepl elpjrns with Sandys, Class. Rev. IX (1895), p. 359.
The thought is the same as I, 100, 10 (v. p. 20).

"For a better understanding of this column compare II, 251.

286

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I. 132, coi.
XXX. 1. 7.

I, 134. coi.
XXXI

I, 137, coi.
XXXIII.
1. 21,

I. 139. coi.
XXXIV.

I. 144. col.
XXX IX.

of principles of such arts are very few, and differ from the
sciences.

They say that the art applies to deliberative and forensic ora-
tory. Therefore when it is demonstrated that they are capable
of neither, it is made plain that they have no art.

... to write imitations of forensic, deliberative and ambas-
sadorial speeches. In addition to this, other imitations of
speeches must be made to deceive people into thinking that this
implants the political faculty, i. e. to demonstrate that it is an
art. For not without system could one persuade the majority
that he knows what he does not know.

Certain arts have been transmitted to men in writing', e. g.
architecture, ship-carpentry, navigation, painting. All these arts
had methods in olden time.

No man was able, whether induced by philanthropy or vain-
glory, to impart to his contemporaries or to posterity [the
principles of politics] unless he employed the political rc'xvat
of the philosophers.

[One] oftentimes advises a man to be just and rich or poor
and humble or magnificent or beautiful, matters in which it is
madness to speak of art; and the statesmen probably arc- better
guessers than others. Why not ? They have more access to the
people. 23

II. 67. coi.
III.

Fragments of Book II.

The very considerable disconnected fragments of Book II are collected
by Sudhaus in vol. II pp. 65-130. A certain grouping is possible, and has
been worked out by Sudhaus in the introduction to vol. I pp. XXVII if.,
which I have used as a basis for my own arrangement. In the case of
most of the groups it will be apparent to what part of the book they
belong, and what relation they bear to the larger continuous fragment. I
have thought it wise to indicate in case of the obscurer passages my own
conjecture as to their position. The meaning of most of the passages,
however, will be clear to one who has read the preceding pages of the
second book." 4

If some say that the faculty of speech comes by practice, the
majority say that practice alone produces poor speakers.

"Reading with von Arnim (Hermes XXVIII (1893) p. 153) in 1. 16
Moucev tivai 1. 20 CTcavLw; i] irpotrodos.

"The following fragments are so inconsiderable that I have not
attempted to include them in this abstract :

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

287

"The technical element they [i. e. rhetoricians] borrow from
other arts e. g. from dialectic, and adorn themselves with bor-
rowed plumage." But [the philosopher] borrows from many
sources, for according to Euripides one can get his proofs out
of the air without toil.

It is absurd to agree with Diogenes that rhetoric is not an art,
and unworthy of a freeman. On this principle he would have
to exclude many arts. 25

. proves that politics and sophistic are the same. He II. 70. fr
may have proved that politics and sophistic do not produce states-
men, but he does not realize that sophistic is not practice, but
that every artist has his theoretical principles.

Some speak without having had the benefit of instruction, but
this does not prove that rhetoric is not an art.

He 20 says clearly that Demades did not study rhetoric, and 11^93, fr
the same applies to Aeschines. All of Demosthenes' opponents
claim that he was an artist and Critolaus does not deny it. In 11,^7, fr
addition to this, our statement that they gained little from the
art supports [the theory]. For hit-or-miss methods succeed only
rarely; no one will say that the continued success of Aeschines
and Demades is a proof that there is an art of rhetoric.

If he instances Aeschines and Demades as good orators, this
does not prove that sophistic is not a science.

"Rhetoric is not an art, for every art aims at a correct (or n, 69, fr
successful) procedure; now hit-or-miss methods do not produce
correct results, but we know that rhetors have been successful II, 71, f r
without instruction." 27

II, 6s, fr. I

II, 76, fr. I

II, 96, fr, VI

II, n 7; fr. XIII

65, fr. Ill

76, fr. II

98, fr. IX

121, fr. II

66, fr. V

76, fr. Ill

99, fr- X

122, fr. Ill

66, fr. VI

84, fr. VIII

99, fr. XI

126, fr. X

67, fr. I

86, fr. XII

99, fr- I

128, fr. XIV

67, fr. II

87, fr. XIII

99, fr- II

128, fr. XV

72, fr. IX

91, fr. XIX b

104, fr. X

129, fr. XVI

73, fr. X"

93, fr. I

108. fr. XVII

73, fr. X"

96, fr. V a

117, fr. XI

73, fr. XI

96, fr. V b

117, fr. XII

25 Cf. II, 95, fr- IV.

K This is aimed at Critolaus or Charmadas ; v. Excursus, p. 371.
"This argument is like that which proves that there is no art of

2 88

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

11,77, fr. IV Probably all that Homer meant was that they surpassed the
fr. XXIl' otner neroes m charm of conversation.

xVAff' ii Speakin §' of heroes who wer e able to speak, and kings

able.

* r > I: S. ^. This argument assumes that sciences are the same in different
localities, but that rhetoric differs in different countries and
cities.

II 74, fr. T he sense of the following passages runs somewhat as follows : Rhetoric
XII = 11, has been criticized for being all things to all men, so that it could be com-
Xli'l XIV Pared t0 the poIy P us which adapts its color to the rock on which it rests. 28
Philodemus' answer is an analogy drawn from medicine ; the rhetor must
consider the needs and character of his audience, just as the physician
must take into account differences of climate and constitution in regulat-
ing the diet of the patient. Fr. XIV, p. 106 views the same subject from
a different angle. A rhetor cannot be expected to be equally successful in
all countries. A great Italian physician if transferred to Egypt would
"send many mighty souls to Hades," through failure to understand all
the local conditions.

Xfr 127 ' fr - ■ • • art does not vai 7 vvith locality, and does not adapt itself
to different peoples, consequently he demands that rhetoric shall
not change.

Xin = Il' ' ' ' demands that the perfect orator be also a good man
75, fr. XIII. and a g° od citizen. 20 But such a combination is not required in

the case of any other art ; a good musician may be a villain.
11,^3, fr. ^ "Every art receives suitable pay ; rhetoric does not." But
dialectic does not receive large fees, nor does medicine; so by
this reasoning these should not be considered arts.
8s ' fr - Grant that the artist alone attains the end, or does so more
than anyone else. If the rhetor is said to succeed alone or more
than anyone else, that does not prove the sophist a rhetor. But
this does not prove that politics is not an art, but the point would
be proven if in law court and assembly no one of them suc-
ceeded more than those not rhetors. If it said that one skilled
in trials attains the end, this remark is ridiculous. For in some
arts, those untrained can attain the end.

rhetoric because the heroes were rhetors before any treatises on rhetoric
were written. Cf. I, 2 7 , 6 = Suppl. 15, 17. Also II, 76, fr. III. Philo-
demus seems to be arguing with a Stoic ; cf . Sudhaus I, p. XXX.
38 Cf. Theognis, 215 f.

" This is the Stoic position. Probably he is quoting Diogenes of Baby-
lon; cf. Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) P- 290.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

289

They will say that the art is independent, but requires much II, 87, fr.
natural superiority, 30 and practice in actual political life in which XIV '
the art is deficient ; and that those who are acquainted with the
principles of the art are impotent if they do not have these
external aids.

Having considered the arguments of this philosopher, we must IT 116, fr.
next take up those of the Cyrenaic Theodorus and his followers.

"If the rhetors deceive, they are themselves deceived by their 11^90,^ — n
own instruments, just as in the case of sight and hearing. For I2I> fr _~7.
if one deceives he can be deceived; therefore they deceive no
more than they are themselves deceived." First, how does this
prove that rhetoric is not an art? I do not see why he says that
the rhetors are deceived, and that they do not merely deceive. 31

When the rhetors deceive they deceive with a deception of II, 89, fr.
others, not of themselves; as when a soldier strikes down his XVn
opponent, and says that he defeated him with defeat, he means
his opponent's defeat, not his own.

When a man sees, he is not therefore seen ; the same applies II, 88, fr.
to hearing. Therefore rhetors are not deceived because they
deceive.

One who deceives is also deceived himself; consequently II, 113, fr.
capable rhetors are deceived in trials fully as much as they IV '
deceive. I wonder if Theodorus did not frequently deceive many ;
he had the power to deceive, and does not acknowledge that he
was led astray.

The third syllogism is more endurable but no less absurd. For n, 88, fr.
the physician can cure even if he uses barbarisms and soloecisms, XVI > 7 -
and does not speak in rhetorical style.

Persuasion is purely a matter of guesswork. xi^=*li

He says that the end of rhetoric is to persuade the hearer. 116, fr.

We shall say nothing to those who say that the end of rhetoric VIIL ^
is to be able to find possible arguments on questions ; or as some XXI = II.
state it, to find the arguments for every question, and to refute Jj 4 ' I( ^' ^ r IIp
the opposing arguments. 32 IXa.

311 irpoT(pTjp.n means 'superiority' as in Polyb. Ill, 89, 9 : v" ^ T « irpoTeprjuaTa
'Pw^atW, aKaTaTpLirra x°PVJ lcL Ka - L x €l P^ v n\ijdos.

" Quimilism has a li.-l of examples to prove that the deception practiced
by the orators does not involve self-deception. II, 17, 18-21.

3= Cf. Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, I, 2: Uvap.ii irepl eVao-roc toC 0eu-
p-rj&aL to ivSexop-tvov Ti0ap6».

290

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

— 'll 4 'i* r ' 11 *- A refutation of an argument against rhetoric based on the

fr. XVII.' mutual recrimination of orators.) If Aeschines charges Demos-
thenes with using 8av/j.ara instead of prjfiara 33 of what use is that
as an argument? Do not the philosophers revile one another? 3 ' 1

II, 97, fr. This fragment yields nothing of importance except the distinction

between practical orators, Demosthenes and Lycurgus, and sophists, Iso-
crates and Matris. Cf. II, 233, 15.

II, 100, fr. This deals with the argument that rhetoric is not an art because it has
• been excluded from some cities. 35

II, 102, fr. Phocion studied the political art with Plato or Aristotle, and

became a statesman.
Vij 102 ' fr ' Rivalry between Critolaus and the rhetors.
II, 105, f r. The next argument is : "All practice and observation and
training has some end to which all the parts ought to tend;
rhetoric has no such end."
n,_ros, fr. [Rhetoricians] were not in good repute at the very beginning,
in Egypt and Rhodes and Italy.

XI.

11^107, fr. We shall next consider the statement that every art is invented
for some useful purpose, but rhetoric tends [to deceive]. 36

H^ioS, fr. [I think that he wishes to] say that they do not have theoretical
acquaintance with all subjects, but only with some; that the
speakers in actual debates discuss many political problems, and,
therefore some are able to speak to the point, others not; and
that those who have a theoretical acquaintance with all subjects
are good speakers. 37

33 Aesch. Ill, 167.

'"'For eav/iacrtovpyiav 1. 6 Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 431, pro-
poses to read ffavfiarowouai:
35 Cf . I, 16, fr. IX.

30 Cf. I, 2, 6, ff . = Suppl. 4, 4, ft. Possibly this is the opinion of Crito-
laus; cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 10-12.

31 It is impossible to determine the identity of the person from whom
Philodemus quotes this opinion. It may be of interest to note, however,
that a similar opinion of the need of universal knowledge in oratory was
warmly supported by Cicero. The most striking passage for purposes of
comparison with Philodemus is in the De Oratore, I, 5, 17: Est enim
scientia comprehendenda rerum plurimarum ; but the thought is elaborated
in a large number of passages which I have collected in my dissertation—
The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, Dionysius and Aristides, pp. 20 ff.
It would be rash to make the claim that Philodemus was aiming at Cicero,
for Philodemus in spite of his long residence at Rome, and his close con-
nection with a prominent Roman family is entirely Greek in his literary

The Rhctorica of Philodemus. 2< > 1

They do not show that rhetoricians were contemporary with n, wg, fr.
the physicists. The fact that there were political rhetors before
the technical treatises of the sophists were written, does not
prove that political rhetoric is not an art.

The same form of argument could be used with damaging II,ho, fr.
effect against its author ; .there were certainly statesmen before
Plato and Aristotle wrote on politics, and it can be proven that
philosophy is not an episteme, for there were good men before
Zeno Cleanthes. Socrates and Aristotle.

If we consider that he (i. e. Homer) was the founder (dpfep) II in, fr.
of philosophy, as he is held to be not by the Critics alone but by ^ -
the philosophers of all sects, it is just as reasonable to hold that
he was the founder of rhetoric. 38

Does rhetoric help body or soul? n > II2 - fr - L

Let us now take up the statement of these same people that II 113, fr.
political rhetoric is an art, but less so than others ; for they agreed -- ■
that a few who had reached the top would be capable speakers.

He who says that the end of rhetoric is to persuade, does not II, 114.
persuade himself but his neighbor.

He holds the art to blame for the mistakes of those who are n,nc, fr.
only partially acquainted with it.

If many are able to attain an easy end, oftentimes better than a „j, fr.
the artist, still artists are to be admired, and are able to attain
difficult end. For a physician who can cure ten out of a hundred
difficult cases cannot be said to succeed in the majority of cases,
vet we might call him a good artist.

' There is no method by which one can persuade the multitude, II, rao, fr.
either always or in the majority of cases.

... and they say that Isocrates and Gorgias and Lysias 11^
acknowledged that' they did not possess science. This is incred-
ible and impossible, since they professed to be artists, and to

references. Cicero's opinions, however, were not unique but merely repre-
sentative of the revival of the 'philosophic rhetoric' of Isocrates, which
is represented on the Greek side by Dionysius, and, as we know from the
introduction to his Attic Orators, by many others, some of whom may
have been in the mind of Philodemus. Furthermore, any reference to
Cicero is excluded by the probability that the Rhetorica of Philodemus
antedates the De Oratore.

35 Wilamowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899) p. 636, reads 1. 10 oi x I. 13
aip«r«ws and explains kpitikw* as the school of Crates.

122.

292

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

teach others. Isocrates left technical treatises, and so did many
other sophists, and declare it to be a wonderful art.

fr. V 3 ' But ^ the rhetoricians ] do not know how to make laws, or

govern according- to their manuals.
II, 123, fr. Inasmuch as rhetors persuade some people by kisses, let us not

say that others are artists who do not possess the rhetor's faculty.

He demands that every science have its own subject matter with

which it is concerned, and tries to show that rhetoric has no such

subject matter. 39

IV. ° 6 ' fr ' • ■ • we use the principles of grammar ; and using the same
line of argument, if we are to heal we shall use the principles of
medicine, and so in the case of the other arts.

IL 125, fr. ^ We take up next the argument that every art attains the end
either always or generally, but rhetoric falls into neither of these
classes, but succeeds rarely, and then by the use of elements
common to all men. 40

II, 126, fr. (Summary of the arguments against the Stoics.) They use a
poor definition which excludes all the conjectural arts; they
make false accusations against rhetoric, which really accom-
plishes much by definite principles ; many other criticisms might
be made against them. We now pass to the next group,
Ptolemaeus. ...

XVII?! How can one teach vocal culture unless one has a trained voice,

or medicine unless one is a physician?

\\ r c f } r - Gladly would I learn why only occupations fit for a free man
can be considered arts. How could rhetoric be called unsuit-
able < lf • ■ • 1 P ass by for the moment the statement that
[the rhetors themselves] do not wish to have it considered an
art; for Demosthenes and Pericles claimed [to possess] rhetoric,
and usage [accepts it as an art].

In 94 ' fr ' _ No less in error is the next argument which runs as follows ;

if the theorems of the art ought to be of such a nature, one must
not do this. However one must not draw the conclusion which
they direct. (What follows refers to periods.)

11^91, fr. Epicurus has stated explicitly in his Tlcpl foroptirijs that their
knowledge of sophistic does not give them theoretical knowledge

[of politic-].

'Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 48 ff., Quint. II, 21; v. Excursus p. 374.
'Cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 13-15.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

293

One who spells Dionysus is not more grammatical than one ^ 88 >
who spells Theodoras." . . . The physician and grammarian
attempt to impart certain things to others, and to instruct stu-
dents of grammar and medicine; similarly, the rhetor . . .

Let us say that music and medicine and Epicurean philosophy 82,
are not arts. Consequently they will say that there is no char-
acteristic exercise in the arts, and judge that the assistance that
comes from the arts . . .

It is quite incredible that Isocrates accomplished any such II, 70,
result with this faculty. 42

If the Spartans and Romans manage their governments without H, 65.
the aid of rhetoric . . . 43

BOOK III.

At the close of the second book Philodemus remarks: "Sophistic is
not the knowledge of political rhetoric; this section we shall take up in
the Hypomnematismus which is to follow. In that it will be demon-
strated that political ability cannot come from these sophistical schools
any more than from the common schools or the philosophical schools;
that oftentimes the possession of it is responsible for 110 small mischief,
and does not bring success in actual law cases."

This is the only certain indication that we have of the contents of the
third book. Sudhaus thinks that some of the fragments of the Hypom-
nematicon may belong to this book, but the two works overlap so much
that the question cannot be settled with certainty.

BOOK IV.

The contents of this book may be deduced from the closing paragraph,
I 222, col. XLIIa, 4. ' kTVOTzOeuptuicvuv ToiYapoC, Si Vaie iral, awavTUv & ptp-q
$a*L Tires Kal dtHdypara rfjs faropiKijs indp X eiv, li piv KaT^evarai, ra S'

oidlv xpijo-i/^ei tois prj li 'prfTopiKa aotpurrevovai, dr)\ov otl iro/iTreiierai Trap afrroh
to m Tepa twv iJ.aHTtp.irwv Kol tOv Te X vS>v ehm kcu tix' ivBf,K V Kal a<PeTT)pior tt)v
pT}TOpiKi)V Kal paWov en peTa ttjs TreiftjOs \apl3avopevrji>. It was a criticism
of rhetoric, following the divisions of the ordinary rhetorical techne.
All that remains is the treatment of Xet's or tppdtris. and inrcKpuris, with
a short digression on the province of the orator. The study of the book

11 1, e. different words have different spellings, and different arts have
different principles, but one is an art just as much as the other.

*' Isocrates is representative of sophistic. The sentence means : It is
incredible that sophistic trains for practical rhetoric.

"Cf. the use of the same argument in the larger fragment, I, 14, fr. V.

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

may be facilitated by prefixing a short outline of its present contents to
the detailed treatment of the fragments.

The main body of the book is devoted to A^ts. The first two columns
however, do not have any connection with this subject. Column I, vol. I,
p. 147 deals with <pvais, column II with the meaning of (pCKoaocpia.. The
connected fragment begins with column III. III-X discuss the meaning
of saXii as applied to M{u. XI-XIX treat of faults of style, soloecism,
barbarism and obscurity. The second group of fragments (I, p. 162 ff.)
begins with a discussion of homoioteleuton (col. I) and collision of
vowels (col. II). Col. HI outlines the following discussion of 4>pd<ris
dividing it into rpojros, (T X r}pa and ir\dap.a. The first part of the discussion
of rpoTros is too fragmentary to permit of any restoration. X-XXII criti-
cizes the rhetorical treatment of metaphors, XXIII introduces the subject
of allegory, and there the fragment ends; the sections on Txv.^a and
TrXdovM are entirely lost. The next group of fragments, continuing the
criticism of text books of rhetoric, denies that rhetoric can claim the
credit for teaching men to avoid faults of speech (col. I a -XI a ). XI a -
XIX" makes a similar criticism of the rhetorical claims to teach virbKpiau.
XX"-XXX a attacks the rhetorician's claim of ability to speak on all sub-
jects, XXX a -XL a criticizes the sophistical use of epideictic, denying that
the sophistical encomia possess moral value. XLI has a brief remark on
Demetrius' peculiar fourfold division of oratory. The book concludes
with a summary (XLII-XLIV).

J - P- 147, They agree with us regarding- what is naturally and truly

advantageous. Therefore he who has learned what is naturally
good and bad. and intermediate and indifferent, and has acquired
the practical and theoretical means of producing this .

J, 147. col- The restoration of this column is very uncertain. I cannot understand
the use of Jttov (1. 7) with e K a\ovv following in 1. 11 without a connective.
The meaning seems to be that the rhetoricians, claiming that their pro-
fession was a philosophy and an art. meant that it was a philosophy in the
sense in which Isocrates used the term, i. e. the study of the whole of
human activity from the standpoint of the orator, and not with the inten-
tion of parallelling the Peripatetics and Stoics by propounding a peculiar
system of thought. This claim that rhetoric is the most comprehensive
of studies is noticed again at the end of the book, I, 223, 11 quoted above
P- 37-

1, 148, col. This fragment is part of a discussion of the meaning of xaXyj as applied
nl - { ° x<f £" ° ! ' •Ppao-'-i- One possible definition is that Ka\f, Aejis j s one which

can present proposals which shall seem advantageous 1 in such a way as to
wm the audience. This definition is mentioned only to be rejected.

1 For the thought cf. Sext. Emp. Adv. Rhet. 56 : Sibwtp frav Xiyirai 6
trf-rap KaSrji X^eus efrai KaTatnctvaiTTiKbs, froi Kara, tovto Xiyerai ko.86 tt/v Tit

av^ipovra. Trpd.yp.ara Sr/XoOa-av Xe*iv mraaKevd^t oirre Si ko.66 tt)v rit avfupipovra.

Ttp6.yna.ra in)vio<o<sav ■ oudev yap icaat rrepi toiW rdi* Trpa.yp.iTUp ot gropes.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

295

KaXri <j>pdcns belongs to the Epicurean philosophers, but is not J ^49, col.
even remotely connected with the rhetoricians or sophists. For
}f by koXti one means the use of words in their proper meaning',
why should the philosophers take second place?

Any "imitation" of things by words is impossible. In the
beautiful style of Isocrates, or the grand style of Demosthenes t. i 50> col.
we do not find this attempt to fit sound to sense. VI -

If there were no naturally beautiful style, it might be neces- co! -
sary to be content with one established by arbitrary authority.
But as there is a naturally beautiful style it is a shame to seek
for another. For the arbitrary style is not accepted by all, noi-
ls it always the same in the same author ; some imitate the style
of Isocrates, others that of Thucydides. 2

Whom then shall we imitate, especially since it is so formidable 1.^152. col.
a task? Perchance we might imitate all who have been success-
ful at any time or place. One cannot even say that all rhetors
adopt one style.

Only two or three at the most imitate Isocrates, and some col.
say that the style of Isocrates is not uniform in all his works.

Therefore the grammarians and philosophers who refuse to J^ 15 ^'
follow these rules, but write in simple style and not in the
ridiculous style prescribed by the manuals [write better than
the sophists]. We have now discussed every possible phase of
the subject.

Now in regard to a correct use of the Greek language which I. 154. col.
some say consists in observing the local peculiarities of speech
(dialectical peculiarities), and in the avoidance of soloecism and
barbarism 3 — some call the failure to observe the local peculiari-
ties soloecism, still others make a distinction between barbarism
and incorrect pronunciation, e. g. a mistake in aspiration or
accent — it is not convenient to speak at present. 4

2 Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 365, quotes Maximus
Planudes, Schol. Hermog. vol. V, p. 440. 25 W; * »« yt'Ewlmvpos h r$ «/>«
jiTiropiKijs avBadearepov tifyat \iyan> tprjalv airbi p.6i'os evp-r/Kevai t4 X vw itoXitucS»
A67WI/ • tous Se aWovs airoaKopaKifav pTjropas eoi'ra ?rws FW E »» ^7" ' Jap
ianv i) KaTopdoma \6yovs, rex"1 ovSep.ia. Apparently he thought that Epicurus
was a rhetorician !

'Reading in 1. 11 mSi for oi 5e as suggested by von Arnim, Hermes
XXVIII (1893) P. IS3-

' The distinction between barbarism and soloecism which is given by the
later grammarians when the theory had become crystallized was that

296

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

Xl} 55 ' CO! ' "^ le S0 P n ' sts commit more soloecisms than anyone else. There
is no art of style, such as they desire, and as is found in other
lines of study. To sum up the question of style — one style is
common to all. (I. e. the natural.)

XIII 6 ' C01 ' Obscurity is of two kinds, intentional and unintentional. It
is intentional when one has nothing- to say, and conceals the
I 1 col P ovei "ty of his thought by obscure language that he may seem
XIV.' ' to say something useful. [Connected with this] is the use of
many digressions, poetic images, recondite allusions and archaic
I, 157, col. language. Soloecisms prevent the hearer from understanding
many things. Only the true philosopher is free from these-
I, 158, col. faults. Unintentional obscurity arises from not mastering the
XVI - subject, or not observing the proper formation of periods either

in writing or speaking, and in general from failure to use pure
Greek, and from believing that words are in harmony with
things. 5

barbarism was a mistake in a single word e. g. in the use of a wrong
ending, while soloecism was a mistake in syntax. The two overlapped
somewhat, and it remained a question whether to use hanc meaning a
man, was a soloecism or barbarism. (Cf. Quint. I, 5, 34 ff., Diomed.
455K-) QuintiKan with his usual good sense decides that this is a soloe-
cism.

Quintilian and later authorities include under barbarism mistakes in the
use of the aspirate and in accent, which some teste Philodemo preferred
to make a separate class. (Quint. I, 5, 19; I, 5, 22; Donat. p. 392K.)
The definition of eW-qviaiws here given is parallelled in Herodian, De
Soloecismo et Barbarismo, Nauck, Lex. Vindob. p. 311, 9; ' EparriOeh ns
t'l ttTTLV eWrj v iff fibs, e07/, ' TO TTa.ffo.is 7 ah oioK^ktoXs 6p9ws xPV a ^ aL '' In their
origin there seems to have been no distinction between soloecism and
barbarism. Aristotle uses the terms interchangeably (Soph. El. Ill) ;
Hegesias has the same confusion (ap. Dion. Hal., De Comp. Verb. 18, p.
82, 5 U. et R.). The first clear statement of the distinction which after-
wards became fixed is in Diogenes of Babylon ap. Diog. Laert. VII, i. 59.
But the question was far from being settled by his dictum, as this passage
from Philodemus shows.

5 Reading <jvn<p[ava\ for avpupfcrij] lines 24, 25. Does he refer to the
doctrine, elaborated by the Stoics though not originated by them, of the
onomatopoetic origin of language? Cf. Arist. Rhet. Ill, 1, 8; Plato Crat.
423A; August. Princ. Dialect., VI (I, 1412M). Of the Stoic position the
latter says: Stoici autumant, quos Cicero in hac re irridet, nullum esse
verbum, cuius non certa ratio explicari possit. Et quia hoc modo sug-
gerere facile fuit, si diceres hoc infinitum esse; quibus verbis alterius verbi
originem interpretaveris, eorum rursus a te originem quaerendam esse

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

297

[Obscurity also arises] from ignorance of the proper mean- I, i59> col.
ings of words, their connotation, and the principles on which
one word is to be preferred to another.

In addition to these there is a fault treated separately by the I, 160, col.
theorists, namely the too frequent use of hyperbata, and failure XVI11 -
to make the gap between the separated words short enough when
it is necessary to use this figure ; and the separation of correlated
conjunctions by too large an interval. 6

One should use ordinary expressions appropriately, and not ^.j 1 ^ 1, co1 -
express onesself inaccurately, nor vaguely, nor use expressions
with double meaning. 7

They (the sophists) have not explained the intricacies of
subject matter. [This belongs to the philosophers.]

(A discussion on the choice of words has preceded.) The Ii J 6 2 . co '- !■
most important of the rhetorical sophists err in their too great
devotion to homoioteleuton and similar figures, and pay little
heed to the use of words.

Collision of vowels is rather frigid, but sometimes not inop- I, 163,
portune. However they (the sophists) do not define each case co1 ' '
(i. e. when it is to be avoided and when permitted), but they
depend entirely on subjective tests. ... If, then, the observa- j jg. col _
tion of the principles laid down by them involves anything III.
extraordinary, and there are present r«tf</ and and the other
characteristics of artificial speech, I wonder if a satisfactory
form of expression has not been moulded from the vulgar speech.
This artificial speech they divide into three parts : rpmros, (r^jia,
irXaafw. ■ Tpo7ros includes metaphor, allegory, etc.; o-t^/m, periods,
cola, commata and the combinations of these ; -n-Xdcrfia refers to

donee perveniatur eo nt res cum sono verbi aliqua similitudine concinat,
ut, cum dicimus, aeris tinnitum etc. . . . Sed quia sunt res, quae non
sonant, in his similitudinem tactus valere, ut si leniter vel aspere sensum
tangunt, lenitas vel asperitas litterarum ut tangit auditum, sic eis noraina
peperit. . . . Lene est auribus, cum dicimus, voluptas, asperum est, cum
dicimus, crux. . . . Haec quasi cunabula verborum esse crediderunt, ut
sensus rerum cum sonorum sensu concordarent. Hinc ad . . . simili-
tudinem . . . processisse licentiam nominandi. . . . Inde ad
abusionem ventum est. . . . Innumerabilia enim sunt verba, quorum
ratio reddi non possit; aut non est, ut ego arbitror, aut latet, ut Stoici
contenclunl .

Cf. Arist. Rhet. Ill, 5. 2.

'• Cf. Arist Rhet. II, 22, 12.

2 9 8

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

the distinction between grand and plain and middle or smooth
style. s It is foolish to apply the term nXda-fia to everything which
transgresses the bounds of plain speech.

I, i65-i6 9 . Cols. V — IX are too fragmentary to permit a restoration of a complete
sentence. It is evident from such phrases as p-eraipipuv rat 6vop.aaLai
(167, col. VII, 6), TrXetcTas €v rots 7rpdyiJ.acriv dfj-otor-qras £pvoeii> /cai Sia^opds
( 16S, 24), iuTa(t>opah (169, 16), that they are devoted to a discussion of
Tpowos (c.f. col. III). Apparently in col. VIII there was some discus-
sion of the propriety of metaphors in deliberative oratory. Col. X
sub fin. and col. XI discuss some plan for a scientific classification of
metaphors, the details of which are not clear. He continues (coll. XII,
XIII) with a criticism of the common rhetorical doctrine of metaphors.

I. 171. 2, The rhetoricians are content to classify and describe metaphors.

col. XII. e g animate objects are compared to animate, or animate to
inanimate, inanimate to animate etc., but they give no practical
working instructions.

I. 173, col. They will ridicule a metaphor without explaining why it is

XIV " faulty or how a good metaphor is to be invented. While they

divert the attention of young men from philosophy they do not
give specific instructions when to use metaphors and allegories.

i. 174. co! for tne y consider that the use of metaphors is of advantage

XV. only to teachers, but to one engaged in the intercourse of active
life they are superfluous baggage. If the use of literal expres-
sions is extended over so wide a field, every art will be silent
because deprived of the helpful assistance of metaphors. Some
even apply opprobrious epithets to those who call in the aid of
figurative language.

I, 17;, col. The language again becomes fragmentary. Apparently the charge is

XVI. I, 176, made that the sophists use metaphors even more freely than the poets, not
col. XVII. tQ ment j on t he other writers of prose. Other fragments of these two

columns are almost too small to notice.
I, 177. col. Some say that they use metaphors for the sake of the compari-
XV III. son or resemblance ; not however resemblance per se, but . . .

I. 179, col. This column deals with the far-fetched metaphors of which two

XX. examples are given. These were criticized by persons whose own use of
metaphors was not above reproach on this score.

I, 180, col. Many who have received an education, and who are acquainted

XXI. vvith the sciences, use metaphors nearly as much as the sophists.

5 For /ieyeBos 1. 4 read y-eabTrira with Radermacher, Rhein. Mus. LIV
(1899) p. 361, n. 1.

The Rhctorica of Philodemus. 2 99

It is strange then if we are to avoid metaphors, wholly, or I^So. col.
in part, while the sophists use them constantly.

Col. XXIII is the beginning of a discussion of allegory, dividing it into L^iS^col.
three parts, atmy/m, ira/mii'ia, eiptliveia, disregarding for the present such
subdivisions as ypt<pos and ivreur/iis.

The first five columns of this section are disconnected fragments. The j t ,8 2i co l,
subject is the avoidance of faults of style. In column IV the thought is, I«— I 186,
"But the avoidance of these faults is not the result of technical training in co1 - v •
rhetoric." Various faults to be avoided are mentioned in column III*";
viz. the use of rhythm in prose, obscure use of metonomy, and omission of
the second of two correlating particles. The continuous section begins
with column IV a 1. 5a.

The sophistical training does not prevent faulty speech. Those
who compose these technical treatises would have us believe that
nobody observed these errors in speech before they wrote, and
that they speak more correctly than other people.

How can he (i. e. some rhetorician whose statement of the I. i86,_co:.
above tenor has just been quoted) say that these faults were not v "< 1 b -
observed by the famous statesmen and philosophers who pre-
ceded Zopyrus and Antiphon, who avoided most if not all of
them? He did not allow himself any loophole for escape, such
as allowing "rhetoric" in his statement to be interpreted as
meaning such instruction as Phoenix is reputed to have given
Achilles, for he will not allow natural ability in speaking to be
called rhetoric. And he made his statement more emphatic by
saying, "before the study of rhetoric became firmly established."
Consequently both Thucydides the son of Stephanus 10 and
Thucydides the son of Olorus were guilty of these faults of
style. For the systematic study of rhetoric began in their day,
but can hardly be said to have been firmly established. And yet ^ ^ ^
the introduction of these studies has made no difference in the y Ip _ ! "
way people speak. I hesitate to say that no one except a ditch
digger and Maison talks in the way which he criticizes, but I
think that such language as he condemns is characteristic not of
an uneducated man, but of one lacking in common sense.

Therefore let us not wonder at his statement that the technical y/n?'

COi.

• It is probable that col. IV should precede col. III*. Then col. Ill" and
col V are continuous reading ; *r«» ^" ™W-o>» ^ a9k * f7rol7 > K •

airis m x&P" «** *«8#«««». thus illustrating the omission of 5i after i*r.
This is the suggestion of Sandys, Class. Rev. IX, p. 359-

™ Apparently a slip for Melesias.

3°° Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

IX* 90 * T'i treatises 011 rhetoric al "e the sole standard of correct speech.

coI.'x» I91 ' If he caIled rhetorical speech the only correct speech, his state-
ment would be consistent. And that is what he actually appears
to mean when he says that at the time poets and educated men
flourished in Greece all were inferior to the sophists in correct-
ness of speech. He does not permit us to understand him to be
speaking- of ordinary conversation, because he cites examples of
faults in diction, and corrects them. If he said that the rhetors
were successful in rhetoric he was speaking- either with reference
to the dialectician (a position which we refute) or with reference
to other educated persons or artists, each of whom understands
the principles of his profession better than a layman, as for
example he himself has represented Philo the architect address-

r, 192, col. ' m S the people about the arsenal. 11 But study of technical

XI s -. rhetoric has never advanced anyone.

Section II.
Delivery.

XI* L 12!' ° f the S ' X ' ° r as some sa y seven ' P arts of rhetoric, Athenaeus
says that the most important is delivery, 12 and we agree that a.
good delivery lends dignity to the speaker, secures the attention
of the audience and sways their emotions. But if 13 it is more
the task of rhetoric to teach this than it is the task of dialectic
or grammar one would desire to learn it. One teaches how to
argue, the other how to read. If they claim that delivery in
drama comes under the head of rhetoric, we congratulate them
on their sense. But if actors do not need assistance from the

kin* C °'' rIletorician wh y do they not allow us, too, to decide on the delivery
proper to our own sphere? The fact- that, uncertain in the

_ 11 On Philo the architect cf. Cic. De Orat. I, 14, 62. The use which the
rhetorician made of Philo may be estimated from the words of Cicero,
Neque enim, si Philonem ilium architectum, qui Atheniensibus arma-
mentarium fecit, constat perdiserte populo rationem opens sui reddidisse,
extstimandum est architecti potius artificio disertum quam oratoris fuisse!
Is "fcosaWi Demetrius of Phalerum? See the discussion by Fuhr in
Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 434.

12 1 adopt the emendation of Gomperz, Sitzungsb. d. k. Ak. in Wien, vol.
CXXIII, p. 33, quoted in Sudhaus' apparatus.

"Reading in 1. 25 el for ou with von Arnim, Hermes XXVIII (r8gi)
P- 153.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

301

beginning, they take refuge in this, that the actors try to rival
the delivery taught by the rhetoricians, is not consistent with
their magnifying the art of rhetoric because of delivery, and
claiming that for this reason it is better than philosophy. If
they say that they are the only ones who have formulated an
art of delivery, they do violence to the plain fact that the poets
and writers of prose have a theory of delivery even though they
have not committed it to writing.

Much of delivery is the natural and unconscious bodily expres- I, 195, col.
sion of the emotions. Delivery depends, too, on natural endow- XIV ' l > 8 -
ment, beauty of voice, grace of body, selfpossession, qualities
the lack of which caused Isocrates to refrain from public
appearances. But Demosthenes said that delivery was the first Co1 - xv °-
thing in oratory, and the second and the third, and actors say
that it is everything in their art. However it was ridiculous to
say that this element which is of assistance to all is of more
account in rhetoric than in other forms of prose. Although
Demosthenes was in the first rank of rhetors, still he is criticized
by Aeschines for his shrill voice, and again for loudness, 14 and
by Demetrius of Phalerum for being too theatrical, and not
simple and noble in his delivery. Moreover most of the sophists,
judged by their writings, seem to have had a poor delivery.
Their long periods are hard to pronounce, teste Demetrio. 15
Hieronymus also criticizes Isocrates. His orations he says are
easy to read, but hard to deliver in public ; there is no fire in ( igg> cq1
them; everything is monotonously smooth. He sounds like a XVII a , 23.
boy speaking through a heroic mask. Sophists of the present
day have somewhat improved in delivery.

The formal instruction in delivery is a product of recent I, 200,
foolishness ; however many of the heroes had an excellent xvln > 1
delivery. What the technographers have done is to make plain
what had been kept secret before by the statesmen, viz. that
they have a system for making themselves appear dignified and
noble, and for misleading their audiences. This system is not
needed by any other artist, certainly not by the philosopher.
The fact is, each profession has its own peculiar delivery.

14 Aesch. 2, 157: ivTtiv&iievos TTjv o^tidv Kai Avbaiov <$navi\v. Io6, dvajSog.
ira-nixeyidiS Aj)fuxr#ei<ijs. Cf . 86 ; In Ctes. 218.

15 For Isocrates' own opinion on the way people delivered his orations
v. Panath. 17, Phil. 25-29.

302

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I. 201. COl.
XX". 12.

I. 202. COl.

XXK

I. 204, col.

XXII", 16.

I, 204. col.
XXIII".

I. 20(5. coi.
XXV".

r. 207. coi.

XXVI".

Sophists with common sense confine themselves to a discus-
sion of political questions, and do not claim to discuss the form
of introduction, narration etc. suitable to every question. 10 The
latter is reserved for the thick-witted crew who fail to distinguish
whether 1) only political questions can be treated in these divi-
sions, or 2) all questions can be so treated, and that they are
the only ones who outline methods adapted to all questions, or
3) they are the only ones who have published such treatises.
All three positions are unsound, for 1 ) almost all questions are
treated according to this division, 2) the technographers have
given us no treatises on philosophy or music, 3) other professions
have laid down rules for presenting their subject matter.

The same confusion of thought is found in the claim that the
end of rhetoric is to find the possible arguments on any subject,
and that rhetoric is alone or almost alone in doing this. 17 In
the first place this is nothing more or less than "invention."
In the second place if rhetoric can discover the possible argu-
ments in questions relating to medicine, music, etc. the rhetori-
cians are immediately put into rivalry with the experts in each
of these professions. As it is impossible for a philosopher to
discover the best possible arguments for some other sect, how
can one in a totally different line of activity discover these
arguments ?

Each profession has its own facts and principles, and is alone
competent to argue about them. But grant that the end of
rhetoric is to find the possible arguments on every rhetorical
subject; the phrase "on every" needs restriction.

Besides iet us say that no good can result from being able to
discover arguments, even if it is valuable to have the state of
mind which could discover them. For it is clear that he who

'"This paragraph is an attack on followers of Isocrates such as Cicero,
who claimed for the orator the right to speak on all subjects. Cf. De
Oratore, III, 20, 76, as an illustration of the principle, although Philodemus
probably wrote before Cicero: Ilia vis autem eloquentiae tanta est ut
omnium rerum virtutum omciorum omnisque naturae, quae mores homi-
num quae auimos, quae vitam continet, originem vim mutationesque teneat,
eadem mores leges iura describat, rem publicam regat, omnia quae ad
quamcumque rem pertineant ornate copioseque dicat.

17 This is substantially Aristotle's definition, Rhet. I. 2, I : ttrru Si> faropiKi)
SAm/us irepi € kc.&tov toO ffeuprjaai rb irSexdpemii iriBavbv.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3°3

discovers the inherent arguments must know those which are

cogent, and those which are only plausible; but they are far

from knowing- what is plausible and what is necessary. Nor r 2og cjl _

do they know what is possible and impossible; their natural XXV1R

philosophy is of no help to them. Then they need a criterion of

truth, and it is folly to think they possess this. If they say L^og.^.il.

that what appears true to the crowd is true, they say nothing

more than that the statesman can discover the inherent political

arguments; secondly, the majority does not always abide by L|io.cM.

the same standard of judgment. Perhaps some one will say

that a happy life has no need of politics and rhetorical sophistic.

I assert that the sophists can. at least as far as their technical

treatises are concerned, discover not the slightest argument

pertaining to politics.

Again another will object that the great sophists have no
ability in sophistic, as is shown by the published treatises. I
say that the arguments of the sophists and statesmen are mostly-
false. To discover all the arguments requires a deeper and
more philosophic understanding.

Rhetoricians divide their subjects into three parts: forensic, L 3n. col.
(SiKaviKa), deliberative (o-v/x^ovXevTiKa), and encomiastic (ra rrepl tow ~ lg '

ij/oyovi). We will omit for the present, discussion of
the first two, except to say that some use the term Swao-TjjpiaxoV
instead of St/ravi/coV, and that deliberative oratory gives advice
only on matters affecting the common welfare, and that this
advice is not the product of the sophistic art, but of quite a
different art.

In regard to the encomiastic branch of oratory, let us say that ^XTI^'f
political orators frequently employ passages of praise and
censure but they do not use them after the fashion of the
sophists, nor do they claim to be the only ones able to praise or
censure. That is the pretension of the sophists whom we now
proceed to answer referring directly to their published works.
If they mean that they alone have the power to praise or censure
all things, it is right to inquire whether they praise or censure
the same object indifferently, or only praise what is praiseworthy,
and censure what is blameworthy. If the former, aside from the
impossibility of praising that which is blameworthy, there are
some things which do not admit of either praise or censure;

3°4

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I, 215, col.
XXXIV".

I. 216, col.
XXXV, 14

I, 218, col.
XXXVII",
19-

I, 220, col.
XXXIX* 4

I, 220, col.
XL".

I, 222, 6.

if to the second, they arrogate to themselves the knowledge of
what is useful or harmful. If they profess to write encomia of
gods and heroes, and to praise some men and censure others,
we say that the gods do not need any praise of men, especially
not the unseemly praise of the sophists. Their praise of brute
beasts does no good, for one can not change the nature of
animals by this process.

They say that men are turned to virtue by their encomia, and
dissuaded from vice by their denunciations. But the sophists
by their praise of Busiris and similar characters, persuade men
to become villains. And when they do praise a good man they
praise him for qualities considered good by the crowd, and not
for truly good qualities. If they had real philosophic insight
into the nature of virtue and vice, they would seek virtue and
avoid vice themselves.

Not only do they fail at times to praise anything useful, but
they frequently praise 'bad things, and by lavishing praise on
matters of small account they incline us to treat all subjects
lightly, and by their praise of men to their faces lead to great
confusion. They are ignorant, too, of the proper time to praise,
which we discuss in our work Ilepi liralvov.

Furthermore, no one can believe the encomiasts, because they
praise bad men, and often praise and censure the same person.

The sophists do not excel the poets in their ability to praise,
nor even some of the philosophers. In fact any one can do what
they claim as their sole possession. We grant that they may
have a monopoly of such encomia as are in common circulation.
That they do any good thereby, we deny.

Demetrius adds a fourth class to those mentioned. This he
calls hTtvKTiKbvo.wa.oLv (obtaining favor with all). 18 If he means
that which obtains favor with the multitude, and with potentates,
let him have his point for the present; later we shall see what
comes of it. But he errs in assigning this and the sophistical
branch of rhetoric to the same individual. If he takes the search
for truth from the philosophers and gives it to the rhetoricians

"Crdnert, Kolotes und Menedemos, p. 69, refers this to Demetrius of
Phalerum. Diogenes Laertius gives among the works of Demetrius (V,
S, 80, 81) 8rjnrrtop,£iv re Kal irpecfieiCiv . . . <ruvo.ywyai, and UpeapevriKbs,
and his fourth class may be speeches of ambassadors.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3°5

he is transferring the power he once had in political affairs to
investigations which require proof.

After considering all the divisions of rhetoric and its claims, ^222, col.
Gains, and recognizing that some are false, and others are of
no use to one who does not make a profession of rhetoric, it is
plain that their claim that rhetoric is the mother of the arts
and sciences is a vain pretense. In another place we shall dis-
cuss the charge that it is based on deceit, and therefore harmful.
We differ from them when they say that the students of rhetoric L^n^col.
become better than their contemporaries. If they mean that
they become better in their private lives they are utterly wrong. 19
If they claim that it gives them more practical power than other
arts, we retort that all do not obtain power, but some are
banished and hated. Gorgias' statement 20 that the rhetorician
is more artistic than any other artist we shall consider later.

BOOK V.

This book consists of three groups of fragments. The first group is
contained in vol. II pp. 131-143, and is designated as A by Sudhaus in his
introduction; the second group is in vol. II pp. 143-167, designated as B
by Sudhaus; the third group, vol. I pp. 225-270, comprises eight uncon-
nected fragments, and a more or less continuous series designated as C.
The contents of this book are foreshadowed at the close of the fourth
book by the statement, "We postpone to another time the discussion of
the claim that rhetoric is harmful because based on deceit." A large por-
tion of the fifth book is occupied with a presentation of the disadvantages
of rhetoric. This is, however, only a foil to the praises of Epicurean
philosophy which are given in the form of a comparison of rhetoric and
philosophy. In a portion of the book, at least, Philodemus discusses a
treatise in praise of rhetoric, the statements of which are taken up and
refuted one by one.

Briefly stated the contents of the book are :— Rhetoric is harmful, and
useless in actual practice in public life; it is no protection against syco-
phants, but a trained speaker is even at a disadvantage before a jury
because they expect to be deceived by his specious arguments. If a man
expects to use it as a means to public preferment he should remember that

10 The claims of rhetoric here refuted are perhaps the common claims of
Philodemus' own day. However they are at least as old as Isocrates,
whose statement of them is perhaps the best; v. the chapter on Isocrates
in the author's, The Influence of Isocrates on Cicero, etc.

20 Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 456C. I. e. better able to discuss medicine than
the physician.

306

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

statesman suffer death, exile and dishonor from the people they try to lead,
and that if they succeed in avoiding popular displeasure, very few attain
eminence ; the toils of rhetoric more than counterbalance its advantages
The rhetorician's claim that the promises of rhetoric are possible of ful-
fillment, and those of philosophy, impossible, can hardly be meant seri-
ously; if rhetoric promises to satisfy all one's desires, the philosopher
replies that most of these desires are unnatural and impossible of satis-
faction ; the true way is to apply the teachings of philosophy and so limit
one's desires. If it be asked what benefit philosophy confers on a state
we reply, it makes men good citizens, content with their lot; philosophy
is the only true benefactor.

Rhetoric claims to be able to "sail the deep seas" i. e. to speak at length
on any subject, while the philosophers use the dialectic method. But the
philosophers can use both methods when they desire ; the real difference
between the two is that the philosophers use strict logic, while the rhetori-
cians use only probabilities and guesswork. But moral questions cannot
be settled by guesswork.

The rhetoricians say that there is no morality except that established by
popular opinion, and that the philosophers try to establish a new morality
like a new coinage. This is not true of the Epicureans. They a°ree with
the people that the end of all conduct is pleasure, but they differ on the
means to be employed to attain the end. It is really the statesman who
differs from the popular conceptions.

The rhetoricians say that a virtuous man unable to defend himself from
malicious attacks is a miserable sight; rhetoric defends a man virtue does
not But the disgrace falls on the attackers not on the virtuous man
Philosophy provides everything necessary for a happy life.

U, 131, f r . I. (Quoting from some Epicurean? author)— he adds that the
training- given by the sophists does not prepare for forensic or
deliberative oratory.

(Frgs. II and III are hopeless.)

Jf, 133, i>. To tell the truth the rhetors do a great deal of harm to many
people, and incur the enmity of powerful rulers, whereas phi-
losophers gain the friendship of public men by helping them
out of their troubles. Ought we not to consider that men who
incur the enmity of those in authority are villains, and hated by
both gods and men.

jJ- ^4> [Those trained in other arts, without training in rhetoric]

can speak, not, to be sure rhetorically, but as laymen or dia-
lecticians or philosophers. What is the loss incurred by inability
to speak rhetorically? I do not mean to say that one trained to
be a soldier, a gymnast or a dialectician could not possess a

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3°7

knowledge of rhetoric, but that many would not. If they did
not abandon the deceit involved in practical rhetoric they
would not be able to acquire such rhetorical ability as even
philosophy provides. . . . Sophistic style is suited to epideictic
oratory and written works, but not to actual practice in forum
and ecclesia.

More men are acquitted because of the lack of rhetoric than n, 136, fr.
by means of it; nay even stammering is more persuasive than VI -
any other form of speech. For it is well said that the juryman
is not affected by any form of speech as much as by the just and
prudent actions of the uneducated, and in trials they fear being
misled by the rhetor. In speaking one should not resort to
ignoble rhetorical tricks ; these have less effect than a straight-
forward character. . . .

Speeches of this sort are no disgrace, if the object of forensic II 137, fr.
oratory be to set forth the facts, and not to show one's power. 1
It is certainly not true that rhetoric is a weapon to be used
against sycophants. . . .

Suppose one to have an abundance of delicate food and drink, 11^ 138, fr.
but to be suffering great physical or mental torment, could one
enjoy them?' The implied comparison is: one cannot enjoy the power
and wealth which are the prizes of rhetoric, if one has to endure its
toils. It is this thought, apparently which is worked out in fr. X.

If they spend all their time about the courts, and start many j Ti 1SQi f r .
lawsuits because of their knowledge of that sort of life, when XI.
they are brought to trial themselves they are ruined (because of
the prejudice against professional speakers) ; if they make a
sparing use of their professional knowledge in order to appear
modest, they lose some of their power, and at the same time
forfeit that peace of life and solidity of character which
contribute most to success.

Every good and honest man who confines his interest to phi- n j I40j f r ,
losophy alone, and disregards the nonsense of lawyers, can xn -
face boldly all such troubles, yea all powers and the whole world.

We do not claim that rhetoric is bad in itself, even if it fur- n, 142, fr.
nishes weapons for wicked men, but it does not indicate what xm -
use is to be made of the power it gives, so as to fit in with our

x Cf. Arist. Rhet. Ill, 1,5; I, 7, 36-37-

3 o8

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

principles of justice and honor. Rhetoricians are like pilots,
who have a good training but may be bad men.

xjy 42 ' fr. Those who are troubled with the itch make it worse by scratch-
ing. If they would only endure the annoyance of the itch, and
think less about it they would get better. So with those who
suffer from sycophants. 2

II, 143, fr. I. [Giving everyone rhetorical ability with the idea that he will
use it only in self-defence] is like giving a brigand or slave a
sword, and bidding him strike only those who attack him.

II, 144, fr. But this does not apply any more to philosophy and the
Epicureans who refrain from such things, than the remarks of
those who combine contradictory principles in their instruction
affect medicine.

in. 145 ' fr ' t Men are lured awa y from their home towns; the small towns
have to sacrifice their best to the large cities.] Many are
attracted by Athens with its enthusiasm for philosophy, and the
opportunity to enjoy the siren song of the philosophical schools ;
some are detained by great capitals, Alexandria and Rome,
either by necessity (as hostages?) or by the fact that they can
derive therefrom some great advantage for themselves or their
country. This I say in excusing philosophers [for going to live
in great cities]. But perchance, some one else might be rude
enough to pray that many of the rhetors be compelled to reside
the rest of their lives in a foreign land, because the cities they
leave will be better off than those to which they go.

Let us now take up the comparison of rhetoric and philosophy
in another fashion. One statement — that the promises of
rhetoric are possible of fulfillment, whereas the promises of
philosophy seem to be made only in jest, and are so far from
actuality that few have ever followed them. . . .

II, 147, fr. Many rhetors have been banished or executed for many strange

IV- reasons, even for insignificant reasons. All this risk they run,

and yet only two or three of them can speak brilliantly, the
majority disgracefully. There follow examples of rhetors who met
with disaster, Themistocles, Alcibiades and Callistratus.

II, 148, This remark praises rhetoric because it strengthens the wicked,

"■ I should read in 1. 14 crvKo<pairrla<:. The thought then parallels that of
fr. VII. Sycophants are not to be fought by their own weapons, but by
paying no attention to them.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3°9

on the assumption that it would not deserve praise if it merely
tried to hinder them and punished them if they did not obey.

Fragment VI i.s not .ubstantial enough to enable us to form an opinion
of its meaning. Fr. VII and VIII answer the argument that rhetoric
gives men higher pleasures and greater power than ordinary people
possess.

It is not necessary or even possible to satisfy unnatural and II, 150, fr.
cultivated appetites. But the natural desires can easily be satis- VI1 -
fied in all pure men — not merely in great rhetors like Pericles;
consequently philosophy which teaches us how to limit our
desires is better than rhetoric which helps us to satisfy them.

I do not believe that even the greatest rhetors can accomplish II, 151, fr.
all they wish even in their own cities, for then they would be vm -
tyrants. Rather it is true that men held in great honor by the
people, when they try to restrain them from following their own
pleasures are humiliated, fined and killed. 3

From the mention of players on the cithara, and physicians and painters u ; I52 f r .
1 judge th.-i' this is part of a comparison of the value of these professions IX.
and sophistic to a city. The passage, however, is sadly mutilated. Frag-
ments X and XI are hopeless.

Rhetors find their public friendly until they have received II, 154, fr.
civil honors at their hands, and then find it hostile. For the XI1-
mob is envious of those whom it has honored, and always thinks
that its heroes make an inadequate return for the honors they
have received. Consequently it is better not to receive public
preferment.

It is objected (by the rhetoricians) that philosophers do not II, 154, fr.
help their country. That is the reason why Critolaus' advice XI11 '
to a philosopher not to join a colony was not regarded as ridicu-
lous. But if philosophers do not enter politics, yet they help
their native land by teaching the young to obey the laws ; nay
more, by teaching them to act justly even if there are no laws,
and to shun injustice as they would fire.

[They say] that not only Lycurgus and Pittacus, but also those II, 155, fr.
who established constitutions were of this nature (i. e. rhetors?). XIV -
But not even those who had rhetorical ability were like these,

*Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 431, proposes these emendations in
f r. VIII : 1. 21 KaKiijewv or dTytuwewx, 5r)/j.e6<reo>v or (pvyaSeiuf.

3i°

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 1.57, fr.
XVII.

II, 157, fr.
XVIII.

II, 158, fr.
XIX.

II, 160,

XXI-XXV.
II, 162, fr.
XXVII.

II, 163, fr.
XXIX.

but with different intent, and with varying- experience they
turned to managing the public revenues and other matters of
administration, and were quite inferior to Callistratus and
Demosthenes. 4

(Fragments XV and XVI are hopeless.)

It is better to learn (from philosophy) to care for oneself,
than (from rhetoric) to care for the multitude of common people
in all sorts of conditions. A rhetor is like a magician ; able to
bring down the moon, but what good does he get from it ?

[An opponent says] "No philosopher qua philosopher could
benefit anyone." If he had added that the philosophers refrain
from speaking their mind freely whether at home or in exile,
he would have brought his impudence to the proper conclusion.
For by their lives, their conversation (they benefit their fol-
lowers).

A complete investigation of the causes destructive of friend-
ship would reveal that politics is the worst foe of friendship;
for it generates envy, ambition and discord.

If we throw them (the philosophers) some small change we
find them satisfied, not affecting- a proud and haughty attitude
like the rhetors. If we are right in considering externals of
little importance, and the soul more important than anything
else, then philosophy is the only true benefactor. Moreover the
rhetors charge for the help they give, and so cannot be considered
benefactors ; the philosophers give their instruction without cost.

(Fragments XXI— XXV are hopeless.)

Furthermore we must add that philosophers are not really
hated by all men, for they live in peace and justice and tried
friendship; those whom they find opposed to them they quickly
soften.

They acquired the inability to speak rhetorically from the
ability. You can not rightly say that anyone acquired inability
in war from rhetorical ability. That one derives the inability
to speak rhetorically from the ability is not correct, nor merely
that he acquired that as being able to accomplish something in.

4 The meaning would be plainer if we had the beginning of the first
sentence. Apparently Philodemus is combating the claim that rhetoric
produces great statesmen. Many, he says, have to content themselves with
menial tasks.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

contests of speaking, but that he acquired the inability to speak
rhetorically.

(First part obscure.) It is impossible to check up the relative II, 164, fr.
success of speakers rheto ically trained and those not so trained. xxx
No one has ever counted all the cases, not even those in his own
lifetime, or in a single year ; and yet you have the confidence to
say that more persuade by rhetorical means than by the simple
processes of nature.

There remains the subject of "proof," of which Anaximenes
says . . . "Speech is the best means to persuade the soul."
In the first place this is false, for money and a thousand other
things persuade more powerfully than speech.

In a picture all is light and shadow; painting cannot produce II, 165, fr.
a living being. XXXI -

Epicurus has this in dialogue form; "First let us agree on
the end for which we do everything, in order that we may-
know. . . ."

It is worth our while to consider what sort of a life those II, 166, fr.

XXXII

have lived who have spent it all in prosecution and defence. ' J * '
Even when priding themselves on their profession they admit
that it is well not to pass one's whole life in such occupation;
but just as it is possible not to have any experience in law courts,
so it is desirable not to be idle, or to see children or friends
suffer, or suffer misfortune in marriage, or lose money, or suffer
similar misfortune.

Philosophy is more profitable than epideictic rhetoric, espe- I, 225, fr. I.
cially if one practice rhetoric in the fashion of the sophists. . . .

The philosopher has many to™ concerning practical justice I, 226,
and other virtues about which he is confident ; the busybody fr " II '
(i. e. the rhetorician) is quite the opposite. Nor is one who
does not appear before kings and popular assemblies forced to
play second part to the rich, as do rhetors who are compelled to
employ flattery all their lives.

The instruction given by the sophists is not only stupid but I, 223, fr.
shameless, and lacking in refinement and reason.

(Fragments IV — VIII and col. II are hopeless.)

He makes an incredible statement when he claims that one I, 231, col.
skilled in such subjects (viz. philosophy) could not be of noble

312

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

character, and that such studies bring no one happiness, and that
no one except a madman would be interested in them. For apart
from the knowledge an educated man ought to have, he should
obey the laws, realizing that they apply to him. . . .

1^234, col. if the goodwill of one's country is esteemed the fairest crown
of victory, the defeated also ought to fare well. A common
country should bestow benefits in common. But as we see in
one country a rhetor neglected rather than crowned, and in
another country one is banished, tortured and insulted, let us
without claiming a share in the ability to manage a city by per-
suasion, be content [to live the quiet life of a philosopher],

*> 234 Very few if any of the [tyrants] have been overthrown by

their mercenaries, whereas many statesmen have been rejected
by their fellow citizens, and slaughtered like cattle, nay they are
worse off than cattle, for the butcher does not hate the cattle,
but the tortures of the dying statesmen are made more poignant
by hatred.

I, 235, col. It is claimed for rhetoric that it protects property like a strong

VI ' tower. First if we are not rich we do not need rhetoric. Sec-

ondly it is much better to lose one's wealth if one can not keep
it otherwise, than to spend one's life in rhetoric.

But Cephenides (Drone) the rich man is a prey to slaves
and prophets as well as to sycophants.

1^236, col. . . . they are unable to make the multitude friendly to them,
as the crowd of politicians can.

I, 237, col. The philosophers are not vexed if people, like foolish sheep
or cattle, attend to an inferior, but are satisfied that what they
say, particularly about the attitude of the common people, shall
please the few; and in action they are most blameless, nor do
they as slaves of all, try to rule everything for themselves.
For they do not expect to satisfy their wants at the expense of
the public. But those philosophers who envy other's property
while they pretend to need nothing, and are detected being coy,
these men the people despise, but consider them less wretched
than the rhetors, because so many obtain the same result that
the rhetors obtain.

I u 239, col. It is numbered among the glories of rhetoric that it can "sail
the deep seas" 5 while those who speak briefly are rejected like

s TreXayifriv = pjutpoKoyeiv. Cf. the discussion of naKpoXoyia in Plato,
Gorgias 44QB ; Prot. 334C— 338B ; Cic. De Orat. Ill 36, 145 ; Quint. XII
proem.

IX

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3i3

small boats unable to sail far 1. im shore, because they accom-
plish nothing brilliant. If by "sail the deep seas" they mean
"make long speeches," then rhetoric is a crazy profession. If ^ ^
by "sail deep seas" they mean treat at length a subject needing col. X.
detailed treatment, and arrogate to themselves alone this power,
not even then are they in their right minds ; for the philosophers,
or any one else with sense can treat a subject in this manner.
However if they examine a subject minutely by their "deep
sea" method, then the rhetors are mistaken in thinking they
speak only about large subjects. ... 1. 26. They borrow the
dialectic method from the philosophers, and pride themselves on
something which they reject as a principle.

For the method of question and answer is necessary not only I, 241, col.
in philosophy and education, but often in the ordinary inter- XL
course of life. The method of joint inquiry frequently demands
this style. Moreover this method is adopted by the rhetor in
the assembly as well as in the court of justice. "Rhetoric enables
a man to be a guard of metics, a friend of citizens and a pro-
tector of those of lesser rank." 7 Therefore one could not say
that a rich man does not possess happiness unless he knows
rhetoric, but that he is much better off without it. For he ought
not to fortify himself, but to free himself from paying ransom to
speechwriters.

Consequently though both methods are useful, they neglect i, 242, col.
one of them. Those who say that the rhetors use the method xn -
of question and answer in its highest degree cannot prove that
this method is peculiar to them, nor that they rather than the
philosophers wrote technical works about it. Neither the
modern sophists in their teaching, nor the ancients in their pub-
lished works attained such distinction in dialectic as have the
philosophers.

They say that the rhetor does not seek pleasure from such I, 244, col.
foolish subjects as geometry, but producing arts and sciences XI11 '
of daily life, he directs men to that path which leads to the city
and place of assembly, which they themselves follow. It is
ridiculous for them to say that geometry produces pleasure and
glory. Certainly we do not claim to devote our whole life to

Col. IX 21-34 is a dittography of col. X, 1-14.

1 Cf. Schneidewin, Studia Philoderaea, p. 10, n. 26.

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

it. . . . The philosopher 8 is versed in the characters and
methods of living which result in faction and exile, through a
knowledge of which it is possible most correctly to govern the city
and the assembly. The sophists have unawares, made a simile
which applies to themselves ; for it is their profession which does
not enter into the civil life and the assembly, and is of no help
to human life. So it is reasonable that some do not care at
all for what they say, but refuse to accept rhetoric and sophistic
and politics even cursorily, considering one foolish, the other
most inimical to peace of mind,
k 345, col. If the remarks following directly after these were intended to
I3- apply to the dialecticians — they are no concern of ours; if they
apply to us they are mere chatter, because when we claim to
speak accurately as the rhetors cannot because their speeches
are composed of probabilities, they proceed to say that spider
webs are finer than cloth but less useful; similarly the finespun
subtleties of the philosophers are useless for practical purposes
because no one in deliberating uses syllogisms, but probabilities.
So that if we use syllogisms, what appeared advantageous at
one time would not remain so ; whence there is no one possi-
bility which will be advantageous if brought to pass, but the
only thing left is to guess on a basis of probability.
After assuming that speeches can be made according to strict
logic, they proceed to use in both deliberative and forensic
oratory, nothing but probabilities, and often the less probable
rather than the more; besides they seek broad effect rather than
accuracy and systematic treatment, as is natural since they have
no method, but depend entirely on observation, and quickly dis-
card their observations because of the changes of the populace
which are quicker than those of the Euripus. But the
philosophers do not restrict themselves to rigidly logical
argument. . . .

I, 249, col. The nature of justice and injustice — that one is always advan-
tageous and the other never, can be settled entirely by strict
logic. Anyone who applies guesswork to such subjects is simply

8 For the emendation v. Schneidewin p. 12 f .

8 On the Euripus as a type of fickleness cf . Plato, Phaedo, 90C ; Rhet.
Gr.W. I, p 591, 21.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

foolish. Then their talk about spider webs, bits and saws for
cutting millet seeds is nonsense. 10 . . . It is clearly proven
that the art of the rhetor is of no assistance for a life of
happiness.

[The sophist says] it is better to estimate roughly on large I, 250, col.
subjects than to treat accurately of some small subject of no xvnI -
importance. Perhaps we can add to the accomplishments of
rhetoric that it can talk in a general way about subjects of no
importance. The comparison of great and small subjects is kept up
at the end of the column in the reference to fishing for tunnies and
sprats.

. . . to one who wonders why they can see clearly into a I, 252, col.
dark and difficult subject, and are unable to see what is in plain
sight of all, they apply the figure of the owl. Such remarks as
they made about oaths and counsels, not only no philosopher but
not even a man of ordinary taste would. . . . The doctrines
of the philosophers are not too finespun for practical life, and
the doctrines of the rhetors are not suitable, so that having
demonstrated that the doctrines of the politicians are like one or
the other — they compare us to owls.

Their next statement is that there is no distinction between ^ 2S3i co ]
justice and injustice except that commonly accepted by the people, XIX, 1. 35.
and that those who assume a different standard are like those
who seek to substitute a coinage of their own for that established
by the state; the new coinage is useless, for it will not pass
current and the maker's life would not be safe.

By rhetoric neither [is accomplished] as it seems, but political
science is not investigated or taught by the rhetoricians, either
exclusively or to a higher degree than by others.

The philosophers of our school agree with oi woXXoi on a
question of what is just and good, differing from them only in
this that they arrive at their conclusions by logic as well as by
feeling, and never forget these conclusions, but always compare j 2S4> co ]_
the chief good with things indifferent. They do differ from XXI.
oi ttoXXol about the means to attain happiness, and do not think
that offices, power, conquests and the like are proper means

10 Following the restoration of Schneidewin, p. 14; . . . -rpvivavuv ml
-Kpibvtav olaTitTLv k^-/xP oijs KaL r< * Tt >Laura rpuwdai teal Siairpiouin.

316

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I, 256, col.
XXII.

I, 257, col.
XXIII.

I, 258, col.
XXIV.

I, 258, col.
XXIV, 1. 26.

I, 259, col.
XXV.

to the end. Similarly the principles derived by them from
"notions" we judge to be just and noble ; but we differ from
the common opinion as to what corresponds to the "notion."
(I. e. what produces the end — pleasure — -which is perceived by
all.)

Not only some philosophers differ from the popular ideas of
right and wrong, but all statesmen do. For in their period of
office they are wholly concerned to change popular opinion on
questions of right and justice and advantage. If this is so, how
do we resemble those who scorn current coinage, and seek for
substitutes? Apart from the fact that we do not despise theories
based on "notions," how could we be said to be acting in this
way if we assume the true principles of right and wrong? For
some of these are helpful to them as well as to us whether they
grant it or not ; others are really established customs, and will
not allow themselves to be used unless we assume them in keep-
ing with the former principles. For if they do not have the
true idea of hot and cold, it is not our authority which they
oppose. It is possible for a fate to befall them like that of those
who differ (with their states) about coinage — and how can their
search be called useless if there is really anything better — if the
cities will not accept the innovations, and the inventor's life is
not safe. For it makes no difference to those truly well if
others will not adopt hygienic measures, nor to those who avoid
fire or snow, if others refuse to acknowledge the natural qualities
residing in them. It is astounding for them to say that the
natural means of safety will not protect them.

Some things are just or unjust by nature and never change,
others vary according to locality and condition. Laws which
are not of this nature, but are established for various reasons
ought to be obeyed, or if the philosophers do not think that
they can live well under these laws they ought to leave the
country. They can be social to a high degree by observing
those principles which make for likeness and not for difference;
we can do this without being observed as well as with publicity ;
with pleasure and not under compulsion ; steadily and not in
an uncertain fashion.

If rhetoric imparts an experience of these things, so that it
is the only road to the happy life, yet it does not lead to courts

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3*7

and assemblies, where there are more wrecks than ever at Cape
Caphereus. 11

[Rhetoricians say that this art makes men good] for one
will wish to seem prudent and just in order to obtain favors from
the people.

[It is strange that one would not endure to be taught virtue] ^261, col.
whereas if he were sick he would endure being forced to undergo
treatment. But their interjection of the argument that virtue
cannot be taught is untimely. For Socrates showed that political
virtue cannot be taught, proving his case by the inability of
Themistocles, Aristides and Pericles to train their sons to be
their equals. By the same means one could prove that sophistic
rhetoric cannot be taught. 1. 30 But "rhetoric would be able
to benefit a man who by its help can persuade the people that
he is of high character." Quite the contrary; even if a man
be virtuous otherwise, he is considered a scoundrel because he
is a rhetor. They say that we ought to believe that there is
something better than truth which does not persuade, on the
testimony of Euripides who says; "Mortals' coin is not only
shining silver but virtue" (i. e. virtue in the commonly accepted
sense). At any rate they purchase many things by character,
as well as by money. But why should a philosopher pay atten-
tion to Euripides, especially since he has no proof . . . ?
Some say they pursue virtue not expecting to receive anything
from it; others desire safety for the sake of happiness.

"Suppose a virtuous man made the object of a slanderous I, 264, col.
attack, and unable to persuade the jury of his innocence; he XXVIII.
would be punished, not pitied and honored." Certainly. But
worst of all is not to recognize exalted virtue, but to consider
it wickedness. According to the argument of the rhetors one
ought to study the reputable rather than the monstrous — and
that when the greatest statesmen bring to the bema things which
should be associated only with the vilest of men. The so-called
virtuous men when they are called to account before the people
refuse to stand trial. They think they are to suffer a treatment

u Cape on Euboea where a fleet returning from Troy was wrecked. Cf.
Vergil, Aen. XI, 256-260: Propert. Ill, VII, 39-40. (Quoted by Gros.)

12 Cf. IsOC. Ant. 278 : otTtpTTtp &VTLS eppufxevcffTepus tiridvp.!} irdOav rovs aKuvovras,
roffotiry p.oXhov dcK^aec KaXos fca7af?6s etyat nal iraph rots 7ro\tTcus eddoKi/xetv.

3i8 Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

much worse than that accorded to the sick, much less acquire
virtue, just as if virtue were not a real good, or there were no
real cure which the people apply when they judge a man in the
wrong.

XXIX C01 ' "Furthermore it has been said that we (i. e. the rhetoricians)
fight not against external enemies at whose hand it is honorable
to die, but against internal enemies at whose hands it is disgrace-
ful to die ; that we have nothing to do with virtue— for that did
not save Socrates; — nor with medicine — that saves men from
disease, not from prison; nor with any other profession than
rhetoric which helps those who strive not only for their lives
but to obtain money, and to prevent disfranchisement and exile."
[, 266, col. However we shall repel our enemies with their own weapons.

Virtue did not help Socrates because when he was led to court
it was lacking in some people. Medicine and other professions
help even in prison. If a philosopher falls a victim to such a
I. 268, col. death . it is not a disgrace to him but to those who kill him.
XXXI. However he does not live in fear of meeting such a fate. For
the superstitions of the common people do not disturb one who
is persuaded that he shall have no existence after death.
j£xxn Co1, f ° r tllese reasons persuasion was reasonably considered a

good by them, she would have been deified by philosophy. The
fact that through it no little harm is done is not true of phi-
losophical persuasion, but of rhetorical which Pisistratus used;
wherefore it does not belong to the category of the greatest
goods as they perversely say, 13 nor to the special categories of
power and wealth. If one does not use these well, he would
receive much harm. Philosophy shows us how to find and use
everything necessary for a happy life.

BOOK VI.

In the sixth book Philodemus attacks the philosophical schools which
advocated the study of rhetoric. The extant portion discusses Nausi-
phanes and Aristotle. The attack was extended to others as we can see
from II, 64, col. LVIII, but the identity of the persons attacked cannot be
determined. In this book as in many others, Philodemus is merely para-

13 Reading for (col &s 1. 15 /raicuis with von Arnim, Hermes XXVIII
(1893) p. 154.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3i9

phrasing the works of earlier Epicureans ; the criticism of Nausiphanes
seems quite clearly to be based on Metrodorus' Tlpis toi>s anb 0ucrioXo7(as
\(yovTa.s AyaOois ehai ^ijropas. The fragments are of very uneven value;
there are large sections of connected argument, in which the relation of
the pages can be clearly demonstrated; but many of the pages stand by
themselves, and the trend of the thought is not always clear. However by
a judicious piecing together of the several parts we can at least gain an
idea of the tenets of Nausiphanes. As the present arrangement of the
fragments in Sudhaus separates ideas which belong together, it may assist
the reader if a resume of Nausiphanes' doctrine is given here with a
brief statement of his position in the controversy over rhetoric.

Nausiphanes was a natural philosopher i>u<7ik6s) of the latter part of
the fourth century, a pupil of Democritus and teacher of Epicurus.
Although Epicurus must have owed much of the foundation of his own
system to Nausiphanes, he took pains to deny any connection with him,
and even abused his master in no uncertain language. The feud thus
instituted by Epicurus was continued by Metrodorus and is reechoed in
Philodemus. The chief tenet of Nausiphanes, that a study of natural
philosophy (4>wioAo7i'a) is the best training for an orator, sounds like an
absurd freak. Absurd it may have been in the effort to connect natural
philosophy and oratory, but it was a natural product of the educational
tendencies of the time. The educators of his period were afraid of a
divided authority. Some way must be found to enable one teacher to
guide the higher studies of the youth. As the ideal of education was for
the most part preparation for public life, and as oratorical ability was
indispensable for the aspiring politician in the Greek state, Nausiphanes
was compelled in self defence to show how a study of natural philosophy
could train an orator. As presented in Philodemus he appears ridiculous ;
we may perhaps be justified in believing that here as elsewhere, Philo-
demus has not been too scrupulous in presenting the views of his
opponents. Disentangled from the maze of Philodemus' polemic the
principles of Nausiphanes may be stated as follows : the study of natural
philosophy produces orators; the natural philosopher derives from his
study of nature the knowledge of the causes of pleasure, and so is able to
guide his audience toward the true end of all action. Contrary to the
Epicurean view he holds that the philosopher should enter politics. The
style of the natural philosopher is plain like that of the average man, and
so is better adapted to explain a difficult case than the elaborate style of
the rhetoricians. The orators use of logic is the same as that of the
dialectician and the philosopher ; irapdSeiy/j-a = iiraywyr], ivd^iJ-tj/m = •jv'K-
Xo7«rju<s, the only difference is in the manner of presentation. Finally a
study of science produces in the student a political state of mind, so that
every natural philosopher is potentially an orator. 1

The discussion of Aristotle begins with the well known parody of the

1 For a full discussion of Nausiphanes and this portion of Philodemus
v. von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, pp. 43-62.

320

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

verse from the Philoctetes; alirxpov cnwTrai', 'laoKpdr^v 5' £av \4yetv, by
which Aristotle justified his excursion into rhetoric. It resolves itself,
into a comparison of philosophy and rhetoric, and a vilification of Aris-
totle for choosing the lower of the two professions. This polemic like
the preceding is part of the inheritance of the Epicurean School; Epi-
curus, we know, was particularly bitter against Aristotle. 2 Perhaps the
most remarkable part is his exaltation of Isocrates; "while Aristotle
descended from philosophy to rhetoric, Isocrates rose from rhetoric to
philosophy." This passage must rest on a misinterpretation of Isocrates'
use of <f>i\oiro<^a, a misinterpretation which must be deliberate on the part
of Philodemus, and not due to any love of Isocrates, but to a desire to
take a fling at Aristotle. Beside the general criticism of rhetoric which
forms the bulk of the passage, Philodemus gives three reasons alleged by
Aristotle for the study of rhetoric and politics : it wins friends, it helps
produce a stable government which is favorable to philosophy, the present
evil conditions in politics demand the help of the philosopher. The first
two are answered and the third is under discussion when the fragment
ends. 3

I, 270. Of fragments I-XVII the only parts that give even a gleam of meaning

are fr. XI and XII. Here from the contrast of 5ta\tyea$at and \6yov
iKTetvai it appears that the discussion is turning on the relative merits of
rhetoric and dialectic, which we found discussed at some length in Book V
(ireXo7/f«i>, kt\. I, 239) and which appears below, col. XLIII. A little
light breaks through in fr. XVIII. This is the end of a paragraph.

I, 276. Philodemus sums up with There is no art which treats of forensic

eloquence, corresponding to the art of music. (From here to
fr. XXX nothing consecutive can be made out.)

I, 283, It is evident that he 4 used the word 'rhetoric' with reference

either to sophistic or to political rhetoric, or to the power to
decide on an advantageous course of action. Grant that as many
erroneously think, rhetoric is the ability to select an advantageous
course of action. . . .

- Cic, De Nat. Deor. I, 33, 93 : Cum Epicurus Aristotelem vexarit con-
tumeliossime.

3 For details v. Sudhaus, Aristoteles in der Beurtheilung des Epikur und
Philodem, Rhein. Mus. XLVIII (1893) pp. 552-564. Gomperz, Zeit. f. d.
ost. Gymn. XXIII (1872) p. 31, holds that Philodemus may have had
before him Aristotle's dialogue, Politicus. Philodemus also criticizes
Aristotle in the Tlepi ttoiijMtwv, on which v. Gomperz in Wiener Eranos
(1909) 1-8.

'Sudhaus, Rhein. Mus. XLVIII (1893) p. 334, thinks that Philodemus is
quoting from Metrodorus Ilpbs tovs M tpvir 10X071115 Xeyovras dyaBoijs dmt

The Rhetorica of Philodemus. 3 21

It" some of the rhetorical sophists because of their political I, 284, col.

insight or experience can choose an advantageous course, we m -
must not assign the credit to rhetoric but to some other source.

It is not plain how one is to pass from general truths to the I, 284, col.
application of these truths in particular instances. 5

ivdv/x^fiaTa differ from (rrj/JLeia and mcrTilifiaTa.

The relation between truth and its opposite is not the same v 28 5-c°l-
as between two probabilities, one more probable than the other. col yi.
We must have either truth or falsehood. Would one accept
probability in place of truth except in cases where truth is
impossible of attainment?

A man should examine carefully and search for truth, and not h^6, col.
use vain enthymemes. For it is clear that one who states the
actual good points of which the accuser denies the existence,
and thus lessens the exaggeration in the minds of the judges,
would attain the useful result of expressing the full content of
the argument which comes from a study of nature.

A study of nature does not give one a knowledge of the Tj 287, col.
"good," the "true" or the "just." vm

One who claims that a knowledge of what course of action to I, 287, col.
pursue comes from a study of the universe, ought to specify IX -
[how it is done] .

It is necessary to make choices with a view to happiness, and I, 288,
not with some vain hope. They ought to show that ^uo-ioAoywi co1 - x -
leads to happiness, because most people think that cfrvaiokoyto.
is far removed from what is useful in life.

In the interval between the publication of the first and second volumes
Sudhaus discovered that this papyrus formed the upper half of the orig-
inal, and that the lower half was Hercul. Voll. coll. alt. torn. VII, fol.
44-67. He combined the two fragments in the second volume. From this
point therefore I follow vol. II.

He (Nausiphanes) said that the natural philosopher and the II, 1, col.
"wise man" will persuade their audience. He left no doubt ■
that by wise man he meant himself. But the essence of method
lies in concealing the method. . . .

Certainly he will not expect such a task to belong to the n t 2j co i, .
rhetorical sophists or the statesmen.

' I. e. how a knowledge of the laws of nature derived from a study of
science can enable one to decide a particular point of political policy.

3 22 Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

col. if the hearer comprehend with sufficient intelligence and zeal

the one who knows how to lead the argument in any direction
he chooses, there is a science and faculty [of guiding the argu-
ment] not whither the speaker, but whither the hearer wishes."
II, 4, col. 3. Who can persuade with the help of natural philosophy?

Nausiphanes says, "Rhetoric strengthens and supports in time
of trouble. 1

Xllt 1i, 5 , A man bIames his neighbor for his own troubles ; consequently
col. 4 . people will hate the rhetor for their political ills. Nausiphanes
did not dodge this ; for he says that the philosopher will prac-
n tice rhet °ric or statesmanship [if his audience is intelligent]

Xiv! C ° ' [ Th,s method then applies] only to the intelligent and interested
(cf. col. XII). The majority of people are not interested in all
methods of persuasion, and they have not the patience to wait
for the great blessing promised by the rhetor, but want something
immediately. 8

' co ■ 5- Aside from this they are ill disposed to one who has such
power, and fear that his tricks of reasoning will serve them ill.
For he does not say, "I wish to persuade you to do what is
for your good," but he merely says 9 that he can persuade his
audience to do what he wishes.

XV 7 ' C01 ' An au dience to whom such an announcement is made would
never be persuaded by the speaker. Even if he made a logical
presentation they would distrust him. Again, how does a knowl-
edge of human nature enable the natural philosopher to per-
suade.'' Does he know of what elements we are composed?

II, 7, col. 6. How can it be that when one speaks of persuading the multitude
one would persuade them by leading them to this (i. e. a con-
dition of trustfulness) when after meeting with many misfortunes
the people will refuse to be persuaded again?

'This is Philodemus' answer to the claim of Nausiphanes that the
scientist can lead the audience whither he will—provided that the audience
is intelligent.

' Von Arnim reads (p. 50) Be(3ciioOTai p.iv, <p w iv, iv T oh Kara irpoaipeaiv fieTyai
ipM,r, iv tt roh uq-.Vtchs KHKoh kov^tm ko.1 AvawvciTai, p W opiKrjs iiv Ti irpoa-woriei

8 Reading with von Arnim, p. 49, o65' Ho-tiv 6Vw; ™ vafru, Ki.ya.ef Trpo<jp.zivat
TI Toi-qam rb vippaBev oi X foov &p.u8pa avvaurejaei ■wpoaSoKriva.l ti niyaXuhv, dXX'
ijdr] Tt (3o6\ovt' (xtiti,

434 Read ' ng X<?7 " Xll>61 " W ' th FUhr ' Rhein ' MuS - LVI1 ('S* 02 ) P-

The Rhetorica of Pliilodemus.

323

What does this sort of persuasion amount to except a knowl- II, 8, col.

XVI

edge of pleasure and pam m a given case? It means treating
men like animals.

The persuasive element is the knowledge of the source of H. 9, col- 7.
advantage. . . .

What about desires in particular cases about which men plan col.
well or ill? If you ask directly, "Do you desire pleasure or
pain?", all will say, "Pleasure." The difficulty is to know their
desires in particular cases.

They are vexed [says the natural philosopher] that the natural II, 10, col. 8.
philosopher alone knows what nature desires, and is able to speak
and argue relative to man's desires.

One cannot know what to do to please the people, for there II^ii^ col.
are many things to change their minds quickly. And if the
natural philosopher always has the same end in view, why does
he not [succeed] ?

If their art is a power of persuasion, it cannot depend on II, 12, col.
arguments from physical facts. They however deny that it is
conjectural ; for then there is no need of presenting a case
persuasively.

If they desire everything which the people wish, then it is II, 13,
impossible to ascertain the desires of the majority. co1, la

He (i. e. the natural philosopher) cannot acquire any power II, 13, col.
to speak. For they will say that the rhetor speaks accurately xx -
and favorably if they will agree to obey him, or it is impossible
to escape (the logic of his words). How can the natural T 4>
philosopher know the opinion of his audience?

Furthermore they will not listen to him even if he seem to ^15, col.
speak according to their desire ; much less will they follow
whatever he says. For they will be troubled at the thought of
recurring disaster because his advice has already resulted
unfavorably.

If he means that they try to say what the people wish, and II, 16, col.
what will not cause them to repent, he is foolish. For it is hard
to know that the people will not repent, even if an action has
been performed to suit them. They cannot see what serious
mistakes we make in our own affairs.

They do not say that if they are fully persuaded in their own II, 17, col.

YYT T T

minds they will find many to agree with them; but simply that AA111 -
by the art of persuasion they can persuade an audience to do

3 2 4

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

It, 18,
col. 14.

Col. XXIV.

II, 19,
col. 15.

II, 19, col.
XXV.

II, 20,
col. 16.

II, 21, col.
XXVI.

II, 22, col.
XXVII.

what they wish. Nor can one know what the populace rejoice
in as they depend on opinion and not on the natural end or
object ; nor if we could know it could any one persuade them.
For the mob changes and repents quickly.

This column is practically hopeless. Von Arnim has a highly doubtful
restoration on page 55.

Their proposition- to persuade reduces to a knowledge of
justice and advantage which he (i. e. the natural philosopher)
is best able to adapt to the common advantage. 10 In the first
place he cannot observe the relations of the subject, but will
be excelled by one who has been engaged in public affairs and
has practiced pleasing the people and advising them to do things
that are within their power. Yet this resembles the doctrine of
Nausiphanes. . . .

On the length of time one must spend with another in order to know
him thoroughly."

[And he seems to agree with us] for he says that persuasive
power comes from knowledge of affairs rather than from
personal investigation. But enough of him.

Let us take up the next division. It is supposed that the
natural philosopher is the best rhetor inasmuch as it is possible
for a study of natural philosophy to give political experience
and skill. "If," he says "he should add experience in political
affairs, and learn the habits of the people as the philosopher
studies natural philosophy." Does this art produce ability to
make political speeches by giving experience from which one may
deduce what is of advantage to the people, or do they think it
produces immediately a state of mind, so that the natural phi-
losopher needs no practice or further study? If the former is
the case they ought to show that one can become a political
rhetor by experience. But no one would grant that any one
who had acquired a knowledge of natural philosophy can make
political speeches. We must understand the statement as if we

10 Cf. col. IV.

11 "If one has a natural philosopher living with him for a year and
associating with him for a considerable time each day, he will be able to
acquire such a knowledge of affairs as to make him a rhetor." This is
von Arnim's interpretation of an exceedingly obscure passage. I do not
feel at all sure that the details are right, or that we can assert more about
the meaning of the passage than is given above.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

3 2 5

were examining' some of the natural philosophers and not the
art or products of the art. For we are not examining politics,
but exhibiting what has been done by others ; nor is his state-
ment true that the natural philosopher will be best able to use
the Ac'iis 8iSttKTi/oj when that is needed to explain some difficult
question to the people. 12 The political scientist (so-called) has no
experimental knowledge of the peculiar facts of politics ; so
when he attempts to make a speech he [goes astray] because
he does not take due account of and Trady. How can a
natural philosopher become a politician and rhetor? He is
exactly like a sophist who has no fundamental principles.
Nausiphanes then . . .

"How is it possible that if one has the power to govern the
state he will not desire to do so. 13

[The art of rhetoric] does not lead to ease nor does it produce
the best in the life of its possessor, nor incline him to
improvement.

partly from custom imposed from without, partly
from the motions of the spirit within, there results a condition
which forces our language to say what is false and empty.

"He did not imitate the common metaphors of those foolish
men who have nothing better to do than listen to contests in the
schools of oratory." 14

Amazing is the style of the natural philosopher "composed
for the delight of his audience, adorned with metaphors best
designed for explaining the new subject, not in an empty style
fixed by rule, but according to nature and sanctioned by custom,"
a style which we found neither useful nor practicable, but vicious
and almost deadly. Wherefore not even if the philosopher has
something better to say will the people listen to him. For the
speech of the philosopher does not differ from that of the states-
man in its adaptation of the useful to the common needs of
the city, but in its relation to the individual.

The soul of the ordinary man is blind to it (the "natural"
style of the natural philosopher) and so it has no power over the

II, 22, col.
XXVIII.

II, 23, col.
XXIX.

II, 24, col.
XXX.

II, 25, col.
XXXI.

II, 26,
col. 17.

II, 26, col.
XXXI 1.

II, 27,
co!. 18.

II, 28, col.
XXXIII.

II, 29,
col. 19.

12 1 adopt the reading of von Arnim for 1. 9 ; kcu nySi to oidaum 5c5a/cri/ri;s
X^|€ws diropelv.

" This is the argument of Nausiphanes.
"A quotation from Nausiphanes.

326

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

multitude. But this is no disadvantage, unless it can be called
a disadvantage that they are not adapted by nature to receive
the highest life.

The philosopher does not choose his profession for the same
reason that one chooses military or political power. The latter
with a slowly acting mind is willing to accept any power, while
the former by syllogisms and memory of resemblance and dif-
ference, and a consideration of consequences, and especially by
the use of his sharpness of intellect, rejects everything that does
not tend toward happiness, and shares in them only as he uses
the necessary arts for the tasks that arise. For to say positively
that military and political power is the result of geometrical
reasoning is vicious and is the product of a system that cannot
reason or produce happiness. The philosopher is not of such
a character but in every matter uses his keen mind, with which
he is able to see when the ambition or idleness of men goes
wrong, and neglects everything which is not useful for happiness.

The aforementioned makes a foolish argument because in
asking if the philosopher is adverse to lawmaking or military life
or political economy he sees none of the advantages of wisdom,
nor considers for what evils a man is responsible himself, and
for what his neighbor is responsible. Nor has he stated in
what respect the philosopher is adverse to such subjects, nor
distinguished how far the multitude can be helped, and in what
way man is superior to the animals ; but thinking that what the
opinion of the people honors in political cleverness and virtue
falsely so-called is the only thing to be sought, he considers
that to have led one to that condition is the best proof of sound
reasoning. On this assumption he tries to show that some
advantage is contributed by the so-called politicians, and at the
same time attacks the lawmaking of the ancients, which was
the cause of men's living together justly. Moreover it is neces-
sary to purify the desires; this cannot be accomplished by
statement and patterns or guidance by political principles and
laws, but by reasoning about wholes starting from the first clear
evidence.

On account of the various faults of mankind it is right for
the rhetor to guide and correct the community . . , 15

15 On the phrase at the end of the column oi rods vdpovs rai t&s TroWetfas
ypdipomi T(i» aofrcTuv Gomperz, Zeit. f. d. 6st. Gymn. XXIII (1872) p. 32,

The . Rhetorica of Philodemus.

To sum up ; by no means should the philosopher acquire II, 35, col.
political experience, or rhetoric of that sort. XXXVIII.

It is evident that it is the height of folly to say that a study
of nature produces a «£ts of political oratory, especially since
they introduce into the scheme of philosophy example and
enthymeme, and in political speeches use syllogism and indue- n i 3 g j
tion which the dialecticians pride themselves on using accurately. co1 - 2 4-
If he thinks that philosophical and political arguments differ only
in form why. does he not show that the political rhetors who
have learned the truth according to nature, agree with the phi- \\ t 3 5 j co j.
losophers in thought and differ only in the form of their argu- XXXIX.
ments? What is the value of syllogism and induction if they
are equivalent to enthymeme and example? Did they think
that in a case in which one can properly use example and
enthymeme, the philosopher will be able to use syllogism and
induction equally well, or did they think that the geometrician II, 37,
is the best statesman since such forms of reasoning are used in co1 - 2S -
geometry ?

But, as it seems, if one is to consider political questions, the
first requisite is a knowledge of affairs ; consequently he must
add that the natural philosopher possesses a knowledge of
statecraft. For even though he seems to himself to be acting
like a statesman, he will not necessarily produce the same results
as a statesman. He may use procedure analogous to geometry, n, 38, col.
but he will not be a geometrician. For everyone who studies co '- XL.
some obscure problem by means of his senses, reasons out the
obscure by means of the evident. Statesman, physician and
geometrician use the same form of syllogism, but one cannot
solve the other's problems. How then, if he has sense can he
say that reasoning from the evident and existent to the future II, 38,
[and unknown] is always useful, and that the ablest political co1 ' 261
leaders use this form of reasoning.

compares Isoc. Phil. 84 ; tois v6(mis /ecu reus TroXcTet'cus Tats virb T&v <X0(purTwv
yeypapiii.iva.is, which is an attack on Plato. He thinks that Philodemus
may have used the attack on Plato and Aristotle made by the Isocratean
Cephisodorus; v. Numenius ap. Euseb., Prae. Ev. XIV, 6, 9-1 1, 270, 12-13
Dind. I am inclined to consider that Philodemus is referring to the activ-
ities of some of the followers of Isocrates who continued their master's
practice of broadening their instruction in rhetoric by theoretical work on
the science of government of which the works mentioned form a part.

328

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 39, col.
XLI, 1. 14.

II. 41, col.
XLII.

II, 41,
col. 29.

II, 42, col.

30, 1. 12.

II. 43,
col. 31.
II, 44. col.
XLIV.

II, 45.
col. 32.

II, 45, col.
XLV.

On investigation we shall find that what they call enthymemes
are mere padding and provoke applause because the multitude
is foolish (col. 27). How can he consider that reasoning from
the evident to the obscure in political matters is the same process
as interpreting the evident from the past, so that he has left
no form of reasoning for any speech except strict induction.

How do they dare to say that they will interpret political
facts better if we philosophers use example instead of induction.

The tSaxt (i. e. the fundamental facts) are partly common to
all partly different for each city and nation. 10

Something about the effect of division of speeches.

Therefore the rhetor is like the dialectician. For the one
who is able to use successfully a long connected speech, will be
best able to use the method of question and answer, and vice
versa ; for knowing how long to continue speech to make the
idea clear to the audience is equivalent to being able to know
how long to make the series of questions which lead the
respondent to grasp the new idea.

Experience is the only guide to forecast the future.

A philosopher (apparently Metrodorus v. infra col. 32) says
that it is a nuisance to observe all these rules about divisions
and length, and commends his own philosophy, the reward of
which is not pay but freedom from false opinion, which will
bring happiness to everyone. 17 Therefore Metrodorus consider-
ing the claim that the same condition enables one to be both
(natural philosopher and statesman) and ridiculing those who
consider the dialectic method more accurate, says, "In the case
of statesmen and natural philosophers the difference is not the
same but the statesman cannot solve the problems of the natural
philosopher nor the natural philosopher those of the statesman."
What ! in accordance with that foolish change will the statesman
make example become induction, or the philosopher do the same,
if the subject matter is the same and only the words differ?
But in their zeal for such things they laid claim to this, and at
the same time they say that these men are not statesmen, so that

10 On the meaning of fMcu cf. the author's The Influence of Isocrates
etc. p. 6 ff.

" This is largely imagination on my part. What is the antecedent of
Siv 1. 21 ?

The Rhctorica of Philodemus. 3 2 9

one wonders what state of political knowledge the philosopher
has reached. We do not deny that we lead our pupils in a dif- II, 46,
ferent direction from politics, but they are led astray by sophists c0 ' 33 '
and pay them money merely to get the reputation for political
ability. For "effect" and "deduction from premises" must be
subsumed under the knowledge of the wholes, and can come
in no other way. Nor does he show how he can know to what ^47, col.
extent the audience understands by means of experience, and to
what extent by means of dialectic, the man having been pre-
viously wretched and obscure. 18 For all such things are derived
from physics, and from a weighing of the obscure and reason-
ing from the existent, and by no other means ; so that they travel
along a regular route, and are not guided by the experience of
some who have no knowledge of affairs. He did not analyze
the next point. It should run as follows ; "One may be poten- n ^
tially a rhetor if not actually one. For we say that the power col. 34.
of building resides in others besides the actual builders when
we regard not the performance of the act but one's ability to
use the builders' tools ; the same is true of medicine and other II, 48, col.
professions. Consequently why should we not say that rhetoric LV •
is the attendant of the natural philosopher if when subjects are
proposed he can speak as well as any statesman or rhetor?" 19
Perchance he might reason about them as well as the rhetors,
but he could not make as good an appearance in public as an 11, 49>
experienced rhetor. The experienced man can speak when he co1 - 35-
wishes, the theorist only after long practice. Furthermore the n, 49, col.
one does many things by the rules of his art — for one cannot XLVIII.
learn the carpenters trade otherwise — the other does nothing by
rule; for they say that the ability comes from philosophy, not
from the political activity itself.

After due consideration of the mad proposition of Nausiphanes
we must conclude that he does not provide a proper philosophical
introduction to rhetoric.

Now let us take up the story about Aristotle, that he taught II, 50,
rhetoric in the afternoon, saying, " Tis a shame to be silent and co1, 3 6 '
allow Isocrates to speak." He showed his opinion clearly enough

18 Practically all the important words in this sentence are conjectures;
the sense is, to say the least, obscure.
™ The passage is much mutilated, and not at all satisfactorily restored.

33°

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

by writing treatises on the art of rhetoric, and by making politics
a branch of philosophy.
col. 5 37. He alle & ed man y reasons for engaging in politics; first, that

one who has no knowledge of what is done in governments finds
them unfriendly to him; secondly, that a good government will
be favorable to the growth of philosophy; thirdly, that he was
( disgusted with most of the contemporary statesmen and their

XLIX. 00 ' continual rivalry for office. One banished to a country where
the people admire rhetoric but lack 20 the most necessary edu-
cation (i. e. philosophy) if he had some experience in rhetoric
might lead them in a short time to the realms of philosophy. 21
II, 52^ But we object that to practice rhetoric is toilsome to body and

soul, and we would not endure it. [Rhetoric] is most unsuit-
IL 53, able for one who aims at quiet happiness, and compels one to

meddle more or less with affairs, and provides no more right
opinion or acquaintance with nature than one's ordinary style
of speaking, and draws the attention of young men from phi-
losophy the true horn of Amalthea and directs it to the sophistical
II, 54, rhyton. 22 . . . If he knew that he could not attain the highest

position or "become a philosopher because of various hindering
col. LI. circumstances, he might propose to teach grammar, music or
tactics. For we can find no reason why anyone with the least
spark of nobility in his nature should become a sophist, as one
could find reason for pursuing practical rhetoric; for the claim
II, 55, that the former leads to the latter is ridiculous. Consequently

col. 40. Aristotle's practice and his remark were not philosophic. Why is
it more disgraceful to be silent and permit Isocrates to speak than
to live in a city and allow Manes to dig, or to stay on land and
col. LII. allow the Phoenician trader to be tossed by the waves, or to
pass one's life in safety as a private citizen and allow Themis-
tocles to enjoy the perils of a general ? He ought to have refused
to rival Isocrates, in order that he might not seem to be acting
II, 56, from envy. Either he judged it disgraceful by the standards of

col. 41. tne mu ] t j tu( j ei or by natural standards. If by the latter why did
he not consider it naturally disgraceful to speak on the public
platform like a hired rhetor, rather than to speak like the divine

" Reading 1. 4, 5, [8ms Si] tu[v imy[ic]alui> [<]i;«e«[s].

21 Still the argument of Aristotle.

'- The rest of the sentence seems to lack coherence.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

33i

philosophers. Why did he abandon his exhortation of the young. 11,^7, col.
arid attempt the road to ruin which was followed by Isocrates
pupils and by other sophists? Why did he prefer to make col-
lections of laws, constitutions, etc., in short to be a polymath and II, 58^
teach all manner of subjects? In this he was less noble than co • 4 ■
the rhetors, in that the rhetors try to provide power, and offer col LIV .
rhetorical hypotheses not merely for the calm of the soul but
also for the health of the body. In short he became a more
dangerous and deadly foe of Epicurus than those who openly
engaged in politics. If he was searching for truth, why did he II 59,
choose Isocratean rhetoric rather than political rhetoric which c0 ■ 43-
he considered different from that of Isocrates? If it was the
political branch that he was practicing, it was ridiculous for
him to say that it was a disgrace to allow Isocrates to speak, if
he did not intend to speak like him. I do not mention the fact n , 59, col.
that none of his pupils could succeed in either art, because LV.
Isocrates had forestalled him; and Isocrates after teaching
rhetoric devoted himself to the quieter and as he said, more
wonderful study— philosophy. He had strange reasons too for
urging them to a study of politics. First that if they acquired
experience and undertook a political career immediately, because
of their occupation in it they would appear lacking in a proper II, 60,
philosophical training. But if they had no experience they could
not be statesmen unless they studied a very long time, and if
they waited for the state to become orderly they were neglecting
the means of making it orderly (viz. philosophical politics).

Not even a woman would be so foolish as to choose the worse n> ^ col
when the better is present. He urged Philip not to aspire to be LVI.
king of Persia.

There is no use for one who rules badly what is near him, and n , 62,
can rule well what he is not permitted to rule. Of the reasons col. 45.
why he urges that one who has the ability to govern should go
into politics, the first applies to himself rather than to one who
takes no thought for the community. For if he thought that
one who took no interest in current events would have no friend,
as a matter of fact he had none, or could not keep a friend any
length of time. Philosophy does not prevent a man's advance;
it did not prevent Aristotle. If prevented from obtaining any-
thing, philosophy is not brought into contempt, because it needs
no help from any man.

332

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II. 63. His second reason was dissatisfaction with political conditions.

But the golden age is past and sudden improvements are
impossible.

col. LVIII. ^;ye slia.ll answer, if opportunity offers, his remarks on A<& s
directed against us, dividing the problems about these subjects
and all connected with them.

BOOK VII.

This book offers little that is new to one who has perused its prede-
cessors. Its theme is a comparison of rhetoric and philosophy, and after
the fashion of Philodemus the discussion is largely a criticism of other
works on rhetoric. Mention is made of Aristo (I, 328, fr. XII, 360, col.
LXXI), and of Diogenes (Babylonius) , (I, 346, col. XLVII, 347, XLIX,
355, LXIV) and a considerable portion of the book appears to be a dis-
cussion of the Stoic attitude toward rhetoric. Another section deals with
the kinds of proof, those subject to the rules of art, and those not so
subject, and this seems to be a criticism of Aristotle. But the fragments
are too scanty to allow us to trace the details of the argument. In brief
it is as follows: rhetoric finds its only field for usefulness in public,
and there rhetors are of more hindrance to a state than advantage ; phi-
losophy, however, leads the way to a happy life in private, removed from
the cares of politics.

f, 326, fr. He said emphatically at the beginning, "One must pursue that

VI1 - which produces a painless life."

VIII 7 ' fl T' lere is no art of persuasion.

I, 327, fr. ... the former (i. e. questions of advantage and disad-
XI. vantage considered abstractly) they will consider the task of

philosophy, the latter (i. e. persuading the people) the task of
rhetoric. However the questions of advantage which he men-
tions are questions of interest to the people if it is a question:
of turning the city over to the enemy, or of confiscating the goods
of the powerful citizens, and this cannot be decided by a
philosopher.

1,^28, fr. ... he appears to have spoken briefly and unsatisfactorily
about rhetoric, and in treating of philosophy to have relied on.
some of the works of Aristo.
I, 329, col. ■ • • to be able to praise persuasively a mode of life which
m - we prefer, and again to censure the same mode of life if we see

fit; so that the argument that the mode of life which we advise

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

333

is healthful persuades, or rather that mode of life persuades
one who wishes to be well. Such power might be useful to one
who is to practice medicine, but does not make one healthy.

... if few of the statements depending on opinion are 1,^9, col.
true — we ought to say on vain opinion— his remarks are foolish,
"not referring to clear evidence" and "the rhetors are not
wholly lacking in this." But for treating the subject under
discussion his example from music seems of no value.

The arguments of philosophy are not conjectural but rigorous. 1^330, col.

Speeches may he pleasing and beautiful, but one would not ^ 33 j ; col
care for them unless they are useful. IX -

Encomium may be a proper field for guesswork, but cannot be C ol. X.
called a science.

All their training is directed toward speaking before crowds I, 33 2, col.
and courts. But none of them practices saying anything for xv -
himself or his kin. If they have an action involving five minas
they study and strain to persuade ; but the one who is going to
spend a talent on evil pleasures because of vanity, and waste
himself as well as the talent, [him they do not try to persuade].

For they profess to make new statesmen, and useful to the J. 333, col.
state and their friends; in the same breath they defend their ' 1 •
art 'by saying that the art is not bad, but errors come from those
who use it badly, as if it were possible for men who fulfill the
ideal of usefulness to city and friends to use the power of
rhetoric unwisely.

Imagine a general planning the strategy of the battle of ^333. col.
Marathon. "You have visited Marathon?" some one asks.
"No." "You have a detailed description of the place?" "No."
"Then why do you try to plan strategy when you do not even
know if the place exists?" Such are the counsellors who seem
to be clever in cities.

[A rhetorician says] sometimes some wicked men use the art. I, 334, col.
But if they fulfil the ideal of being useful to city and friends, •
it is impossible for them to use it unwisely, nor can the unwise
and scoundrels and receivers of bribes be useful to city and
friends.

Discusses whether or not a rhetorician is a philosopher. ^.335: col.

XXI.

The rhetors never having served as generals are not thought l 3$6 col _
likely to conquer, so that some speak more distinctly than . . . XXIII.

334

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

If 336, col.
XXVII.

I, 337, col.
XXIX.
I. 337, col.
XXX.

I, 338, col.
XXXT,

cols.
XXXII-
XXXVI.
I, 340, col.
XXXVII.

I, 34i, col.
XXXVIII.

I, 341, col.
XL.

I, 342, col.
XT.l.

I, 343, col.
XLII.

I, 343, col.
XLIII.

I, 344, col.
XLIV.

I, 344, col.

XLV.

I, 345, col.

XLVI.

For we do not know of anyone very brilliant before Pericles
and Callistratus and Demosthenes, unless he calls impressiveness
brilliance.

We insult the gods as Oileus did.

We must see that none of the young lose their desire for
rhetoric.

. . . they do not profess to put justice into operation but
to 'be able to follow what anyone demands. Not only do the
rhetors not profess this but many, both of former generations
and the present, are not able though willing and conversant with
what is just and true.

(Nothing intelligible.)

. . . by making the science subject to rules of art, and
making similar concession to philosophy, not being able to help
himself otherwise . . .

If rhetoric produces bold, daring, shameless men, or teachings
which lead to these qualities, he can find no occasion for the art,
and is left in the lurch.

. . . says that shamelessness is an important aid to rhetoric ;
this remark was not ironical.

In his speech about judges he mentions the man who appeared
without pay for Aristippus, since he could not speak for him-
self ; to one who asked Aristippus what good Socrates had done
him he replied, "Enabled me to have such men appear in my
behalf as will please my fellow philosophers."

[Many who have composed such treatises] are outdone, not
only in action but in speech by laymen ; nothing is so persuasive
as truth and experience in affairs.

It appears to me that the most ignoble thing of all is to per-
suade the weakness of the crowd, and concoct some reason for
doing anything.

The philosophers though able [to do these things] order them
passed on to those who have toiled and danced, 1 to publicans and
sinners. If he had said not to yield but to claim their results
as our own . . .

Rhetoricians quarrel and philosophers are wicked.

It is [not] proven that the art of medicine does not produce
health when the physicians are outdone by laymen who have

1 Referring to Aeschines says Sudhaus in the index, s. v. xopefe.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

335

discovered some specific for disease. The rhetors of marked
ability are not often outdone in speaking by laymen, but are
frequently outdone in action.

It is not rhetors but Diogenes and his like who say that only ^^^ ol
the philosopher is a rhetor. For they have seen what is truly
advantageous to the state.

Demetrius of Phalerum made a distinction between the acts ^.^j^ 01 -
of the two Philos.

Also on the difference between an experienced rhetor and an inexperi-
enced political philosopher.

[Some] are deceived by Diogenes and others who speak in his ^47? col.
style; the rhetors do not lead men astray but persuade them
aright.

Someone collected instances of failure [in rhetoric] . coi^L
Speeches bolder than those of pathics, as Aristophanes says, t_ j 4 8,' C ol.
expressing it lewdly, as was his wont. Therefore cities often Li-
make serious errors when they listen to such advice.

The great ancient rhetors maintained their position by means I, 348, col.

of political intelligence.

„ . , !_«• I, cols.

On the proper preparation for public otlice. LIV.

Xenocrates says that the Athenians alone are able to be silent, I, 350, col.
and alone know how to speak. For it takes the same man to LV -
do both. Good heavens ! We must certainly believe that
Xenocrates spoke thus before Antipater as Demetrius of Phalerum
has recorded in his Tltpl p^ropiKrji. 2

The greatest of the practical statesmen, Pericles and Demos- 1,^350, col.
thenes for example, received assistance from philosophers ; and
to associate with Socrates was better for Alcibiades and Critias
than to study an art.

The [sciences] introduce no reasoning which is aimed to I, 351, col.
deceive, but all the principles of the rhetoricians are aimed
exclusively at that, and according to Heraclitus rhetoric is the
prince of liars. 3

2 This passage is discussed by Cronert in Kolotes und Menedemos, p.
671, comparing II, 173, fr. XII, and Papyr. ined. 453, fr. IV, also Plut,
Phoc. 27: ?TOTa \{yav &p£iltevov oi>x irroftevuv, d\\' avriKpoiav koX 5vin:o\ahwf
iwot-ntrev diroo-twTrijo-ai. Xenocrates' speech displeased Antipater, and he was
ordered to be silent, hence the taunt in this passage.

3 On the meaning of kottU v. Gomperz, Zeit. f. d. ost. Gym. XVII
(1866) p. 698.

336

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I, 352, col.
LVIII.

I, 352, col.
LIX.

I, 353, col.

I, 353, col.
LXI.

I, 354, col.
LXII.

I, 355, col.
LXIII.

I, 355, col.
LXIV.

I, 356, col.
LXV.

I, 357, col.
LXVI.

I, 357, col.
LXVII.

L 358, col.
LXVIII.

. . . that each one be confused and excited; wherefore
Aristophanes compares them to pathics.

... to one starting to write history he seems to offer the
history of an ignoble man. He roused not only Alexander, but
the comic poet who began it all by mentioning this attack on
rhetors.

. . . attacking unexpectedly and for the nonce adopting the
philosophic style, he presses the philosopher into a quandary.
But we shall put a damper on such arguments if we are com-
pelled by these people to answer them.

To say that there is no harm in knowing how to make the
worn appear new, and how to cut purses, but that one should
not use this power against men except when need arises, is the
same as saying that there is nothing . . .

The [sciences] introduce no reasoning which is aimed to
deceive, but all the principles of the rhetoricians are aimed
exclusively at that, and according to Heraclitus rhetoric is the
prince of liars. How is it possible to say anything apart from
showing that all their arguments tend toward that end?

• . . perhaps it gives some an occasion to deceive the
audience. But, some one objects, arms do not give occasion to
deceive. "We ought not, then," I shall say, "to claim that this
is the characteristic of all the principles of rhetoric, but of some."

Many things such as wealth, strength, beauty, offer an oppor-
tunity for wrong-doing, but are honored for the good they do.
and are called useful even by Diogenes.

How is it possible for the Stoics — not to mention all the phi-
losophers — to claim to be of this character, and to demonstrate
that some rhetors are not of this character?

[Rhetors are the cause of much trouble] as he charged that
rhetors were shown to be in Lacedaemon. I pass over the fact
that he could show that some with philosophical training have
been guilty as well as innocent of the same charges. They will
be able to show that rhetors have replaced tyrannies by democ-
racies, and performed similar good offices.

Nor if he says that at Athens rhetoric was a strong bulwark
against tyrants, where there were more rhetors than in the whole
world put together, can it be said truly that no democracy has
been replaced by a tyranny through the aid of a rhetor.

If Aeschines rebuked the Athenians because they did not treat

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

337

Demosthenes like the captain of a capsized ferryboat, but
refused to try him for capsizing Greece, they will say that
Diogenes is wrong in saying that the Athenians do not use the
same rhetors repeatedly.

They will try to show that the statements of Demosthenes and 1^359, col.
Lycurgus about the acts of Harpalus are false,- and to copy their
statements from the most trustworthy historians ; and they will
assert that he was insignificant and shameless.

If some cities have forbidden the entrance of rhetors, not to 1^35?, col.
mention receiving advice from them, yet others continually avail
themselves of their services. And not all rhetors are boastful.

But we have got more out of this than perhaps was fitting, I^Kta, col,
even if the book of Aristo is longwinded.

He says that one should not abstain wholly from rhetoric, I^6i, col.
only from excess in it, nor wholly from politics. And he says
that the rhetor should not pretend to be a pilot. His position is
that of a boatswain.

He says that the whole system depends on deceit; conse- I, 3 6i col.
quently a veracious person should avoid it. In reply I say that '
leaving out of the question sophistical rhetoric, even if I could
speak about it, and the Technae of Aristotle— and yet I could
show that others of his followers have written against him with
all the trickery of sophistical rhetoricians— the rhetoric of Pericles
and Callisthenes and Demosthenes ...

If he meant "probable conjecture" or "an approach to truth," ^^ol
he used the word tu6Ww to denote what could not be true. On
which subject, as the rhetors say, I am ashamed of not producing
a demonstration. _ ^ 3 6 3 , col.

Boldness and impudence are the offspring of rhetoric. LXXV.

At least rhetoric is the ability to persuade the people in assembly £^focol.
and forum.

Rhetoric provides the necessities of life ; by means of rhetoric Wjg^ci-
men become famous.

Inasmuch as they think the philosopher should enter public I, 364, col.
life, on the principle that politics is philosophy he claims that LX
rhetoric [is also philosophy].

Their remarks are not consonant with their opinions concern- [^s^ol.
ing political activity; these they abandon and support their
position by the other activities of philosophy. Tj ^ col>

Prudent jurors are rare. LXXX.

33«

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

I, 366, col.
LXXXII.

r, 367, col.

LXXXII I.

I, 367, col.
LXXXIV.

1. 368, col.
LXXXV.

I, 368, col.
LXXXVI.

I, 369, col.
LXXXVI T.

I, 370, col.
LXXXVI1I.

I, 370, col.
LXXXIX.

r, 371,
xc.

:ol.

[This must be used] in general if the practical rhetors con-
sider it opportune, but not immoderately; and in the eyes of
those who know he urges to avoid generally that kind of
pleasurable appeal in order to save exertion.

[Adapting oneself to the refutation for which they say they
have explained the details] the rhetor is able to praise and blame
Why should we not marvel at them? For they will not say
that the statesman [gets his power from experience] or if they
acknowledge this why do they not show that his experience
difters from that of the rhetors.

[How can he say that the statesman who] speaks about advan-
tage is master of others and the rhetorician master of none if
he is of the same character?* For he is acquainted with all 5
such forms of advantage as is the thoughtful statesman, and
with the popular ideas of honor and justice.

The largest part of this depends on natural ability; what
comes from study and instruction cannot be imparted "in the
brief portion of a day." Of a like nature are the remarks about
attention. And since the chief virtue of the narrative is clear-
ness, and the clearest narrator is the one who has studied most
rhetoric [cannot be of] immediate [use] to the rhetor.

The Wo-ret? 5t6 XTOI are common to all; of the moras hrrt X vm
probability, and sign, and necessary inference are not the
property of the rhetoricians, but the sign is peculiar to one who
has followed a particular calling; e . g. in diseases it is known
by the physician, in storms at sea by the captain etc. Probability
can be ascertained by one who has considered how

In regard to and ffiy, which move juries, the most impor-

tant part is to know how these emotions are aroused and allayed.
This alone, judging that it is none of their business, the rhetors
have not borrowed from Aristotle, though they have borrowed
everything else.

. . . like those who try to heal the sick by foolish means
not claiming to persuade all, since they do not add themselves or
lover or friend, for these they say are friendly.

... to a fitting character 6 which as a result of its peculiar

4 Punctuating the sentence ending, in 1. 8 as a question.
» Timor for TaKiT&r; or should we read woka-utOwl
'Reading ipiaip instead of oinar.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

339

nature is with a person for all the rest of his life, and does
not come "in the 'brief portion of a day."

. . . possible to say that he is going to make even the people I, 361, col.
understand him in a short time. We may wonder that if he
knows this, he did not likewise see that there is a difference
between the educated and uneducated in that a clearer statement
must be made to the latter.

Consequently, expecting to hear similar statements about other ^372, col.
forms of expression when he says that the mortis arexw such
as evidence, torture, are the common property of all, let us say
that the knowledge of these belongs to laymen, but their use
depends on opportunity, not on knowledge.

For just as the physician knows what is probable in disease. ^73^ col.
and the pilot knows what is probable in weather, so the rhetor
considers the course of political events, when something is going
to occur in the state, and from this knowledge he says he is
going to persuade the people.

The rhetor does not combine his proofs after the fashion of a I, 373, col.
dialectician or philosopher; for probably this would be dis- XCIV -
pleasing to the multitude.

If they 'bring means able to rid them of many troubles they I, 374, col. .
will have the philosopher in agreement with them. Making Xcv -
them such offers, those who give advice or plead before a court,
then express pity and anger. . . .

. . . with whom the majority wish to include the rhetor I, 374. col.

because of his cringing; for he says, "Let him persuade justly XCVI -

and wisely, let him divert their desires, calm their passions and

persuade them individually as friends."

Rhetors prefer to live in a democracy, the worst form of I, 375. col.

XCVTI.

government.

[A competent pilot] who did not know where or how or when I, 375, col.
to sail would be dangerous, fully as much so as the rhetor [who xcvln -
should try to sail a boat in a storm]. For he could not reason
about advantage and harm, as such, even if some one has
charmed him into thinking that power over all is teachable.

[If instead of this] he claims that rhetoric is an art because 1, 376, col.
the rhetor produces a certain effect on the emotions, then his IC -
shift is not honorable, because it is false that the rhetor pos-
sesses universal knowledge, since all poorer artists have wiser
men to judge them.

CII.

34° Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

col 37 C 14 is ' dIe t0 introduce tlle phrase "wiser men to judge them"

whom the rhetor was unwilling to serve, and toward whom his
faculty is useless. For he will introduce as a reply a similar
remark applying to the statesman who has experience in these
matters, alluding to the art which produced Themistocles and
Pericles.

I, 377, col. Potentates even more than democracies pity and almost admire
those whom they subdue if they possess the charm of these
virtues, e. g. Philip and Python, 7 Ptolemy and Demetrius of
Phalerum.

I, 378, col. In addition let it be said that the most powerful speech is that
with rigorous proof, i. e. with the characteristics of philosophy
rather than of rhetoric, since "most powerful" seems to mean
"most powerful in reference to some object."
^379, col. ... so that to exclude these [qualities] is to exclude politics,
and like rhetoric few things, and these decisive, have these
[qualities] .

I, 379, col. In regard to the third point let it be said that even if the
speech be very persuasive, if the possessor of this power does
not know how and whom and when to persuade, he is as useless
as if he were a rudder.

1^380, col. For even if Pericles easily persuaded the people to do what
was lawful, another would not in turn succeed in currying the
favor of the mob, and the populace would never endure
philosophy.

I, 381, col. For he says it is as if a runaway slave expelled the master of
CVI - the ship, and let it drift down stream . . . with the boldest

to serve as pilots and please the passengers.
CVIl' C0 '" Since he is like one who feigns grief for the loss of property

he never possessed, no one would pity him. But we know of

masters and pilots who have even been killed as well as banished

by fugitive slaves. 8

I, 382, col. ... by the statute laws not of philosophers but of rhetors.
CVIII. g ut w jj a{ sort Q £ philosophers does he mean? If we urge him

to indicate one of the political [philosophers] they cannot be

considered statesmen.

' Probably the pupil of Isocrates and orator of distinction who acted as
Philip's emissary to Athens in 343 B. C.
8 Runaway = rhetorician ; masters = philosophers.

The Rhetdrica of Philodemus. 34 1

. . they guided states aright, and the philosopher could ^382, col.
pot rule these.

. Philosophers are unable to help cities, nor have they ^3, col.
ever framed any laws with all their virtue.

Power of persuasion is not helpful but destroys the persuader P. 385.
himself with his city.

Fragmenta Incerta.

The fragmenta incerta do not contribute much of Philodemus' thought
that is new. I have deemed it worth while, however, to include a trans-
lation of the most important of them, as they contribute interesting bits
of information, and have been the occasion for some of the most brilliant
conjectures that Philodemus has brought forth.

a

(Nothing.) H, 168, fr. I.

According to the philosophers this ought to be known, but fr. II.
because of our ignorance, as they are always dinning in our ears,
it is impossible and inconsistent with life for everything to be
predestinate. . . . For the philosophers like to have their
joke and imagine a community of cities and friends and goods
and wives and children.

For one would not say with Anaxagoras that everything exists H 160, fr.
in everything, nor with the Chian Metrodorus 1 acknowledge that
he knew nothing, nor even that he knew nothing, nor with
Parmenides and Melissus that the universe is one, and because
perceptions are false. . . .

. . . exhorting to what is noble and of advantage . . .

11, lyO 1 , ir.

dissuading from what is shameful and harmful. IVa,
Philosophers have been found flattering their states. n I?Q

(Nothing.) fr'v"
For all these reasons, if they chance to be distinguished for ^ ' ^

any cause, one would not trust their statements; if through yil.

mistaken reasoning or under compulsion of a lover, they intrust

such matters to children, certainly Persaeus and Eudemus and

Lycon and the like. . . .

J In 1. 5, Wilamowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899) p. 636, restores M V rpS.s a
shortened form of Metrodorus, comparing Antiphanes p. 129, Meineke.
A Metrodorus of Chios is mentioned in Diogenes Laertius IX, 10, 58,
•£is tXeye fxr}B' aOrii tout eiSecat bri oiidkv oT5e.

342

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

fr. X.

II. I7i. ... it is an indication of fair speech; perchance that is

r ' ' the meaning of the wand or heralds staff. For he says, "golden,
with which he channeth the eyes of men whom he will, and
others sleeping he waketh." Wherefore Amphiaraus was one of
the seven leaders against Thebes, Nestor of those against Troy.
11^ 172, fr. A sophist at the games, catching sight of an idle rich youth,
said to his companions, "There is my treasure chest." In a
similar way, when Aeschines was an actor and a clerk he was
poor, but when he took up rhetoric he became a great entertainer,
and awfully rich.
(Nothing.)

fr. XI. Some philosophers openly advise community of wives and

children. 2

II, 173, fr. ... voted that he should speak among the first because of
his age and rhetorical experience. But Xenocrates addressed
Antipater in the same style that he was wont to use in a phi-
losophical discussion in the Academy, and Antipater rejected his
plea. 3

II, 174, fr. ... punishing those who misappropriate public funds or
xm - do some other wrong, opposing even potentates on the most

important matters,
fr. XIV. Philosophers teaching in a corner. 4

11^175, fr. A hare cannot be safe among dogs, according to Aristotle,
nor can one keep a surly and contemptuous attitude among men.
Philosophers always appear like this; therefore they are liable
to the attacks of sycophants and undesirable citizens.

fr. XVI- (Nothing.)

XVII. 13 '

II, 176, fr. I. If one should seize you and drag you to prison, claiming that
you are guilty, though you are innocent, you could not help
yourself, but would stand giddy and agape, not having a word
to say ; and though your accuser be a mean fellow and not good

z Cf. fr. II.

3 1 follow the restoration proposed by Cronert, Kolotes und Menedemos,
67; 1. 2 dia'p7i]cpio-cicr8ai. 1. 3, iv Trpuirois, 1. g, 5i«^]xEO"*ai Kai ro[iy, 10, X670C
7rpos ro\v ' AvrLTra[rpoi< U7re,0 tt}s ttoXcws ov 5e]£a/x<?[eou 5e dirorvx^f.

* Cf. Plato, Gorgias 486, Cic. De Orat. I, 13, 57, Fuhr. Rhein. Mus. LVII
(1902) p. 436.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

343

for much, you would die. 5 How is it wise if an art takes a
noble man and renders him worse.

We should not hate and banish the teacher — for he taught II, 177, fr.

with a proper object in view — but it is right to kill the one who II-
uses it improperly. Polus in the rest of his defense explains
about the art.

(Nothing.) fr. III.

fr. IV=fr.

y IV, II, 170.

Isocrates received from the Cyprian twenty talents, and from Yr. ll= f r

Timotheus the son of Conon he received ten more. 7 IX, II, 172,

(Nothing.) II> 179, fr.

Rhetoric alone makes laws. 8 f r | ni.

. They (rhetors) have been and are our counsellors in war and ^; T IV = fr -

XII, II, 173,

peace. fr V

A slave on being scourged informed against Anaxagoras, and II, 180, fr.

Cylon of Crotona had Pythagoras fined and banished, and xi^ H

burned his disciples in a body ; and Socrates . . . 174, fr. VII.

Therefore let us pass over this unless there are more sensible n, 180, fr. I.
comparisons to be made between philosophy and rhetoric. It is
the height of folly to maintain that rhetoric is the science of
choosing between what is advantageous and disadvantageous,
and of deciding questions of music and geometry.

(Nothing.) II, 181, fr.

He was still more ridiculous in adding comparisons between fj' In
rhetoric and philosophy.

Men persuade in a variety of ways ; by beauty, by music . . . n lg2

by appeal to the ear. fr. IV,'

Some of the sophists would not allow rhetoric to be called a fr y
condition productive of success ; and those who say they have
political ability. . . .

(Nothing.) fn VI

"Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 486A, B.

"Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 456D, 457B, 461B ff.

7 Cf. Fuhr in Rhein. Mus. LVII (1002) p. 430; Hubbell in Class. Phil.
XI (1916) p. 407.
8 Cf. Isocr., Antid. 253 ff.

This is part of a list of unfortunate philosophers compiled by some
rhetorician. Cf. Radermacher in Rhein. AIus. LVI (1901) p. 214.

34-1

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 182, fr. Therefore we must say that the rhetor is not a flatterer, and
VI1 ' rhetoric is not flattery; for the statesman was said to practice

what would help all the citizens. 10
fr. VIII. [Plato] showed that rhetoric produced pleasure, and shared

this quality with cookery and personal adornment, and showed

in addition that one produced something not noble, and another

something disgraceful. 11

e

II, 184, fr. (Nothing.)

]f n jy t pass ovel - the fact that they criticize Gorgias, and ask him to

submit to an examination on Greek usage, since all sciences
depend on words for their power. 12

fr. V. (Nothing.)

fr VI ... he knows what weaving and music and medicine deal

with, but inquires about rhetoric, because he does not know,
fr. VII. (Nothing.)
fr. VIII. Plato in the Gorgias. . . .

fr. IX-fr. (Nothing.)
XIV. 4

II, 187, fr. Sardanapallus . ... deeds in war. And yet some mythog-
II! raphers introduce stories about him. 13

II 188 fr. Themistocles" . . . that marvelous wall around the city as
HI- Sardanapallus surrounded Anchiale and Tarsus. For if they

pride themselves on this, every man would be a statesman.
fr T y One thing I do not think worthy of notice, that he considers

it not to be the task of a statesman to make a small city great.
fl . VI This grammarian having observed what has escaped notice

everywhere, has not failed to collect examples of cocks who

10 Cf . Plato, Gorg. 463A, 464B.

11 Cf. Plato, Gorg. 462C.
1= Cf . Plato, Gorg. 450D.

13 The phrase i)m<?w /"? which I have not translated refers to the
building of Anchiale and Tarsus in a single day; Arrian, Anab. II, 5, 4;
Strabo XIV, 5, 9, p. 672; Athen. XII, 530b quoted by Fuhr, Rhein. Mus.
LVII (1902), p. 429, and previously by Gomperz, Zeit. f. d. ost. Gymn.
XXIII (1872) p. 24.

14 eefucrro] kX&ks. He is also referred to in fr. IV infra ir6Xi>< Ik imkp&s:
iroirjo-ai ^eyaX-nv. The restoration was made independently by both Wil-
amowitz, Hermes XXXIV (1899) p. 636, and Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII
(1902) p. 429.

The Rhetorka of Philodemus.

345

lower the crest and look at the tail. Let us praise him because
he attends to the slanders of the opponents of Demosthenes who
did not receive a fifth of the votes, and does not attend to the
Athenians who disfranchised the accuser. 15

V

Beating his father or refusing him food or shelter. tj ^g, fr. I.

The prolepsis of rhetoric is less limited. , m

He did not make his investigation systematic, but either by n 190,
the lack of differentiation of the idea which he has subordinated fr - V.
to the names or . . .

They thought that most of the philosophical rhetors devote f r- yi.
their energy to this one part and the following part ; that those
who attack rhetoric insist that it is no art.

. . . art is the art of beautiful speech, by which they mean n fr L
persuasive speech; and the art was the art of beautiful speech,
so that speech came by nature, but beautiful speech by art.

How when they have come thus far, can they profess to teach n, 191, fr.
that few arts involve imitation ? HI-

To speak in any random way is the work of nature; to speak f,-_ jy_
beautifully is the work of: art. This seems true to me, and you
also hold the same opinion. ... All the so-called conjectural
arts . . .

One may accidentally speak beautifully now and then; but to jt

192,

attain this end frequently requires art. fr. V.

About the end of art, and whether it is theoretical or empirical. TT , _

,„ , . II, 192, fr. I.

(Nothing.) II, 193, fr.

Metrodorus teaches in regard to rhetoric that it does not arise ln

from a study of science.

(Nothing.)

fr. IV.

"Gomperz 1. c. p. 25 suggests that the anonymous author here quoted
had collected all derogatory passages in Aeschines, and that reference is
here made to Timarch. cap. 23, 25 (about cock fights). Wilamowitz 1. c.
reads Mvovras for xtttVovras quoting Phrynichus fr. 16 1. 5 lirrt/^ dXAcrwp
SovXov <*ts k\iv6.s wrephv.

10 This section is erroneously designated by Sudhaus as f.

346

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 194, Since this is so what do they mean by trusting to foreign . . . ,

fr ' V- or what has Anacharsis said on this subject? For we acknowl-

edge that rhetoric is of foreign extraction,
fr. VI, VII. (Nothing.)

Hypomnematicon.

For a statement of the relation of the Hypomnematicon to the Uepl
priTopLKTjs see the Introduction p. VII.

II, 196, fr. (Nothing.)

I'j {r No artist can perform the task of another artist ; a com-
n' 1 mander of cavalry cannot command a ship, etc.
f r . iv. • • . Theophrastus lived all his life in the privacy of phi-

losophy, ignorant of the affairs of kings. 1
II, 198, [Rhetoric is] the best assistant for all the villainy in this world.

it. VI-IX. (Nothing.)

It, 199, Advantage and disadvantage. . . . It is evident that we

fr - x - shall find that the argument amounts to this ; "The wise man

has knowledge of these and other things."
fr. XI. (Nothing.)
H, 200, fr. (Nothing.)

fr. XIII. Critolaus, it seems, taught strategy, the duties of kings, equi-

tation and navigation,
fr. XIV. (Nothing.)

II, 201 fr. If 'hey search for the mighty rhetors, surpassing all others,
XV. they are carried back to the time of Corax in whose day

Themistocles and Aristides flourished. The ability possessed by
Odysseus, Nestor, Solon, Themistocles and Pericles we do not
call rhetoric ; . . .
fr. XVI. (Nothing.)

fr XVII .... they happened to have conversed intelligently,

powerfully and nobly.

Coll. I-XXIV attack the Stoic doctrine that the philosopher is the only
orator. Passages are quoted from Diogenes of Babylon and refuted in
turn.

II 202 According to Diogenes there has never been a perfect states-

col. I. man, such as you 2 say they ought to be, not even Phocion whom

Demosthenes called the pruning knife of his speeches. 3

l Or, more probably 'of political affairs,' reading 7roXiTiic]fi» in 1. 8.
'Addressing the Stoics.

* Wilamowitz. Hermes, XXXIV (1899) p. 637, reads in line 26 <r<p[aylSa].
For the anecdote cf. Plutarch Phoc. 5, Dem. 10: Demosthenes said of
Phocion as he mounted the bema, i tS» ifiun kotU iMoraTai.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

347

The rhetor imagined by the Stoa has never existed, and will II, 203, col.
never exist.

After this he 4 makes the following incredible statement: "We 11,204, col.

Ill

see that statesmen like Cimon did not waste time or money on
such things, nor subject themselves to professors of such sub-
jects." How this can be true I do not see. For the noble rhetors
who have successfully held the preeminence in their states have
spent time and labor and endured hardships to gain their posi-
tions. One could instance Themistocles who walked in front
of the generals quarters at night, 5 and could not sleep for the
trophy of Miltiades ; or Pericles who in order to be a successful
statesman spent much time, and studied with the philosophers
of his generation; Demosthenes who was said to have studied
with Plato and Eubulides, and set up a cheval-glass, and
reproached himself because he slept until aroused by the sound
of artizans, and turned his lisping into correct speech; many
others might be mentioned who have toiled to become prominent.
However success in some lines requires a suitable length of time,
and expense and subjection to masters; others demand time
only; now all require time, and not all require expense or sub-
jection to masters — and one of these is politics.

. . . that Demades took those who wished to study with II, 207,
him to the true teacher, i. e. the people. co1 ' V-

As for saying that the rhetors spend all their time in examin-
ing and being examined, and serving what is bitter in the
character of mankind — we know that the distinguished rhetors
have brought others to examination and submitted to examina-
tions themselves, and such is the natural condition of political
life. But the philosophers also examine one another in order to
arrive at the truth.

If Diogenes said that no rhetor was ever systematic, 6 but n, 208, col.
acted strictly from a desire to please, distributing the public VI.
money in theoric funds, he speaks as one who has never inves-
tigated the lives of the rhetors. Some of them have been as he

* Diogenes — from whom the following quotations also are drawn.

5 Fuhr, Rhein. Mus. LVII (1902) p. 429, compares Cic. Tusc. IV. 19, 44,
noctu ambulabat in publico Themistocles, and restores, 1. 28, vOarup irpi
rod arpaTTjyiou.

' I. e. no rhetor ever followed a definite consistent course of conduct,
but simply strove to satisfy the momentary desires of the people.

348

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

describes, but the majority have given practical advice showing'
deep thought, and have acted with great boldness in opposition
to those who favored such distributions, and history will bear
us out.

After this he says, "The statesman ought to be able to fill
the offices in the state; the rhetor cannot do this, and is not
fitted for statesmanship."
II, 209, col. The term statesman, properly used, is not stretched to include
the general or admiral; similarly, one able to advise, and plead
causes receives his name from his possessing this particular form
of experience, even if he is not able to speak well. But if, as
oftentimes happens, one called a statesman in the narrow mean-
ing, knows how to be a general, or fill other offices, he will not
receive the power in this line, nor does the ability in this pro-
fession far removed from his own come to him as a result of
his political ability. 7
vhl"' C ° 1- (Diogenes speaks:) "The philosopher is not only a good
dialectician, grammarian, poet and orator, in short skilled in all
arts, but knows what is useful to cities, not Athens alone but
Lacedaemon. For in the philosophic state there is no law, but
the divine precepts of the philosophers and truth prevail. The
philosopher will lie general and admiral, treasurer and lax-col-
lector, and can fill all offices, since the statesman must have a
knowledge of all these matters."
II, 212, col. But if we must express our opinion about this, the successful
statesmen who have never studied the Stoic philosophy 8 seem
possessed of rhetorical ability; Pisistratus and Clisthenes were
orators, and Themistocles the greatest general of them all, and
Pericles who made Athens powerful and rich and famous, and
Pausanias who won the battle of Plataea, and Cimon who showed,
by his victories on land and sea how to increase the power of
the state, and Alcibiades who defeated the Peloponnesians, and
Timotheus the pupil of Isocrates. 9

7 The implication is that neither does rhetorical ability imply any military
ability, a denial of the claim of Isocrates for rhetoric; cf. De Pace 54,
Panath. 143.

8 1 should prefer to read at the beginning of col. IX, ttjk 2tu«cV
<t>i\oao<t>tati, and make this Philodemus' reply to the Stoic argument of the
preceding column.

9 TV60£oi 6 fiati-riTfy was suggested by Fuhr, Rheiu. Mus. LVII (1902)
P- 430.

IX

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

349

Some select the deliberative branch of rhetoric, others the II 213,
forensic, others that which pertains to experience in principles, co • ■
as is the case in medicine and other arts. Demosthenes and
Demades worked out the deliberative and forensic branches.

They ought not to judge Callistratus and Pericles and other II 215, col.
political rhetors by the technical treatises written by those who ' ' • 22 '
are also called rhetors.

"The Lacedaemonians," he says, "expelled rhetoric, and man- II 216., col.
aged all their affairs with the help of their natural ability in
speaking." In the first place one will not grant that the Lace-
daemonians managed all their affairs with the help of their
natural ability in speaking, nor were they successful ambassadors,
nor for this reason would one grant they did not study rhetoric,
but this is a careless remark of Diogenes. And if we grant that
they were successful ambassadors, how does this prove that
they did not study rhetoric?

"Nothing is more puerile than the speeches of the ambassadors II, 2^7, col.
trained in the rhetorical schools, who still keep up the ancient
pride in the Tyndaridae and Atridae. Rhetoric claims to be
able to persuade in diplomatic negotiations by speech, not by
power or bribes or dignities or anything else an ambassador
might possess." What if the Spartans possess natural aptitude
with which they persuade in diplomatic negotiations? Shall we
say that rhetoric is of no assistance to them in speaking as
ambassadors ?

If some who are not rhetors make good ambassadors, how II 218, col.
does that prove that the art of rhetoric is not the art of politics?

"Even the Athenians, though fond of rhetoric are tired of
periods, and those who savor of art and school rhetoric." It is
ridiculous to say that the Athenians are tired of this. Why are
they more tired now?

"But not all of them savored of art and school rhetoric,
Aristophon and Aeschines for example, and they did not use
loose sentence structure." 10

[Since] there are philosophers who are accustomed to talk n, 219, col.
nonsense— men like you and Critolaus— listen to [Zeno?] say- xv -
ing; "The experience of political rhetors which depends entirely
on opportunity, teaches one at one time to make a lengthy speech,

10 For XeXv^wtis Sudhaus made in the index mxi/^kus. Radermacher,
Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 356, suggests

35°

Harry M. Hubbett, Ph.D.,

II, 221, COl.

XVI.

II, 222, COl.

XVII.

II, 222, COl.

XVIII.

II, 224, COl.

XIX.

II, 225, col.
XX.

II, 226, col.
XXI.

at another to make a short discussion (or dialogue), and again
not to say anything." Therefore as he takes away from science
and experience what they especially have to give, when one
fails he himself is ridiculous." "Why! if they are able to
reconcile cities and make alliances they ought to be better able
to reconcile friends who have quarreled, or sundered families;
for the same experience will serve to unite two individuals as
well as multitudes ; just as the same skill is required to tune one
harp or many." How can they reconcile a wife to her husband,
as they persuade the multitude? Only a man who knew little
philosophy would think that the two tasks were the same.
(Nothing.)

Quite the contrary; Socrates knew how to reconcile indi-
viduals, but could not win the multitude for one man; 11 neither
could Antisthenes nor Zeno nor Cleanthes nor Chrysippus. If
he says that [the rhetor] will be able to stop quarrels and wars
between states, as the musician can tune one lyre to harmonize
with many, we should say that the rhetors do not aim at abolishing
war.

"Scarcely a single ambassador," he says, "has been of service
to his state."

He slanders the Greeks — thousands of whom have been use-
ful ambassadors, were prudent in their advice, were not the
cause of disaster, did not speak with an eye to gain, and were
not convicted of malfeasance in office.

"Why not one of them is recorded as having been a good
citizen . . ."

Not only many rhetors, but many private citizens as well have
become good political rhetors without philosophy.

"Many, you say, if not all are wretched, not one is upright,
kind, patriotic or distinguished by ordinary virtues, let alone the
higher ones." Yet given natural endowment and training it is
granted that one can become a political rhetor without philosophy.

"Not one," he says, "rhetorical . . .

. . . men may become great artists. Whence they say that
the rhetor cannot guide the state successfully without philosophy,
even if he has experience. Pericles, who, he said, was the most
endurable of the rhetors, studied under Anaxagoras and other

1 Is he thinking of Alcibiades?

The Rhetorica of Philodemus. 35 1

philosophers, 'but he never studied Stoicism, but principles con-
trary to these. According to Diogenes, only Stoicism makes
good citizens. 12

If we cannot call Pericles a tolerable citizen I do not know II, 227, col.

XXII

whom in the cities he called good.

One should not attend to the doctrines of the Stoics, but study II, 228, col.

■A a XXIII.
with good men.

Now that this subject is finished, perhaps some one will
say ...

. . . says that Demosthenes, Callistratus and Themistocles H, 229

r , . , VIII", fol.
and all the other rhetors were not statesmen. Alter this he Sg

says that the Epicureans make clever speeches on many sub- co1 - XXIV.
jects, and these are they who have experience in leading cities;
and he grants earnestness to the rulers of cities, and does not
class them with the wicked.

At the end of col. XXXI p. 230 is found a phrase which by comparison
with I, 122, 17 can be restored to read, "From a study of political affairs
we can discover what is of advantage to the multitude." In I, 122 this is
part of a quotation from Metrodorus' work attacking the views of Nausi-
phanes. Nausiphanes' doctrine recurs in col. XXXII "The best rhetors
are trained by a study of natural science," to which Philodemus (Metro-
dorus) replies: "It is foolish to say that natural scientists make the best
rhetors." The name Metrodorus occurs again in col. XXIII, 1. 20, coupled
with Epicurus. A part at least of coll. XXV-XXXI dealt with Nausi-
phanes' principles, and an idea of its contents may be gained from Book
VI, particularly vol. II, pp. 24 ff. What follows is fragmentary up to
p. 240.

Demosthenes, Lvcurgus and Demades are not classed as II. 231, col.

XXXII.

statesmen.

What is more violent than saving" that rhetoric promises II, 232, col.

XXXIII

nothing except the power of speaking. It is plainly false that
the power of speaking cannot include any of the other qualities
which it professes to include. . . . rhetoric is better designed
for the transaction of private than of public business.

Power of speech can be considered from different standpoints. II, 233, col.
When he mentions Themistocles and Pericles he means states- XX XIV.
men like Phocion ; if he named Isocrates and Matris he makes

12 On the relation of this theory to Cicero and Quintilian v. Rader-
macher, Rhein. Mus. LIV (1899) p. 290. Diogenes originated the idea of
the orator as being vir bonus dicendi peritus, and so starts a succession
which extends to Quintilian.

352

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 234, col.
XXXV.

II, 236, col.
XXXVI.
II, 237, col.
XXXVII.

II, 238, col.
XXXVIII.

II, 239, col.
XXXIX.

II. 241, col.
XL.

a partial error. For Themistocles and Pericles have always been
considered consummate rhetors. If Matris and his school are
called rhetors, as he said, he ought not to apply this term to the
political rhetors but to the other class, just as we would confine
the term rhetors to Demosthenes and Callistratus and others of
their class, who are said to have possessed political power, of
whom we spoke in another section.

Now changing our subject we shall show that the so-called
sophists seem to us to have more power in political rhetoric
than the theorists in politics. Now we have already treated in
a previous section the idea that sophistic or panegyric or what-
ever it may be called, by means of which some exercise the power
of speech in assembly and forum, may easily be called rhetoric.
That statement "He is a good rhetor" simply means that he is
experienced and skilled in speaking. For as we say "good
rhetor" we say "good artist" meaning "skillful" ; "good rhetor"
might also mean "morally good."

(Nothing.)

. . . of those who were statesmen and had acquired this
faculty, and of those who do not have it but succeed by dint of
experience, of these many are better in character, many are very
good, some have private virtues ; some who have studied phi-
losophy are justly considered more attractive than these.

In examining political matters he is not accurate, as we have
shown in the passages referring to his statements. And when
he considers rhetoric and the rhetor equivalent to politics and
the statesman, he is inaccurate.

We shall inquire whether rhetoric is politics, and if there is
a faculty which produces rhetors and statesmen; and again
whether politics is exactly equivalent to rhetoric ; and we shall
make a careful inquiry as to whether the art of rhetoric is also
the art of politics. We meet these questions as follows;
sophistical rhetoric does not include a study of politics, and it
is not political science; the rhetorical schools do not produce
the political faculty or statesmen prepared for practical speak-
ing and success in ecclesia and other public gatherings; and
rhetoric qua rhetoric is not politics, and the rhetor is not a
statesman and public speaker ; and by no means do we agree
with the statement made by some that rhetoric is politics; and
we deny that the rhetor is always a statesman, not even in the

The Rhctorica of Phiiodemus.

353

narrower sense of the word among the ancients by which every
one who spoke before the people was called a rhetor. Each of
these topics we shall try to explain more fully.

Now it is made clear by Epicurus in many passages in his book
Depi prjTopiK^'s written with reference to those who are able to
persuade, and by Metrodorus in the first book ITe/M 7ro«?par<m<
that by rhetor the masters of the Epicurean school 13 understand
a person possessing technical training who has political expe-
rience, and is able to discover what is of advantage to states.
But we are content with the passage quoted just above (i. e.
in the gap coll. XXV. -XXXI) against Nausiphanes, in which
to a certain extent the word is used in accordance with accepted
usage. For he divided the term rhetoric, and made it refer to H; 242, col.
panegyric, and to the faculty, "by which from experience and XLI.
investigation of political events one could perceive well what
is advantageous to the multitude." . . . the phrase "as such"
is added, and besides the phrase "there is no need of much
argument." . . . We shall prove that if by rhetor he con-
sidered one who has political experience, if he adds the sophist's
art to his equipment, it is plain from mere examination that
rhetoric possesses something over and above politics, and the
rhetor something over and above the statesman — namely effec-
tiveness of speech; he certainly possesses experience in politics.

According to Greek usage one does not call Demosthenes and II, 244, col.
Callistratus and the like statesmen more than rhetors, and in
that they are called rhetors they are called statesmen ; but those
who deliver epideictic orations and speeches more charming than
theirs are not called rhetors in the same sense that these are
called rhetors, or if they are so called it is because one speaks
after a common form of concept. Consequently why is it not
possible to call all rhetoric politics, in so far as it is rhetoric, and
to call the rhetor a statesman? Why not call a rhetor qua
rhetor a S^/Hjydpos. For the phase "in short he is a Sij/wjydpos"
means in so far as he is called S-^ydpos, and not differently from
the rhetor, in as much as the S^p/^ydpos is also called rhetor.
Therefore Metrodorus says that Callistratus and Demosthenes, n, 245, col.
in so far as they possessed rhetoric were S^p^ydpoi ; but in the first XLIII.

" By Tods tivSpas 1. 18 he means the great Epicurean authorities particu-
larly Epicurus, Hermarchus and Metrodorus.

354

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

book Ucpl noLrj/xoLToiv he appears to disagree saying-, "There is no
faculty and science of persuading the multitude."

The art of politics then is understood to be experimental
knowledge of constitutions and laws, and a knack which enables
one to accept the guidance of states. Rhetoric is considered to
include along with this the equipment and faculty for speaking.
Now whoever has this experience, but lacks effectiveness in
speaking, evidently possesses the political faculty and is a states-
man, but he cannot be a rhetor, because though they possess
experience in government and much greater knowledge of con-
stitutions and laws and revenues and other things which pertain
to the management of states, than the rhetors have, and actually
XLIV' C01 ' d ° govern their countries > many who possess this experience do
not possess the rhetorical faculty or such equipment as do those
who are properly called rhetors ; many in fact have no rhetorical
ability at all.

The rhetors on the other hand would not seem to anyone to
lack rhetoric, which is the proper possession of a rhetor. For
none of those called by common consent powerful and noble
rhetors can be found without political experience and faculty.
But it is not one of the attributes of sophistical rhetoric qua
rhetoric to be the art of politics, nor is the sophistical rhetor,
qua rhetor, a statesman; nor is the statesman qua statesman, a
rhetor, as is evident from what Epicurus says in his llepl p-qropu^
and Metrodorus in the first book Ucpl iroirjpdTwv, and Hermarchus
in an epistle to Theophides.

XLV 8 ' C01 ' N ° W ' f 6Very itS ° Wn pecuIiar field < we sha11 not ex P ect

navigation to produce geometricians and grammarians, nor is the

knowledge of these sciences an attribute of a sailor. Why should

we any more expect that statesmen or men prudent, courageous

and highminded should be produced by this rhetoric qua rhetoric,

and that such qualities are peculiar to rhetoric? For as we

certainly would not say that the majority of people possess these

qualities in so far as they possess the rhetorical faculty, but .that

they are good geometricians and grammarians, brave and just,

and philosophers in a greater rather than in a less degree than

those who possess the rhetorical faculty ; and that many who

II, 249, col. have the advantages of rhetoric plainly lack the abovementioned

XLVI. sciences ; in similar fashion, since many who not only have not

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

355

acquired the rhetorical faculty, but have not studied at all with
the sophists, nor have acquired a technical knowledge through
practical study with a rhetor, still speak powerfully in public,
and to use the term in its common meaning are artists and pos-
sess technical ability [whereas many from the schools can not
speak successfully]. . . . Many of those trained in sophistic
after the fashion of Isocrates have no political capacity or expe-
rience, and are unable to speak in public. If they ever attempt
it the audience die a-laughing; since this is true, as geometry
and grammar have no need of rhetoric, and it cannot produce
these sciences, so the art of politics is not the property of the
rhetorical sophist, and they do not produce statesmen.

Some one will say, "If because some are able without study
of rhetoric to speak ably, we separate statesmanship from rhetoric
on the ground that it is not peculiar to rhetoric, take away too
the panegyric style of rhetoric which the rhetoricians practice
both in writing and in the spoken word. . . . For many could
imitate this, though they have not studied with the sophists, but
merely because they are talented ; and without having the tech-
nical treatises composed in the schools, would imitate the work
of some sophist."

"Charm really helps in public speaking. Some who have II, 252, col.
acquired a rhythmical style from these schools have become j^ 111,
considerably more pleasing in public assemblies."

The same is probably true of studies in poetry and philosophy. II, 253, col.
Some would certainly be harmed by rhetoric; certainly many XLIX -
sacrifice their natural gifts and character, and what they learn
in the schools is not persuasive or successful with their audience.

Such is our discussion of the subjects mentioned. If anyone
reproaches us with poverty, we shall be content with what we
have, and shall not take up rhetoric to make money.

But when they say, as Anaximenes does, that people would n i 254, IIP,
not pay the rhetoricians for instruction unless they acquired ™ l J^*'
completely the power to speak in public they speak stupidly. For col. II, 1.
by this line of reasoning one could prove that soothsaying
and . . . are arts, and have greater right to be called arts
than philosophy because the professors of these arts receive
larger pay than the philosopher. It is senseless to compare
faculties in this way, nor does the fact that some pay money to

35 5 Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 256, col rhetors" prove that statesmen are produced by rhetoric. One
Ilia. must not think that we have mentioned this proof merely for

the sake of talking, but that it is true, and that those are mis-
taken who pay money to sophists. Epicurus says, "Whenever
they listen to their displays and panegyric speeches, and are be-
guiled because the speech is not about a contract nor public policy
as it is in assembly and court (for in these they pay close atten-
tion to the speaker, because they have something at stake in the
assembly, and they are bound by an oath if they are sitting on
the jury, whereas in the case of sophistical displays they care
nothing- for the oath, for they have not sworn to judge fairly
nor do they care whether what is said is advantageous to the
II, 257, col. state or not, for it is not a question of war and peace, such as
1Va they have to vote on at times ; and if the speech deals with war

or peace or some other subject discussed in assemblies, it does
not deal with a timely or pressing question, consequently they
listen to displays without any feeling of anxiety) whenever they
listen to such a speech they give no heed whether it is advan-
tageous or disadvantageous, or even true or false, but are be-
guiled by the sound and the periods, parisoses and antitheses and
homoioteleuta, and think that if they could talk like that they
would succeed in assembly and court, failing to recognize that
they would not endure anyone who spoke like that in assembly
II. 258, or court. That is why they spend money on sophists. Then im-
col. V s . mediately they recognize that they have lost their money, for
they get no result but hard feeling and worry; hard feeling
because they have been trained in rhetoric, and if their speech is
successful they are thought to mislead the jury; but if they fail
they think they have paid the sophist in vain ; they are anxious
about these very points, and still more how they will seem to
come off with the speech, or about not misleading the jury by
appearances. They have these troubles, and besides they have
II, 259, col. to attend carefully to conjunctions and cases, not abiding by their
VI a . own rules but by those of others. For these and other reasons

some study with the rhetoricians ; in some of these they are de-
ceived more than in others as we have stated above.

The rhetors among the sophists behave no better, not even
when they say that one can prove that their art produces states-

" Here pwwp apparently is equivalent to priTopatds or aotpusT-qi.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

357

men from' the fact that some of their pupils are able to plead
causes and conduct themselves properly before the assembly, in
the same way that one could prove that the art of grammar pro-
duces people able to read and write from the fact that those who
have attended the school can do this. Their argument works ^260, co1 -
against them rather than for them, since everybody who studies
the art of grammar learns to read and write, and no one learns
without studying. But many who study rhetoric cannot speak
in public, in fact this is true of the majority, and many who have
not studied can speak — they outnumber those who have studied.
Therefore we must agree that those who have studied and are
statesmen, are such not by virtue of acquiring the faculty which
the sophist professes to impart, but from other reasons. Such
would be remarkable natural ability for acquiring the rhetorical
faculty, and ardor in practicing in politics when once they have
shown themselves desirous of rhetorical instruction, and have II, 262, col.
filled themselves with political speeches which involve a con- VIII a .
siderable degree of imitation, and, last of all, a spirit of meddling,
which is the source of most political experience. There are
many other causes, consequently their statement is unsound.
And so, although there is such a connection between these
studies, nevertheless rhetors skilled in swaying the passions are
not produced by these studies any more than by such studies as
grammar and philosophy. It thus appears vain to claim that
these studies produce the political faculty ; just because some
statesmen come from these schools one cannot claim that rhetoric ^ ^
produces them. So much for that. IX>.

When they ask, who is a statesman if we cannot call the
rhetors statesmen, it is easy to answer, laymen, but they are not
the only ones or the majority, but the rhetors are the statesmen,
however these are not the panegyrical rhetors, but those who en-
gage in real contests ; also many are statesmen who are not
rhetors but possess the political faculty. But it is foolish and
senseless to inquire what this faculty is, to say that it is the
faculty which produces statesmen, and then to add that rhetoric
is the art of politics, and produces statesmen.

When they argue as follows : "It is the task of the statesman II, 265,
to govern the state, to advise, to have experience in embassies, co ' - ^ "
constitutions, decrees, etc.. and the rhetor understands all this."
grant that this can be proven, and let us allow for the sake of

358

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

argument that rhetors qua rhetors possess knowledge and ability
in these matters, yet it must be objected that some statesmen
who are not rhetors possess all these qualifications. If by
rhetors they mean those trained in the schools, we shall simply
laugh at them; if they mean the practical rhetors, they will not
find us opposing them. For they claim for themselves nothing
ridiculous.

When they say that it is ridiculous to separate the political
faculty from perfect rhetoric, for it is included in the concept
II, 266, col. of rhetoric, just as those skilled in the art of medicine possess
XIa - a knowledge of what is healthful and harmful, they are exceed-

ingly amusing. For how can that which is not acknowledged
to include politics be granted to include politics by preconception?
But the announced claims of rhetoric do not include this ; only
a confusion of thought includes this with rhetoric without
proving that it belongs to rhetoric. There is no need of fur-
ther argument in reply to the claim that states have been man-
aged by rhetors. For even if we grant that it has been done by
the political rhetors, qua statesmen, we shall not grant that it has
been done by the rhetoricians, and if by them, not qua rhetori-
cians. It is the same way with the claim that it is the rhetors, not
the philosophers, who have busied themselves with political af-
II, 267, col. fairs. They may use this argument against others, we grant
XIIa - that philosophy does not produce statesmen. Some babblers they

produce who use the same words that the statesmen use, but not
for that shall we grant that it produces the political faculty. If
we worked on this principle we should soon be granting every
thing which they profess to write about.

Now that we have finished this chapter, it remains for us to
discuss the question w ; hether the rhetor because of his rhetoric
would become a good statesman. As for the rhetor produced
by the schools, how could we say that qua rhetor he could become
a good statesman, seeing that qua rhetor he is not a statesman
II 268 col. at a " ^ ^ n re & ar d to the political rhetor we think the case stands
XIII a . thus: the phrase "good statesman" means either a capable and

experienced statesman, or one morally good. According to the
former interpretation, qua rhetor, we say that he is a good states-
man, just as we call the artistic flautist, qua flautist, an artistic
flautist, and so a good flautist. According to the second inter-
pretation we no longer say that the rhetor qua rhetor would be a

The Rhetorica of Philodemus. 359

good statesman. In the first place he is estimated according to
his experience in what is advantageous to the state, and m speak-
ing just as the physician is estimated according to his knowledge
of what is healthful and unhealthful. If he possesses this, no
matter what his character is, there is nothing to prevent his
be ng a rhetor. The same must be understood of one who is n.^ cdL
not a rhetor but a statesman. There would be objection if he
had to be good, qua rhetor. For the expression qua rhetor
means that in this he is a rhetor, and from the same condition
and no other can a rhetor arise; but it is plain to all that many
are capable rhetor, but bad morally. "Qua" is of this nature;
if it is added it cannot be removed. Since this is so, we do not
consider the political faculty by itself useful either to those who
possess it or to the states, but that it is often the cause of ir-
reparable dissensions in the sense that what gives tire impu se
is the cause If it is accompanied by uprightness of character
it often contributes great blessing to states, and sometimes
greater good to its possessors than to private citizens but often- II^i, •
times greater woe, as is proven by their lives. And if anyone
says that the good statesman ought to have many virtues, and
that states are saved not by rhetors qua statesmen, but by good
statesmen, he will be right. It would be well if the statesman
studied philosophy in order that he might be more actively good
and for this reason we say that philosophy if it were associated
generally with the political state of mind and in individual cases
made suggestions applicable to political management, would pro-
duce a wonderful improvement. He would be a good rhetor and
statesman who possessed kindness, uprightness and temperance
in his private life, education, wisdom which is the outgrowth of 11,272, col.
his natural ability, and combined with all these, astuteness.

Fragmenta Hypomnematici

(Nothing.) , , . . H. f 3.fr. I.

When mentioning such a statesman he says that he is expen- fr. II.
enced in what is helpful and harmful, and possesses all virtues,
and that the rhetors know none of these things, and do not claim
to know them, but possess simply boldness and garrulity. n ^ ir

... by this line of argument how could Lycurgus, Demos- in.

360

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 2 7S , fr.
IV.

fr. IX.

II, 275,
fr. X.

fr. XIII, fr,
XVII.
II, 278, fr.
XVIII.
fr. XIX.

fr. XX,
XXI.

II. 279, fr.
XXII.

fr. XXIII.

II, 279, fr. I.

II. 280, fr.
II.

fr. nr.

II, 281, fr.
IV.

fr. V— VII.
II. 282, fr.
IX.

fr. XI.

thenes and Hyperides be considered practical ? In the first place
not only was any appearance of order lacking in the speeches
which they delivered, but it did not appear even in their writings,
and it is plain that they did not avoid empty talk. Quite the
opposite ; if any have talked discreetly and powerfully. . . .

The public speakers say that the political art is nothing but
rhetoric. . . . Critolaus says that the art of politics demands
only time.

(Nothing.)

Anyone with common sense would say that the rhetors wrote
the laws, and that now states do not entrust lawmaking to

philosophers, but to rhetors If any philosopher ever

made any laws he must 'have been one of the old philosophers.
He certainly had no connection with the Peripatetics.

(Nothing.)

Sardanapallus (cf. ! 1 . 1 88 I .

Separate politics and rhetoric (cf. II, 66, col. X a ) .... there
is no use for it in politics ; for persuasion is not needed for
everything.

(Nothing.)

Many rhetors will be found who have performed proper and
righteous acts.
(Nothing.)

P

If he takes from rhetoric experience in what is advantageous
to the state, and assigns it to philosophy, let us not be vexed.
Yet to turn to something with which they agree .... that
the rhetors have need of a knowledge of character, and acquire
this from philosophy, which some said was to be acquired from
the sophists .... which Demosthenes. . . .

(With lrapmpiK€vai ras c-?n.0v/xias cf. II, 2/1, fr. I.)

. . . nevertheless as such he is better than the majority of
rhetors, by nature . . however one who is called a good artist
is not of this nature.

. . possessing one part of the science, but lacking the other.
"According to these, and those who speak as befits themselves,
rhetoric cannot produce men just and prudent."

(Nothing.)

Justice is not peculiar to a state, but belongs to any association.
But experience, speaking plainly testifies that they do not wear

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

361

out states by selling their interests. Now states have recog-
nized their ability, for the power of the state is increased under
their rule.

The first is false. What he has not learned himself how could fr- XII.
he teach another who has never studied the question of advan-
tage? How could one refrain from accepting bribes, and from
base gain and deceit?

7

The rhetor ought to be earnest. The perfect statesman is n, 283, fr. I.
acquainted with what is advantageous to the state.

(Nothing.) tr - 11

Demosthenes . . Aristodemus. 15 fr - nl -

— Diogenes seems to have seen this ; for all their attempts, fr. IV.
so to speak, are reducible to this one demonstration, that the
statesman always possesses all virtues. . . .

Thus they will try to say that rhetoric is the same as the art II, 284,
of politics, however it is not self sufficient for successful states- fn Vl
manship, but needs some assistance in calming the passions.

The huckster and the pilot ought to be vigorous and brave, fr. VI.
even if one adds "good." 16 He will be in still greater error,
and will run equal risk if he judges from the lives of those only
partly trained in philosophy who have lived wickedly, that
philosophy does not produce a happy life.

If it is advantageous and proper for the statesman to be just ^285, fr -
and brave, the statesman would wisely be just and brave and
prudent. Likewise he demonstrated a third point, as follows:
One cannot be a statesman, unless one is brave and just, and
ill the possession of all virtues.

The rhetors executed Socrates, by making most wicked ",^86, fr -
charges against him, as Plato says in the Apology —

(Nothing.) £ Ig-XL

Management of states in the hands of cobblers. x j Iju '

[Having shown] that rhetoric is not an art we shall f r . Xllb.

now try to present the common faults found in most speeches,
some of them perhaps in all. Our manner of refutation will be

15 Gellius, XI, 9, tells the story of Demosthenes receiving a bribe from
Miletus and boasting of it to Aristodemus.
15 Cf. II, 233.

3 62

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

II, 289, fr.
XHIa.
fr. XHIb.

1 1. 290. fr,
XIV.

II, 291, fr.
XV.

II. 291, fr.
XVI.

fr. XVII.

II, 292, fr.
XVIII.

II, 292, fr.
XIX'

fr. XX.

II, 293, fr.
XXI.

fr. XXII.

more methodical if we proceed from some principles in making
our divisions.

No philosopher is able to speak in public.

The rhetor ought to possess Hermes' wand "with which he
soothes the eyes of men whom he will, and others sleeping he
awakes," and the embroidered girdle of Aphrodite "in which
there is love," i. e. speech which is not without charm, which
is the peculiar product of rhetoric. And he ought to be ac-
quainted with constitutions, laws, edicts and customs, and in ad-
dition to this decisions reached in assembly and court.

Rhetoric has said nothing to us about freeing us from love
of glory, but rather increases it by praising its advantages, and
holding- (nit glory as a prize.

. . the aforesaid logographers and the comic poets of their
day, and the writers of biography. They demonstrate that these
men have been servants of their own states and of the rest of
Greece.

If the rhetor cannot guide his own household, consisting of
wife, children, slaves and free servants, how can he control the
greater ship, the state, consisting of more children and women?

(Nothing.)

It takes the same skill 17 to tune one lyre as to tune many in
unison, and the results are evident. Scarcely one of these is
recorded to have served his country well on an embassy, some
are convicted of malfeasance, and others, if they accomplish
anything, do not accomplish anything useful.

In order that some may not think that we pass over in silence
what has been written, matters of no importance or small points
savoring of Stoic toil, we shall present the arguments on both
sides.

(Nothing.)

He will say what is advantageous ; and will agree that what
is advantageous is good, and the same for private citizens and
communities ; contrariwise, what is harmful is evil. But only
philosophy possesses the knowledge of these subjects, and it
must be said that this is not productive of statesmanship.

(Nothing.)

" Cf. II, 221, 223.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus. 363

But one who cannot guide his own skiff successfully, would II, 294, fr.

not be able to pilot the triremes of the state. 18 XXIII.

(Nothing.) f r . XXIV.

When they write as if there were need of both we shall make II, 295, fr.

the proper reply when we think the explanations given by the XXV.
other worthy of fitting answer.

(Nothing.) fr IIL

Constitutions and laws and customs and the like. For it is II, 296, fr.
clear that some of them manage their states by means of their IV -
acquaintance with these things. Many are willing to depend on
mere sham, as will be evident when we come to that section. . . .

While they say that the political faculty is not the political fr. V.
art unless it is conjoined with philosophy, they do not deny that
there is need of philosophy, but you do not disprove that rhetoric
involves the political faculty. In another way they will not be
at a loss even according to Stoic principles to give a character-
istic answer.

Neither physician nor pilot nor painter is an artist, for they II, 297, fr.
have no proper (special) knowledge, nor do they possess the VI -
faculty, because often they do not attain their desires : the
pilot does not save but wrecks his ship, the painter does not
produce beautiful but ugly pictures.

Just as a physician can be good, and so can an architect and a fr. VII.
pilot, so a statesman can be good.

(Nothing.) fr. VIII.

€

Just as we speak of inexperience and ignorance in relation n, 29S,

to philosophy, so we speak of people as good in relation to tr - n -
character.

If he wishes to consider that statesmanship is not a part of fr. III.
philosophy, he will be right. We agree with him.

He says that philosophy does not produce artists. H. 2 99, fr.

As among the Gauls those unable to bear arms became trump- f^'vi.
eters, so those who cannot manage political affairs become
sophists, and blow their trumpets in the midst of crowd.

Pericles is said to have been the disciple of Anaxagoras. fr. VII.

(Nothing.) fr. VIII, IX.

18 Cf. II, 291, fr. XVI.

364

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

i

fr. ri-VII. (Nothing.)

II, 302, X 2 , "The Athenians though fond of oratory are offended by peri-

fr'lll. 70 ' °d s ' a "d those who savor of scholastic rhetoric." 19 There is
need of opportunity in diplomacy.

fr. V. Since every virtue, not that which existed in the time of the

heroes, but in the time of Pythagoras and men of earlier gen-
eration. . . .

fr. VI. (Nothing.)

Excursus.

The rise of teachers of the art of oratory in Greece marks the
beginning of a movement in Greek literature which is of the
highest importance in determining the course of Greek thought
for the succeeding centuries ; in fact through its influence on
Rome and those modern literatures which derive largely from
Rome it has shaped much of the thought and expression of the
modern world. The movement seemed destined from the very
first to be unusually significant. The enthusiasm with which the
new study was welcomed by the youth of Greece showed that
the sophists had accurately judged the. needs of their public,
'flu: importance of the new teaching is shown no less by the
violent opposition which it encountered. It was an unerring
instinct which led the enemy of Athenian democracy and Euri-
pidean tragedy to direct one of his most vigorous attacks against
the teaching" of the power of speech which was so intimately con-
nected with the other objects of his aversion. Aristophanes is
our sole extant example of a feeling which was general in the
latter part of the fifth century among conservative classes that
the teaching of the sophists was a detriment to the community.
Tricky and even lying speech there had always been, and would
always be, but it seemed incredibly monstrous that men should
undertake to train others in the art of deception.

At first the attack was couched in general terms, and was
aimed at the immorality of the new profession without attempt-
ing to analyze its principles or methods. But the growing skill
and subtlety in argument, and a more precise limiting of the
spheres of the professions by specialization gave to the con-

"Cf. II, 218.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

troversy a technical character which it was not soon to lose. It
is to Plato that we owe the origin of this as of so many other
lines of thought. In attempting to set off for himself the field
of "philosophy" he is led in the process of defining the limits
of his field to exclude rhetoric. In doing this he introduces a
new turn to the attack by denying that rhetoric is entitled to be
called a rexvrj. We may suppose that the sophists had referred
to their occupation as a ri\vq, in the broad use of the word
which is nearly equivalent to the English "occupation." Cer-
tainly their written works on rhetoric were styled i-exrai or
"systematic instructions." The tacit assumption in all this is
that speaking proceeds by certain rules and can be reduced to
a system in the same manner that stone cutting or carpentry can.
Plato, therefore, goes to the heart of the matter by declaring in
the Gorgias and Phaedrus that rhetoric is not rk X v^, but c/i7r«pia
or T P if3ij. He does not define "art" in the precise fashion of
his successors, but implies clearly enough that the prerequisites
for art are a knowledge of the nature of the "materials" —
whether animate or inanimate — treated by the art, and of prin-
ciples of action based on scientific acquaintance with cause and
effect 1 ; to this he adds that an art always aims to produce a
beneficial result. Tested by all of these principles rhetoric is
found wanting. At the same time he grants the possibility of a
true rhetoric which aims to produce justice in the souls of the
people. 2 In a sense Plato merely continues the old popular
prejudice against rhetoric as a pursuit detrimental to the best
interests of the community; but by introducing the question
whether rhetoric deserves to be called an art, he opened the way
for a controversy which extends through several centuries. It
is a controversy in which some of the philosophical schools are
at times found on the side of rhetoric, but in the main, the divi-
sion between philosophers and rhetoricians, initiated by Plato,
remains throughout the life of the philosophical schools. In all
its ramifications it is an interesting and ofttimes puzzling chapter
in the history of human thought, on which much has been written;
much more however waits on the discovery of a new papyrus, or
a new interpretation of an old fragment. It is my purpose in

1 Gorgias 501A.
'Gorgias S04D.

3 66

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

this excursus to discuss merely certain phases of that part of the
controversy which deals with the question whether rhetoric
deserves to be called an "art."

Aristotle's attitude toward the question of "art" admits of
some dispute. True in his extant work there is no doubt that
he regards rhetoric as an art ; in fact the Rhetorica is a scientific
treatise on rhetoric along the lines laid down by Plato ; it rests
on a study of psychology, and discusses the means of arousing
the emotions and convincing the intellect. It differs from Plato
in that it takes little account of the question whether the art is
beneficial; a natural difference since Plato regards rhetoric as
the art of persuasion ; one who professes to persuade his people
makes himself responsible for their welfare ; whereas Aristotle .
extends the field of the art only to include the discovery of the
persuasive elements in any case. So far the position of Aristotle
is plain. But in his lost dialogue, Gryllus, he attacked the right
of rhetoric to be called an "art." Quintilian, who is our authority
for the contents of the dialogue, suggests that it was a mere tour ■
de force, an attempt to maintain a paradox. 3 This seems some-
what improbable, and I should suggest three possible explana- j
tions of the inconsistency between the Gryllus and the Rhetorica.
i) The Gryllus may have been a dialogue in which both sides j
of the question were presented, with the conclusion that rhetoric j
is an "art." This seems hardly deducible from Quintilian's j
words, which imply that Aristotle's position in the Gryllus needed
to be harmonized with that of the Rhetorica. 2) The Gryllus J
may have been an attack on certain phases of the contemporary
teaching of rhetoric, certain perversions of the art, as Aristotle !
may have thought. Here again Quintilian's words might mean j
this, but are more naturally taken to mean that the attack was )
unqualified. 3) The Gryllus may be from the earlier period of \
Aristotle's teaching. We know that rhetoric was a relatively late
addition to the curriculum of the Lyceum, whether or not we
credit the story that he was driven to adopt it by the competition
of Isocrates. It may well be that in his early career, while still
under the influence of Plato, he wrote against rhetoric, and later
adopted the position which he holds in the Rhetorica.

■II, 17, 14; Aristotles, ut solet, quaerendi gratia quaedam suptilitatis !
suae argumenta excogitavit in Gryllo : sed idem et de arte rhetorica tris
libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum earn fatetur etc. I

The Rhetorica of Philodemus

3 6 7

The post-Aristotelian schools differed somewhat in their atti-
tude toward rhetoric. The Peripatetics followed the lead of
Aristotle until Critolaus broke with the tradition of the school,
and ranged himself with the Academics who had remained true
to the Platonic position. The Epicureans consistently opposed
rhetoric, with a slight inclination to favor the epideictic branch
with the honor of being an art. The Stoics from the very begin-
ning regarded rhetoric as an art, but with a Stoic reservation
which nullified much of their concession. The hundred and fifty
years following the death of Aristotle were, however, not pro-
ductive of much controversy on this point. The most influential
of the philosophical schools had included rhetoric as a part of
their philosophical system; men were more interested m the
novel tenets of new philosophical sects than in the rehearsal of
old controversies. But a more important reason for the lack of
conflict was the decline of the rhetorical schools. The effort ot
Isocrates to maintain rhetoric on a par with philosophy had been
in vain and the rhetoricians sank into mere declaimers, scarcely
deserving an attack. It is not until rhetoric begins to assume
once more its old vitality that the controversy begins again, this
time conducted with even more subtlety and much greater ani-
mosity. The period is the second century before our era; the
Rhetoric of Hermagoras is only one, though perhaps the most
influential one of many works which placed rhetoric once more
in a position to be considered a worthy successor of the phi-
losophy" of Isocrates. As soon as rhetoric raised its head once
more the philosophical schools opened fire. The old arguments
are furbished up, and the Platonic method of definition is pressed
to its limit. The dispute turns largely on the old question
whether rhetoric is to be regarded as an art. The addition which
two centuries of philosophy have made is that the definitions
of art are much more precise, and that the debate is very largely
a series of quibbles. Verbi enim controversia iam diu torquet
Graeculos homines contentionis cupidiores quam veritatis.

The history of this later stage must, be gained by piecing
together notices in many later authorities, of which there are
four of prime importance: the rhetorical fragments of Philo-
demus, particularly the first and second books; Cicero's De
Oratore, Quintilian's Institufcio Oratoria, and Sextus Empincus
IIpos gropes. The material here presented was discussed some

3 68

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

years ago by Olivier in his dissertation De Critolao Peripatetico,
and more systematically by Radermacher in the preface to Sud-
haus' Supplementum Philodemi. My excuse for a renewal of
the discussion must be found in the fact that Radermacher did
not take into account the notices in Cicero, and was thus led to
assign to Critolaus a share in the debate which is larger than he
seems to deserve. It is with the idea, therefore, of supplement-
ing the work of Radermacher rather than of joining issue with
him on his main thesis that I present the following pages. A
comparison of the arguments used by our four authorities will
reveal that they drew from common sources, some of which
can be identified, but most of which must be classed as part of a
store of commonplaces which were familiar to all educated people.
So well known was the general form of argument employed that
as Radermacher acutely observed, Lucian could base one of his
richest parodies — Hepl irapaaiTov — on the old lines of the discus-
sion whether rhetoric was an art.

At first sight the discussion appears more than unusually
futile. Of what account was it whether rhetoric was t^x^o
or Tpi{Sr)'l But the question was evidently felt to be of vital
importance, and we may not be far from wrong in assuming that
the bread and butter of many a philosopher and rhetorician was
at stake. So long as the rhetorician was a mere declaimer, there
was little danger that he would attract any considerable portion
of the student class. But the rejuvenated rhetoric of the last
days of the Roman republic claimed to be a complete education
in itself, supplanting philosophy, or at least reducing phi-
losophy to the position of a handmaid of rhetoric. To combat
the new rival philosophy put forth its utmost strength. The
question of "art" was of vital importance, for it was assumed
that only "arts" can be taught ; once it was proven that rhetoric
was not an art, it followed that the rhetoricians had nothing to
offer the prospective student. The situation offers some parallels
to certain educational questions much debated a few years ago,
and still, I believe, not entirely settled. It was once the fashion
to claim that certain studies offered exceptional "mental disci-
pline," or general training of the mind. Investigations in
psychology have tended to show that there is no "general"
discipline, but only special disciplines. Mathematics, for example,
does not increase the ability to study law, but only improves the

The Rhctorica of Philodemus.

369

mathematical faculty. This theory, whether correct or not, was
seized by the opponents of certain studies to claim that in the new
light of psychology these studies could no longer claim a place
in the curriculum. Substitute "mental discipline" for ri\v7j,
and many of the arguments of Philodemus have a remarkably
modern sound.

Those who denied that rhetoric was an art took two positions.
The milder group granted that there were some principles of
rhetoric which could be imparted from teacher to pupil, but
that they were the result of the teacher's observation and expe-
rience, and needed the supplement of the pupil's own observation,
and were thus subjective and individualistic, and did not possess
that generality which characterized the arts. This is the position
of Philodemus toward the forensic and deliberative branches of
rhetoric. 4 This is the view which Cicero puts in the mouth of
Antonius when he wishes to represent him as all but granting
that rhetoric is an art. 5 On the other hand the more severe critics
of the art termed it a xaKOTexna or perversion of art. 6

Philodemus and Quintilian have in common the well known
argument from design : the perfect product implies the existence
of the artist and the art. If a vase is evidently the product of an
art, much more must the sublime products of the orator be the
result of art. 7 There is no indication in either author of the
source from which they drew.

: *I, 40, 18 = Suppl. 21, 7. Some unnamed rhetorician is arguing that in
rhetoric there is a transmission of knowledge from teacher to pupil;
" ticrircp ifi fiovcTLKrj Kal y pap.p-ar lkt/ Trapadoaets riv&v eiuiv ayvoovpjvojv, outws Kal eiri
pi]TopiKijs : Kal ouk ip.i6odos r) ^e\eV»j yiverai." Philodemus replies, Tlapa&otreis
ay voovfie vwv hvvavrai rives eiecu, Kav p.r\ Kara riva rkxvr)V ivyLvuvrai, Kara de
iaroplav 7) iraparriprjau' rj riva roLovrov rpbirov.

'De Orat. II, 57, 232; Observatio quaedam est earum rerum quae in
dicendo valent. Cf. I, 23, 109; Sin autem ea quae observata sunt in usu
ac tractione dicendi, haec ab hominibus callidis ac peritis animadversa ac
notata, verbis definita, generibus illustrata, partibus distributa sunt — id
quod video potuisse fieri — , non intellego, quam ob rem non, si minus ilia
suptili dennitione, at hac volgari opinione ars esse videatur.

' Sextus Emp. 12, 49, and 68. It is ascribed by him to Critolaus and
Plato. The same expression was used by Epicurus teste Ammiano Marc.
30, 4-

'Quint. II, 17, 3; Philod. I, 44, 10 ff. = Suppl. 23, 5 ff. Quintilian
repeats the idea in summing up the arguments for rhetoric, II, 17, 42.

37°

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

An argument was based on the relatively late appearance of
formal treatises on rhetoric. There were orators, they said,
before Corax and Tisias, and better orators, too. The implica-
tion, carried out somewhat fully by Quintilian, is that if there
were orators without the so-called "artistic" training', men might
still become orators without studying with a rhetorician, or
reading any of the manuals of rhetoric. If a speech can be
produced without the "art," then the pretensions of the "art"
are false, there is no art. This appears in Quintilian and Philo-
demus, and is answered by both in the same way. I give the
passages in parallel columns.

Phil. I, 27, 6

Tlpo tov KaTafiXrjOrjvai Tas Terras
fHkruov epr/Topevov, i(j> ots Se <jvv-
ecrTrjcrav ^apov.

Tovtoj /j-ev yap Ta> Tpo7ra> /cat rrjv
TroajTiK-qv Kal Tr/v laTpiKyjv Kol
7roXAots oAAas ovk clvat T^vas
\tyu>ptv.

Quint. II, 17, 7

Deinde adiciunt illas verborum
cavillationes, nihil quod ex
arte fiat, ante art em fuisse;
atqui dixisse homines pro se et
in alios semper ; doctores artis
sero et circa Tisian et Coraca
primum repertos . . . aut
tollatur medicina . . . nec
fabrica sit ars . . . nec
musica.

Such must have been the original kernel of the argument, and
the regular reply of the rhetoricians. Philodemus, however,
almost obscures the reply by interpolating his favorite argument
that rhetoric is the product of natural ability plus experience,
hence one might expect the ancients to be better than the moderns.
For Philodemus is an enthusiastic laudator temporis acti.

An argument of similar nature is drawn from the fact that
there have been successful orators who have had no rhetorical
training. This occurs in Philodemus, Quintilian, Sextus, and
Cicero, with just enough suggestion as to its ultimate source
to make a puzzling problem. I give in parallel columns the
passages from Philodemus, Quintilian, and Sextus, reserving
Cicero for a separate discussion.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

37i

Quintilian

II, 17, 11
Quo illud quoque ex-
cluditur, quod dicunt,
non esse artis id,
quod faciat, qui non
didicerit: dicere au-
tem homines et qui
non didicerint. ad
cuius rei confirma-
tionem adferunt De-
maden remigem et
Aeschinen hypocriten
oratores fuisse.

Philodemus
II, 97, fr. VIII

2a<£ui; yap Ae'yet on
A yj p a S rj s ovk tpaOtv.
(05 8* avrais A t cr ^ Lv rj s
t/tol Kat irap' aAAtuv ^ St'
aiT(w ra pedoSiKa. r^s
prjTopiKrjq oiV aVAara to
ttA^os ovTaTrpotTKaprtprj-
o"€oj? re TroXXrj^ ov Seo'/Aem.
Toy p.£t> yap Arjpoo-&€v7]v
7rai'T£5 KCKpayaaiv ot Kar
avrov Ttyy'iTrpi Aval, Kat
KptTo'Aaos o£k d7rapve(Tat.

Sextus
Adv. Rhet. 16

EtVep re evSexirai ye-
veoSai prjTOpa py) ptra-
cr^dvra tt;s prrropiKTjs
ri^yq%, ovk av uij Tts
Ti-xyrj prjTopiKf). evSe'xerat
8e ye tKavws Kat Kara rov
rpoirov pyjropevetv pyj
peTao~)(6vTa p-qropiKTjS , u>s
Kat 7rept A rj /a a S o v ira-
pu\rj(f>apev. KtoiryjXaTyjs
yap an' wp-oAoyetxat apt-
0"ros yeyoj/eVat prjrayp, Kat
o-ijj' totjtw aAAot rrajXTrXyj-

0£tS. TOIVDV OVK €0~TI T()(Vrj

y) prjTOpiKi'j.

The similarity of thought is striking, and the employment of
Demades as an example 'by all three, and Aeschines by two of
our authors makes it almost certain that we are dealing with
material drawn from a common source. There are two possi-
bilities to be considered. Philodemus mentions Critolaus in the
sentence following the reference to Demades and Aeschines.
This sentence is to the effect that Critolaus did not deny that
Demosthenes was an artist. This seems to imply that Critolaus
did deny that some orators owed their success to art, and hence
it is a plausible conjecture that the preceding statement that
Demades and Aeschines were self taught is also part of the
argument of Critolaus.

The situation is somewhat similar in regard to the passage in
Sextus. Critolaus is not specifically mentioned as the author of
the argument, but he is mentioned shortly before (10) and
immediately after (20). This in itself is not sufficient ground
for supposing that the argument under discussion is also derived
from Critolaus, but the combination of the references in Philo-
demus and Sextus led Radermacher to infer that he was the
source from which they both drew. But the occurrence of the
name Critolaus in section 20 of Sextus does not lend as much

372

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

support to his view as appears at first sight, for Sextus adds the
names of two Academics, Clitomachus and Charmadas. The
case for Critolaus is thus to some extent weakened. If the
argument from juxtaposition means anything, the thought we are
considering might derive from Charmadas as well as from
Critolaus. And this possibility receives support from the pas-
sage in the De Oratore alluded to above. The passage is the
long speech of Antonius beginning at the eighteenth section of
the first book. He narrates a debate which he had heard at
Athens between the champions and opponents of rhetoric. The
incident may be true, or more likely, merely a fiction designed to
establish a personal connection between Cicero and Charmadas
from whose published works he is drawing the material for his
argument. 8 Cicero represents Charmadas as making the prin-
cipal attack on rhetoric. His argument that we are so consti-
tuted by nature as to be able to be orators without the assistance
of "art" was supported by examples of successful orators who
had never studied in the schools of rhetoric. The argument is
the same that appears in Sextus, Philodemus, and Quintilian;
the only point we miss is the reference to Demades and Aeschines.
I suspect that the lack is due to a definite purpose of Cicero's
in adapting his sources. Antonius is represented as one who
looks with mild contempt on the learning of the Greeks. Hence
the scornful nescio quo with which he dismisses Corax and
Tisias (91). It is in keeping with this assumed indifference that
he sums up the examples of Charmadas with innumcrabilis
quosdam. In place of these Greek examples he makes Charmadas
substitute a Roman example, Antonius himself. This is Cicero's
trick of working over his Greek source so that it appears as if
it were really composed for a Roman audience. This method
may be illustrated, and our conjecture on this passage supported
by comparing a passage in the long digression in the third book
of the De Oratore. Cicero is developing the thought that before
the rise of the Socratic schools the term philosophy was not
confined to abstract speculation, but covered the whole field of
intellectual activity, so that the oratorical power of a Pericles,

"This method is used more than once by Cicero; for other instances
see Hendrickson, Literary Sources in Cicero's Brutus and the Technique
of Citation in Dialogue. Amer. Journ. Phil. XXVII (1906.) p. 184.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

373

or the shrewd statesmanship of a Themistocles were as much
the products of "philosophy" as the mathematical subtleties of
Pythagoras. Cicero is drawing from a Greek source which
ultimately goes back to Isocrates. From this source he derives
a triad of Greeks who combined deep speculations with power
of speech. They are Lycurgus, Pittacus, Solon. (De Orat. Ill,
15, 56.) He parallels these by a list of Romans, Coruncanius,
Fabricius, Cato, Scipio, thus clothing the thought in Roman
dress. This same method he has followed in the passage in the
first book, by putting into the mouth of Charmadas a Roman
example, Antonius, instead of the Greek examples, Demades and
Aeschines which Charmadas really used.

Cicero thus distinctly points to Charmadas. as the source of
this thought; Sextus may be interpreted to favor either Char-
madas or Critolaus ; Philodemus is slightly in favor of Critolaus,
but not enough so to outweigh the definite statement of Cicero.
The possibility must be considered, however, that both Critolaus
and Charmadas may have used the same line of thought and the
same illustrations ; Quintilian implies that the kernel of the
thought "rhetoricen . . . observationem quandam esse, non
artem" is as old as Lysias, hence it would be common property
by the time of Critolaus and Charmadas. Moreover the rapid
rise of Demades from a common seaman to a position of political
leadership was well enough known to pass into a proverb. At
least this is the most probable origin of the expression, 'A™ Kmnp
iwl ffifw., From the oar to the rostrum, found in Apostolius III,
65. I am inclined to believe, however, that whatever may have
been the ultimate origin of the idea, the form in which it appears
is due to its use in an attack on rhetoric published by Charmadas.
It is quite likely that this was in dialogue form, and that the chief
persons were Critolaus, Diogenes, and Carneades, the master of
Charmadas. Such a debate would be highly natural, suggested
perhaps by their association on the embassy to Rome. More-
over the assumption of such a dialogue removes any difficulty
that may be felt in regard to the references to Critolaus in our
Greek authorities, which have given some color to the claim
that some work of his was the source of this argument. Cicero
refers to Charmadas, because he was known to be the author of
the dialogue, and the ideas might be assumed to be his also ;
Sextus and Philodemus mention Critolaus because these argu-

374

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

merits had been put into his mouth in the dialogue. It is possible,
also, that the quotations from Diogenes in the second book of
Philodemus come from the same work of Charmadas. The two
detailed accounts of the embassy are in Cicero, De Oratore II,
37, 155 ff., and Gellius VI, 14. Both deal with the rhetorical
aspect of the embassy, and discuss the three styles as exemplified
by the three philosophers. Cicero and Gellius evidently draw
from a common source, and a source which contained technical
discussions of style. This fits in with our hypothesis that
Charmadas used the philosophical embassy as a setting for the
presentation and discussion of current views on rhetoric.

After proceeding to a certain length in his discussion of this
question Quintilian attempts to confine himself to the most general
forms of argument ; the opponents of rhetoric, he says, are many,
Critolaus, Athenodorus, Agnon, Epicurus; their arguments are
numerous, but reducible to a few general lines of thought. At
the head of these arguments he puts the question of the sub-
ject matter, or "raw material" of rhetoric. In brief this is that
every art has some definite material with which it works ; the
carpenter works in wood, the smith in metals ; the orator, say
the critics, has nothing which is peculiarly his own ; if he dis-
cusses medicine he is invading the field already occupied by
another art ; if he discusses either politics or ethics he is met by
the claim that these belong to the philosopher. Quintilian dis-
misses the subject with a curt "quod esse falsum in sequentibus
probabo," a promise which he fulfills in the twenty first chapter.
He follows Cicero in holding that the field of rhetoric is all
subjects which at any time arise for discussion; not that the
orator is by virtue of his rhetorical training acquainted with the
subject matter of all arts, but that if he has to speak about music,
for example, he can acquire the necessary facts from the musician,
and present them in a form which will be more persuasive than
the crude statements of the unlettered musician. So much for
the main outlines of the thought. It is, as Quintilian says, a
commonplace of the rhetorical controversy; we have seen it
in Cicero from whom Quintilian derives his main arguments ;
it appears in Philodemus, quoted from an unnamed philosopher ;
II, I23, fr. VI. ^lojcre iracrav €TntTTi]fjLrjV ex £11 ' 'Slav v\-qv, ircpi rjv
<rTpt<t>tTai, tt)v Se prjToptKT/v €7r€t/jaTO SeiKvveLv ov$tp.iav s^ovu-av vkyjv.

In Sextus it is given one of those queer twists which were the

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

375

result of the intensity of controversy. From the very beginning
of the discussion there had been a division of opinion as to
whether words or things were the subject matter of rhetoric.
But the rise of the sceptical philosophy made it more advan-
tageous for the purposes of polemic to assume that rhetoric dealt
with words. Accordingly Sextus disregards all phases of the
question except this. He assumes that rhetoric deals with
words (48), and on the lines of the sceptical philosophy he proves
that as words are composed of syllables, and syllables do not
exist, therefore words do not exist, and as there can be no art
of a nonentity, there is no art of rhetoric. (Adv. Grammaticos,
p. 131 ff-)

In the collection of arguments which Philodemus has assembled
in his second book there is one which appears also in Sextus,
and which is confused by Quintilian with another similar but
different argument. In Philodemus it runs as follows : "In
other arts the rules are true, in rhetoric they are false"; to
which Philodemus replies that the same phenomenon occurs in
medicine or music which every one grants are arts ; and even in
philosophy men sometimes enunciate principles which prove to
be false, but that does not vitiate all philosophy. This passage
may be illustrated by comparison with Sextus 10-12, who gives
the reason why rhetoric cannot be an art if its rules are false.
He adopts the Stoic definition of art ; Ilacra toiW rix^v cvorijfta

iariv (K KaTaX-i)ij/(u>v <Tvyytyvp.va<Tp.(vm> kcll crrl t«'A.os cvxprjo-rov to flitu
Xa^/Jai/di/Tw rr/v avcupopdv (io). The second part of this definition,
that an art is useful, agrees in thought with Plato's requirements
given in the Gorgias 501B, and was recognized as fundamental
Academic doctrine (Sextus 43). Sextus continues to argue that
rhetoric is not an art because it is not a inirnjp « KaraXri\pi<iiv,
for there can be no perception of the false, but the rules of
rhetoric are false — >l>cv8rj Se ecrTi ra Xcyopcva t^5 fnjTopiKyjs dvai
0c<aprjimra. He then gives examples of the false rules ovtw
irapairacTTiav tous StKacrras xat dpyijv KivrfTiov r) tXtov koI /Aot^cu

O"UV7jy0pTf]T€0V 7j LipOUvXiO.

The other argument occurs in several places in Philodemus,

°I, 22, col. 111= Suppl. 12, 18; "kcltcl tAs AXXas rix^s tA SewpriiuiTi itjTiv
i\T)0ij, tpevSij Si Kara ri)v pi\ropt.K-r\v." Ati roOro oidi rr)v (piKoaotptav rix"V f-qriov
oihk r7]v iarpiKTjv kt\.

376

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

all in fragments of the second book. The sense of them all is
as follows : rhetoric aims at times to deceive ; but the rhetorician
is just as liable to be deceived as he is to deceive. A single
example will illustrate: II, 90 fr. XVIII, 1. 12 tt& <™ X ' ™v 1%

emdavpda-eL'i toioStoi' mdpx OVTa ! " amrSxriv ol p^ropes, Kal avrol

£rm airaTuxriv, awaTWrai, Sio-wcp ovS aAAws yiWat Iv bpa.au oho' OKOlW-
d yap aAXai <jvp.jiifiy)KCV rj diran/, Kal ai-ros dffaTaTal • ov paXXov TOtvvv

amTSxTiv ri dbruTwrai". For the answer to this argument cf. II,
88 fl". XVI. . . • «^X' <? ovp-PefiriKcv to bpav, ov^ h*Ka tovtov Kal
avrbi bpwrai • rb Si atn-6 koi iirl itjs aKorjs oi8' apa 8<A tov tow pr/Topat
a-rrarav Kal avrol awarwirrai. So much for the argument in Philo-
demus; it does not occur in Sextus, and appears in Quintilian
in combination with the preceding argument. This "contamina-
tion" will now require our attention.

Quintilian starts by quoting the first argument that no art rests
on false principles, because there can be no "perception" of
what is false. Section 18 is a close parallel to Sextus 10.

Quintilian II, 17, 18 Sextus 10

altera est calumnia nullam na<ra iww rexyi) owTijp-a eoriv

artem falsis adsentiri opinioni- « mra,V#ew — 17 iSe pV°P""i ovk

bus, quia constitui sine percep- vwrrriim « KaraXrjiptoiv, as

tione 10 non possit, quae semper vapaarqa-optv ■ ovk apa Io-tIv rj

vera sit ; rhetoricen adsentiri pV°P"°/- tS " W> fevSSiv ovk do-l

falsis, non esse igitur artem. KaTaXrpbu^, ipev&j 8e tori ra Xey6pa>a

T?}s [>rjToplKri<i thai d<Lwpr/paTa.

The proper sequence to this argument in Quintilian is a discus-
sion of the 6f.wp-tip.aTa or opiniones of rhetoric to prove that they
are true. This would be parallel to the claims of Sextus that
such principles as ootids opyr/v kivtjtIov (ii) are false. But
Quintilian replaces this by the reply to the argument which , we
found in Philodemus that rhetoric deceives and is therefore
deceived. His general reply is (19) ego rhetoricen nonnumquam
dicere falsa pro veris confitebor, sed non ideo in falsa quoque

10 Perceptio is the translation of KardX^tt as is shown by Quintilian's
translation of this definition later in the chapter, section 41 ; artem con-
stare ex perceptionibus consentientibus et coexercitatis ad finera utilem
vitae; and by Cicero's equation in De Fin. Ill, 5, 18. Rerura autem cog-
nitionem quae vel comprehensiones vel perceptiones, vel si haec verba aut
minus placent aut minus intelliguntur, KaraXr/^ets appellemus licet.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

377

esse opinione concedam, quia longe diversum est ipsi quid videri
et ut alii videatur efficere. This he supports by several examples :
Hannibal tricked Fabius into believing that the Carthaginians
were retreating, but he did not deceive himself ; Theopompus
put on his wife's clothing and passed his keepers without being
detected ; Cicero befogged the jury in the Cluentius case, but
he saw the truth clearly enough himself. These are all answers
to the claim that rhetoric is not an art because it deceives ; but
by a confusion arising from the use of falsa to represent the
Greek words ij/evSrj and aimruivTcu Quintilian has been led to com-
bine what were originally two separate arguments.

Quintilian cites and discusses several arguments which are
found in the De Oratore. The first two are closely related; (30)
nullam esse artem contrariam sibi, rhetoricen esse contrariam
sibi ; nullam artem destruere quod effecerit accidere hoc rhetorices
operi. Both of these are alluded to in passing by Antonius in
rejecting the claim that rhetoric is an art (II, 7, 30). The argu-
ment is utilized by Sextus (68) who reduces it to the question
whether rhetoric can decide between the true and the false; (71)

aKoXovOti to Kai ima-Ty/Ar/v avTr/v aXr/Ooiv T£ Kai <ji€v85>v yaw&u, tov

irpa.yixo.Tos fir/ ovtuis e^ovros. In none of these three discussions
is there any indication of the ultimate source of the argument.

Quintilian next quotes from Cicero the rest of section 30 of
the second book of the De Oratore in which Antonius adds to
the statements previously quoted the claim that an art must
depend on knowledge, whereas rhetoric is concerned wholly with
opinion. This claim is treated at greater length by Cicero in
the first book (I, 20, 92). Artem vero negabat esse ullam, nisi
quae cognitis penitusque perspectis et in unum exitum spec-
tantibus, et numquam fallentibus rebus contineretur. Haec
autem omnia quae tractarentur ab oratoribus dubia esse et incerta
etc. This is marked as a quotation from Charmadas. So far as
I know, no trace of this line of thought occurs in Philodemus
or Sextus.

Beginning' at section 22 Quintilian discusses two charges which
are closely related : I ) that rhetoric has no "g° a '" as a 'l true
arts have, and 2) that if it has a goal it seldom reaches it, whereas
an art should reach it always or in the majority of cases. We
have parallels to this in Philodemus in two small fragments of
the second book.

378

Harry M. HubbeU, Ph.D.,

II, 105. fr. XI, I, 4 Ilao-r/s Tptfirjs Kai TrapaTrjprja-eoii ert Si do-/a/o-{oi>5
i<TTiv Ti TtAos, i(f>' o navTa. to. f-eptj (Tvvvevuv o<£ei'A.ei, t^? Se prjTopiKrji oiSeV
«o-Tt tc'Ao?". This corresponds to the first argument in Quintilian.
The other fragment in Philodemus is evidently the second in a
series of quotations unfavorable to rhetoric, and inasmuch as it
is the counterpart of the second argument in Quintilian, it seems
reasonable to suppose that it belongs after the fragment just
quoted. It runs as follows: II, 125, fr. IX, Toiavr^s 8< rrjs

upturns d7roS«'£«jJS Trc<f>VKVia<; /3A«rtTai to SirjfiapTr}p.(vov r/Sy] Kai Trji
eKScxop-evrjs, kcl9' rjv tXtytro iratra ri^yr] Tvyxavuv ad tov ts'Xous 17 Kara to
irXuarav, rj Si pijTopiKrj p.r)SiTtpov yevovs p-eT^av ktX.

The same thought occurs in Sextus 13 — 15; in none of the
three places however is there any hint of the source from which
they come. The two illustrations which Quintilian uses to prove
that rhetoric deserves to be called an art are drawn from navi-
gation and medicine; the captain and physician as well as the
orator have a definite end in view; whether they attain or not
may depend on circumstances beyond their control, but they
nevertheless work "artistically" when they do all in their power
to attain the desired end. These illustrations occur again in
Philodemus, I, I9=Suppl. II, I 'Ei/iWe yap oiKoSd^ios oiKiav
Kara^i&iipii Kai £<uypd</>05 u-i'vaxa Kai vavv TrcpiTpmu Kvf}tpvrjTr)<; Kai i'aTpos

avdpaiwov anoKTuvei p.cdoSiKu)': ktX. The close parallelism of examples
suggests that they are replies to the same argument. Now the
passage just preceding this in Philodemus is too fragmentary
to prove anything. It is worth noting, however, that one of the
few distinct words, Karop6ovv, (I, 18, 28) might very well cor-
respond to Quintilian's praestabit (hunc finem) (23). I am
inclined to believe therefore that this passage in Philodemus
follows II, 125, and that the three fragments thus put together
form a complete parallel to Quintilian.

Sudhaus thought that Critolaus was the author of the argu-
ment which is answered in I, 19. He inferred this from Sextus
10 — 12. But Sextus refers there to Plato as well as Critolaus
as author of the argument which he discusses ; and furthermore
it is very doubtful if the thought of Sextus 10-12 is a proper
prelude to the answer given in Philodemus I, 19. Sextus argues
that rhetoric is not a system of "perceptions," that its principles
are false and deceptive. That does not seem to fit Philodemus'
answer so well as the following paragraph in Sextus: 13-15

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

379

«al firjv iircl iratra Tt^vi; tJtoi £<ttijko5 e^ei to Te'Ao; kcu iraytov, <us <£iAoo"0-
</>ui Ka! ypafipxLTLKri, r) tov As to 7roA.l) exo/Meiw, Kaddwep laTpiKT] tc Kal
KvflepvrjTtKy, Ser/o-a Kai t^v ptjTopLKyjv, uirtp eart tc'^vt;, to ertpov tovtwv

c-irayyc'AAto-^ai. If it be assumed that Philodemus is answering
this argument, as I think I have shown above is reasonably
probable, then there is no indication of the source, for Sextus
gives no hint of the anthorship of this particular form of the
argument.

Philodemus and Sextus supply us with the next argument.
It is stated like so many others in the form of a syllogism.
States do not expel those who practice arts ; some states, notably
Sparta and Crete, have banished rhetoricians, therefore rhetoric
is not an art. This appears in Philodemus four times, in each
case in a short and incomplete fragment. 11 But it is given at
considerable length in Sextus (20-26) who reveals the course
of the controversy. The argument originated with Critolaus,
and was adopted by the academics Clitomachus and Charmadas.
The rhetoricians countered by attacking the major premise;
cities do banish artists says Philodemus. "The Spartans put
the ban on perfumers and dyers ; and physicians, musicians and
even philosophers have been considered harmful enough to be
banished." Sextus attempts to answer this, but has difficulty
in making a plausible defence. It is not philosophy as a whole,
he says, which suffers indignity, but only certain sects ; for
example the Epicureans are banished because they teach
hedonism. But when he acknowdedges that Socrates was the
victim of popular judgment about the value of "arts," he
practically destroys his own case.

Sextus in section 51 advances the argument which is based on
the definition of rhetoric as iino-T-qp.-t] tov iv Xiyuv, a definition
formulated by Xenocrates and adopted by the Stoics (Sextus 6).
Every artist can speak well, he says, about his own art, but this
speaking does not make him a rhetorician. The argument is an
old one ; it is hinted at in the Gorgias, but not fully developed.
Just what was the history of the argument till the time of Philo-
demus we can only conjecture, for none of our authors mention

U I, 14, fr. V; I, 16, fr. IX; II, 65, fr. II; II, 100, fr. Ill; it occurs
also in Quintilian II, 16, 4 in connection with the discussion of the useful-
ness of rhetoric, but without reference to its bearing on the controversy
over rixv<\-

3 8o

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.,

a source. At some time, however, the principle has been illus-
trated by the speech of Philo the architect on the arsenal at
Athens. We know from several sources that this was erected
during the administration of Lycurgus and that the speech
referred to was in the matter of accounting for the work. Philo-
demus seizes this instance of a man apparently without rhetorical
training who was capable of making a creditable speech on his
special line of work, and uses it to back his claim that rhetorical
training is not necessary for effective speaking. 12 Philodemus
is quoting from an author whom he refers to as oStos aires,
who had introduced into his work this speech of Philo. Who
this was we are not told, but as he states in another passage
(I, 346, Col. XLVIII, 1) that Demetrius of Phalerum discussed
a Philo in his treatise on rhetoric, it may be that he was the first
to use Philo as an illustration. The turn which Philodemus
gives to the argument must, however, be due to some philosopher
unfriendly to rhetoric, and it can hardly be original with Philo-
demus, because the use of Philo the architect as an argument
against the necessity of a knowledge of rhetoric was known to
Cicero. 13 Now it is hardly to be maintained that Cicero was
answering Philodemus ; the case is rather that Philo had become
a stock illustration to use when attacking the claims of rhetoric.

The definition of rhetoric as the power of persuasion which
Plato ascribes to Gorgias contained an ambiguity which gave
an opportunity for reply. Other things, the opponents said,
persuade, — wealth, beauty, reputation. Hence rhetoric cannot
be an art, for an art has an exclusive field (v. Philodemus I,
19, 12 = Suppl. 11, 7). Phryne whose beauty did more to win
her case than the pleading of Hyperides, became a stock illustra-
tion for this phase of the controversy. She is cited by Philo-
demus, Sextus and Quintilian, 14 who give the natural and normal

12 I, 192, 15. 0)5 /j.ijv dXXa toi)s [>r)T0pas ei KtxTopBovv rofc pijTopacoTi eXeyev,
wpbs rbv diah€KTiKbi>, eXeyev, 06 rbv eXeyxov iroiodp.ev, 6 tV %<pri Trpovbe'foe&Bai ryjs
'pr/TopiKris, t) irpbs rot)$ aXXovs iren-ai5cvfj.evov5, /xaXXov 5e Kai rex^Tas SXais, oi t&
rotaura Kai irXeiy toutwv kv rots idiots (pvX&TTf.trdat p.av66.vQWLi>, cos Kal QlXuva rbv
apxiriKTOva irepi ttjs <TKevodrr)Krjs obros aiVros tio-tiyaysv Si]/j.^yopovvTa.

" De Orat. I, 14, 62; Neque enim si Philonem ilium architectum, qui
Atheniensibus armamentarium fecit constat perdiserte populo rationem
operis sui reddidisse, existimandum est architecti potius artificio disertum
quam oratoris fuisse.

11 Philod. I, 20, 4; Quint. II, 15, 6-9; Sextus, 4.

The Rhetorica of Philodemus.

381

answer that it is not persuasion but persuasion by speech which
is the end of rhetoric. In the absence of any indication of origin,
we must regard Phryne with Philo as part of the common store
of illustrations.

Philodemus quotes several arguments which appear in none
of our other authors. They are of little interest or importance;
none of them can be traced to a source, and they can best be
classed with that mass of arguments which Quintilian assigns
without distinction to Critolaus, Athenodorus and the other
philosophic opponents of rhetoric. 15

Both Quintilian and Philodemus devote sections of their dis-
cussion to proofs that rhetoric is an art. In a way this division
of the discussion into refutation and confirmation is artificial,
for most of the arguments in favor of rhetoric have been
exhausted in replying to the attacks of its enemies. In fact it
is hardly conceivable that any rhetorician was ever concerned
to prove that he possessed an art until the philosophers began
to question his position. Consequently all the pleas for rhetoric
are colored more or less by the criticisms of it. For example
Quintilian undertakes to show that rhetoric conforms to all
definitions of art. It has "method," it is based on a body of
perceptions applied to the attainment of a useful end, it involves
investigation and practice. But all these definitions were formu-
lated for controversial purposes if not for the express purpose
of excluding rhetoric. It has been shown how Sextus employed
the Stoic definition to refute the claims of rhetoric, and the same
argument has undoubtedly been used before.

Philodemus carries the debate one step further than Quintilian,
for while the latter aims to prove that rhetoric is an art, Philo-
demus is equally interested in refuting arguments pro and con;
for his position is that all theories of rhetoric whether advanced
by rhetorician or philosopher are false except those proposed by
his group in the Epicurean sect. There is one line of thought
which perhaps deserves more than cursory attention, as its
course can be traced with some distinctness. That is the relation
of rhetoric to dialectic. Aristotle had said that rhetoric was the
counterpart of dialectic, and made the grouping, cnAAoyioyxos iv-
Qvixrifw., eTraywy?; -n-apdStiy^a. The same idea underlies Zeno's

"They are Suppl. 12, 6; 13, 5; 13, 21 ; 14, 10; II, 83, fr. VII.

3 82

Harry M. Hubbell, Ph.D.

example; closing his fist and then opening it he said the first
was dialectic, the second, rhetoric (Sextus, 7; Orator, 32, 113,
and elsewhere). Quintilian, however, seems to have been the
first to revert to the argument from the similarity of the two
subjects, that if dialectic is an art, as all acknowledge, then
rhetoric must be also.

In following the course of the debate as exhibited in our
principal authorities, we have come upon a few names such as
Critolaus, Charmadas, who can be safely designated as the
originators of certain phases of the argument. More arguments
are assigned to less definite sources, Academics, Stoics, Peri-
patetics, without any designation of . persons. And still a larger
share while common to several of our authors are entirely
anonymous. The reason is as I have intimated before, that the
chief points in the controversy were developed very early, and
became commonplaces of literary discussion everywhere; the
only room for originality was in varying the expression and
illustration of the arguments, and as we have seen in the case
of Phryne and Philo, these, too, soon became stereotyped.